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PREFACE 
(An Introduction to Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Logic, Neutrosophic 
Set, and Neutrosophic Probability and Statistics) 
 
Florentin Smarandache 
Department of Mathematics 
University of New Mexico 
Gallup, NM 87301, USA 
 
0.1 Introduction to Non-Standard Analysis. 
       In 1960s Abraham Robinson has developed the non-standard analysis, a formalization of 
analysis and a branch of mathematical logic, that rigorously defines the infinitesimals. 
Informally, an infinitesimal is an infinitely small number.  Formally, x is said to be 
infinitesimal if and only if for all positive integers n one has xxx < 1/n.  Let &>0 be a such 
infinitesimal number.  The hyper-real number set is an extension of the real number set, which 
includes classes of infinite numbers and classes of infinitesimal numbers.  Let’s consider the 
non-standard finite numbers 1+ = 1+&, where “1” is its standard part and “&” its non-standard 
part, and –0 = 0-&, where “0” is its standard part and “&” its non-standard part.   
Then, we call ]-0, 1+[ a non-standard unit interval.  Obviously, 0 and 1, and analogously non-
standard numbers infinitely small but less than 0 or infinitely small but greater than 1, belong to 
the non-standard unit interval.  Actually, by “-a” one signifies a monad, i.e. a set of hyper-real 
numbers in non-standard analysis: 
      .(-a)= {a-x: x%‘*, x is infinitesimal}, 
and similarly “b+” is a monad: 
      .(b+)= {b+x: x%‘*, x is infinitesimal}. 
Generally, the left and right borders of a non-standard interval ]-0, 1+[ are vague, imprecise, 
themselves being non-standard (sub)sets .(-a) and .(b+) as defined above.  
Combining the two before mentioned definitions one gets, what we would call,  
a binad of  “-c+”: 
.(-c+)= {c-x: x%‘*, x is infinitesimal} 4 {c+x: x%‘*, x is infinitesimal}, which is a collection of 
open punctured neighborhoods (balls) of c.  
Of course, –a < a and b+ > b.  No order between –c+ and c. 
Addition of non-standard finite numbers with themselves or  with real numbers: 
-a + b    = -(a + b) 
 a + b+  = (a + b)+ 
-a + b+  = -(a + b)+ 
-a + -b  = -(a + b)  (the left monads absorb themselves) 
 a+ + b+ = (a + b)+  (analogously, the right monads absorb themselves) 
Similarly for subtraction, multiplication, division, roots, and powers of non-standard finite 
numbers with themselves or  with real numbers. 
By extension let inf ]-0, 1+[ = -a and sup ]-0, 1+[ = b+. 
 
0.2  Definition of Neutrosophic Components. 
Let T, I, F be standard or non-standard real subsets of ]-0, 1+[,   
  
with sup T = t_sup, inf T = t_inf, 
            sup  I = i_sup, inf I  = i_inf, 
            sup F = f_sup, inf F = f_inf, 
and      n_sup = t_sup+i_sup+f_sup,  
            n_inf  = t_inf+i_inf+f_inf. 
 
The sets T, I, F are not necessarily intervals, but may be any real sub-unitary subsets:  
discrete or continuous; single-element, finite, or (countably or uncountably) infinite; union 
or intersection of various subsets; etc. 
They may also overlap.  The real subsets could represent the relative errors in determining t, 
i, f (in the case when the subsets T, I, F are reduced to points). 
Statically T, I, F are subsets. 
 
But dynamically, looking therefore from another perspective, the components T, I, F are 
at each instance dependant on many parameters, and therefore they can be considered 
set-valued vector functions or even operators.  The parameters can be: time, space, etc. 
(some of them are hidden/unknown parameters): T(t, s, …), I(t, s, …), F(t, s, …), where 
t=time, s=space, etc., that's why the neutrosophic logic can be used in quantum physics.  
The Dynamic Neutrosophic Calculus can be used in psychology. 
Neutrosophics try to reflect the dynamics of things and ideas. 
See an example: 
 
The proposition "Tomorrow it will be raining" does not mean a fixed-valued components 
structure; this proposition may be say 40% true, 50% indeterminate, and 45% false at 
time t1; but at time t2 may change at 50% true, 49% indeterminate, and 30% false 
(according with new evidences, sources, etc.); and tomorrow at say time t145 the same 
proposition may be 100%, 0% indeterminate, and 0% false (if tomorrow it will indeed 
rain).  This is the dynamics: the truth value changes from a time to another time. 
In other examples: 
In other examples: the truth value of a proposition may change from a place to another 
place, for example: the proposition “It is raining” is 0% true, 0% indeterminate, and 
100% false in Albuquerque (New Mexico), but moving to Las Cruces (New Mexico) the 
truth value changes and it may be (1, 0, 0).  
Also, the truth value depends/changes with respect to the observer (subjectivity is another 
parameter of the functions/operators T, I, F).  For example: “John is smart” can be (.35, 
.67, .60) according to his boss, but (.80, .25, .10) according to himself, or (.50, .20, .30) 
according to his secretary, etc. 
 
In the this book T, I, F, called neutrosophic components, will represent the truth value, 
indeterminacy value, and falsehood value respectively referring to neutrosophy, 
neutrosophic logic, neutrosophic set, neutrosophic probability, neutrosophic statistics.     
 
This representation is closer to the human mind reasoning.  It characterizes/catches the 
imprecision of knowledge or linguistic inexactitude received by various observers (that’s 
why T, I, F are subsets - not necessarily single-elements), uncertainty due to incomplete 
knowledge or acquisition errors or stochasticity (that’s why the subset I exists), and 
  
vagueness due to lack of clear contours or limits (that’s why T, I, F are subsets and I exists; 
in particular for the appurtenance to the neutrosophic sets). 
One has to specify the superior (x_sup) and inferior (x_inf) limits of the subsets because 
in many problems arises the necessity to compute them. 
 
0.3. Operations with Sets. 
Let S1 and S2 be two (unidimensional) real standard or non-standard subsets, then one 
defines: 
 
Addition of Sets: 
S1/S2 = {xxx=s1+s2, where s1cS1 and s2cS2},            
with inf S1/S2 = inf S1 + inf S2, sup S1/S2 = sup S1 + sup S2; 
and, as some particular cases, we have 
{a}/S2  = {xxx=a+s2, where s2cS2} 
with inf {a}/S2 = a + inf S2, sup {a}/S2 = a + sup S2. 
 
Subtraction of Sets: 
S10S2 = {xxx=s1-s2, where s1cS1 and s2cS2}. 
For real positive subsets (most of the cases will fall in this range) one gets        
inf S10S2 = inf S1 - sup S2, sup S10S2 = sup S1 - inf S2; 
and, as some particular cases, we have 
{a}0S2  = {xxx=a-s2, where s2cS2}, 
with inf {a}0S2 = a - sup S2, sup {a}0S2 = a - inf S2; 
also {1+}0S2  = {xxx=1+-s2, where s2cS2}, 
with inf {1+}0S2 = 1+ - sup S2, sup {1+}0S2 = 100 - inf S2. 
 
Multiplication of Sets: 
S1?S2 = {xxx=s1$s2, where s1cS1 and s2cS2}. 
For real positive subsets (most of the cases will fall in this range) one gets  
inf S1?S2 = inf S1 $ inf S2, sup S1?S2 = sup S1 $ sup S2; 
and, as some particular cases, we have 
{a}?S2  = {xxx=a$s2, where s2cS2}, 
with inf {a}?S2 = a * inf S2, sup {a}?S2 = a $ sup S2; 
also {1+}?S2  = {xxx=1$s2, where s2cS2}, 
with inf {1+}?S2 = 1+ $ inf S2, sup {1+}?S2 = 1+ $ sup S2. 
 
Division of a Set by a Number: 
Let k c‘*, then S12k = {xxx=s1/k, where s1cS1}. 
 
 
1. NEUTROSOPHY: 
 
1.1  Definition: 
Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature, and scope 
of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra.  
  
It is the base of neutrosophic logic, a multiple value logic that generalizes the fuzzy logic 
and deals with paradoxes, contradictions, antitheses, antinomies. 
1.2  Characteristics of this mode of thinking: 
- proposes new philosophical theses, principles, laws, methods, formulas, movements; 
- reveals that world is full of indeterminacy; 
- interprets the uninterpretable; 
- regards, from many different angles, old concepts, systems: 
showing that an idea, which is true in a given referential system, may be false in another 
one, and vice versa; 
- attempts to make peace in the war of ideas,  
and to make war in the peaceful ideas; 
- measures the stability of unstable systems,  
and instability of stable systems. 
Let's note by <A> an idea, or proposition, theory, event, concept, entity, by <Non-A> 
what is not <A>, and by <Anti-A> the opposite of <A>.  Also, <Neut-A> means what is 
neither <A> nor <Anti-A>, i.e. neutrality in between the two extremes.  And <A'> a 
version of <A>. 
     <Non-A> is different from <Anti-A>.   
1.3  Main Principle: 
Between an idea <A> and its opposite <Anti-A>, there is a continuum-power spectrum of 
neutralities <Neut-A>. 
      1.4  Fundamental Thesis of Neutrosophy: 
Any idea <A> is T% true, I% indeterminate, and F% false, where T, I, F _ ] -0, 1+ [. 
      1.5  Main Laws of Neutrosophy: 
Let <α> be an attribute, and (T, I, F) _ ] -0, 1+ [3.  Then: 
- There is a proposition <P> and a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I% 
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>. 
- For any proposition <P>, there is a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I% 
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>. 
- <α> is at some degree <Anti-α>, while <Anti-α> is at some degree <α>. 
 
 
2.  NEUTROSOPHIC LOGIC: 
 
2.1  Introduction. 
As an alternative to the existing logics we propose the Neutrosophic Logic to represent a 
mathematical model of uncertainty, vagueness, ambiguity, imprecision, undefined, unknown, 
incompleteness, inconsistency, redundancy, contradiction.  It is a non-classical logic. 
Eksioglu (1999) explains some of them: 
“Imprecision of the human systems is due to the imperfection of knowledge that humain 
receives (observation) from the external world. Imperfection leads to a doubt about the 
value of a variable, a decision to be taken or a conclusion to be drawn for the actual 
system. The sources of uncertainty can be stochasticity (the case of intrinsic imperfection 
where a typical and single value does not exist), incomplete knowledge (ignorance of the 
totality, limited view on a system because of its complexity) or the acquisition errors 
(intrinsically imperfect observations, the quantitative errors in measures).” 
  
“Probability (called sometimes the objective probability) process uncertainty of random 
type (stochastic) introduced by the chance.  Uncertainty of the chance is clarified by the 
time or by events' occurrence.  The probability is thus connected to the frequency of the 
events' occurrence.”  
“The vagueness which constitutes another form of uncertainty is the character of those 
which contours or limits lacking precision, clearness. […] 
For certain objects, the fact to be in or out of a category is difficult to mention.  Rather, it 
is possible to express a partial or gradual membership.” 
Indeterminacy means degrees of uncertainty, vagueness, imprecision, undefined, unknown, 
inconsistency, redundancy.  
 
A question would be to try, if possible, to get an axiomatic system for the neutrosophic logic.  
Intuition is the base for any formalization, because the postulates and axioms derive from 
intuition. 
 
2.2  Definition: 
     A logic in which each proposition is estimated to have the percentage of truth in a subset T, 
the percentage of indeterminacy in a subset I, and the percentage of falsity in a subset F, where 
T, I, F are defined above, is called Neutrosophic Logic. 
 
We use a subset of truth (or indeterminacy, or falsity), instead of a number only, because in 
many cases we are not able to exactly determine the percentages of truth and of falsity but to 
approximate them: for example a proposition is between 30-40% true and between 60-70% 
false, even worst: between 30-40% or 45-50% true (according to various analyzers), and 60% 
or between 66-70% false. 
The subsets are not necessary intervals, but any sets (discrete, continuous, open or closed or 
half-open/half-closed interval, intersections or unions of the previous sets, etc.) in accordance 
with the given proposition. 
A subset may have one element only in special cases of this logic. 
 
Constants: (T, I, F) truth-values,  where T, I, F are standard or non-standard subsets of the non-
standard interval ]-0, 1+[ , where ninf = inf T + inf I + inf F m -0, and nsup = sup T + sup I + sup F 
[ 3+. 
Atomic formulas: a, b, c, … .  
Arbitrary formulas: A, B, C, … . 
 
The neutrosophic logic is a formal frame trying to measure the truth, indeterminacy, and 
falsehood. 
My hypothesis is that no theory is exempted from paradoxes, because of the language 
imprecision, metaphoric expression, various levels or meta-levels of 
understanding/interpretation which might overlap. 
 
2.3  Definition of Neutrosophic Logical Connectives: 
The connectives (rules of inference, or operators), in any non-bivalent logic, can be defined in 
various ways, giving rise to lots of distinct logics.  For example, in three-valued logic, where 
three possible values are possible: true, false, or undecided, there are 3072 such logics! 
  
(Weisstein, 1998)  A single change in one of any connective’s truth table is enough to form a 
(completely) different logic. 
 
The rules are hypothetical or factual.  How to choose them?  The philosopher Van 
Fraassen (1980) [see Shafer, 1986] commented that such rules may always be 
controvertible “for it always involves the choice of one out of many possible but 
nonactual worlds”.  There are general rules of combination, and ad hoc rules. 
For an applied logic to artificial intelligence, a better approach, the best way would be to define 
the connectives recursively (Dubois, Prade), changing/adjusting the definitions after each step 
in order to improve the next result.  This might be comparable to approximating the limit of a 
convergent sequence, calculating more and more terms, or by calculating the limit of a function 
successively substituting the argument with values closer and closer to the critical point.  The 
recurrence allows evolution and self-improvement. 
Or to use greedy algorithms, which are combinatorial algorithms that attempt at each iteration 
as much improvement as possible unlike myopic algorithms that look at each iteration only at 
very local information as with steepest descent method. 
As in non-monotonic logic, we make assumptions, but we often err and must jump back, revise 
our assumptions, and start again.  We may add rules that don’t preserve monotonicity.  
In bio-mathematics Heitkoetter and Beasley (1993-1999) present the evolutionary algorithms 
which are used “to describe computer-based problem solving systems which employ  
computational models of some of the known mechanisms of evolution as key elements in their 
design and implementation”. They simulate, via processes of selection, mutation, and 
reproduction, the evolution of individual structures.  The major evolutionary algorithms studied 
are: genetic algorithm (a model of machine learning based on genetic operators), evolutionary 
programming (a stochastic optimization strategy based on linkage between parents and their 
offspring; conceived by L. J. Fogel in 1960s), evolution strategy, classifier system, genetic 
programming. 
Pei Wang devised a Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System as an intelligent reasoning system, 
where intelligence means working and adopting with insufficient knowledge and resources. 
 
The inference mechanism (endowed with rules of transformation or rules of production) in 
neutrosophy should be non-monotonic and should comprise ensembles of recursive rules, with 
preferential rules and secondary ones (priority order), in order to design a good expert system. 
One may add new rules and eliminate old ones proved unsatisfactory.  There should be strict 
rules, and rules with exceptions.  Recursivity is seen as a computer program that learns from 
itself.  The statistical regression method may be employed as well to determine a best algorithm 
of inference. 
Non-monotonic reasoning means to make assumptions about things we don’t know.  Heuristic 
methods may be involved in order to find successive approximations.  
In terms of the previous results, a default neutrosophic logic may be used instead of the normal 
inference rules.  The distribution of possible neutrosophic results serves as an orientating frame 
for the new results.  The flexible, continuously refined, rules obtain iterative and gradual 
approaches of the result.   
A comparison approach is employed to check the result (conclusion) p by studying the opposite 
of this: what would happen if a non-p conclusion occurred?  The inconsistence of information 
shows up in the result, if not eliminated from the beginning.  The data bases should be 
  
stratified.  There exist methods to construct preferable coherent sub-bases within incoherent 
bases.  In Multi-Criteria Decision one exploits the complementarity of different criteria and the 
complementarity of various sources. 
For example, the Possibility Theory (Zadeh 1978, Dubois, Prade) gives a better approach than 
the Fuzzy Set Theory (Yager) due to self-improving connectives.   The Possibility Theory is 
proximal to the Fuzzy Set Theory, the difference between these two theories is the way the 
fusion operators are defined. 
 
One uses the definitions of neutrosophic probability and neutrosophic set operations. 
Similarly, there are many ways to construct such connectives according to each particular 
problem to solve; here we present the easiest ones: 
 
One notes the neutrosophic logical values of the propositions A1 and A2 by  
NL(A1) = ( T1, I1, F1 ) and NL(A2) = ( T2, I2, F2 ).   
For all neutrosophic logical values below: if, after calculations, one obtains numbers < 0 or > 1, 
one replaces them by –0 or 1+  respectively. 
 
2.3.1  Negation:   
NL(ÕA1) = ( {1+}0T1, {1+}0I1, {1+}0F1 ).     
 
2.3.2  Conjunction:                   
NL(A1 . A2) = ( T1?T2, I1?I2, F1?F2 ). 
(And, in a similar way, generalized for n propositions.) 
 
2.3.3  Weak or inclusive disjunction:  
NL(A1 - A2) = ( T1/T20T1?T2, I1/I20I1?I2, F1/F20F1?F2 ). 
(And, in a similar way, generalized for n propositions.) 
 
2.3.4  Strong or exclusive disjunction: 
NL(A1 I A2) =  
          ( T1? ({1}0T2) /T2? ({1}0T1) 0T1?T2? ({1}0T1) ? ({1}0T2),                     
             I1 ? ({1}0I2)  /I2  ? ({1}0I1)  0I1  ? I2 ? ({1}0I1)  ? ({1}0 I2), 
            F1? ({1}0F2) /F2? ({1}0 F1) 0F1? F2 ? ({1}0F1) ? ({1}0F2) ). 
(And, in a similar way, generalized for n propositions.) 
 
2.3.5  Material conditional (implication): 
NL(A1 h A2) = ( {1+}0T1/T1?T2, {1+}0I1/I1?I2, {1+}0F1/F1?F2 ). 
 
2.3.6  Material biconditional (equivalence):   
NL(A1 f A2) = ( ({1+}0T1/T1?T2) ? ({1+}0T2/T1?T2),  
                            ({1+}0 I1/ I1? I2)  ? ({1+}0I2/ I1 ? I2),  
                            ({1+}0F1/F1? F2) ? ({1+}0F2/F1? F2) ). 
 
2.3.7  Sheffer's connector: 
NL(A1 | A2) = NL(ÕA1 - ÕA2) = ( {1+}0T1?T2, {1+}0I1?I2, {1+}0F1?F2 ). 
 
  
2.3.8 Peirce's connector:  
NL(A1oA2) = NL(ÕA1 . ÕA2) =  
               = ( ({1+}0T1) ? ({1+}0T2), ({1+}0I1) ? ({1+}0I2), ({1+}0F1) ? ({1+}0F2) ). 
 
 
2.4 Generalizations: 
When the sets are reduced to an element only respectively, then 
t_sup = t_inf = t, i_sup = i_inf = i, f_sup = f_inf = f,  
and n_sup = n_inf = n = t+i+f) 
Hence, the neutrosophic logic generalizes: 
- the intuitionistic logic, which supports incomplete theories (for 0 < n < 1 and i=0, 0 [ t, i, f 
[ 1); 
- the fuzzy logic (for n = 1 and i = 0, and 0 [ t, i, f [ 1); 
from "CRC Concise Concise Encyclopedia of Mathematics", by Eric W. Weisstein, 1998, the 
fuzzy logic is "an extension of two-valued logic such that statements need not to be True 
or False, but may have a degree of truth between 0 and 1"; 
- the Boolean logic (for n = 1 and i = 0, with t, f either 0 or 1); 
- the multi-valued logic (for 0 [ t, i, f [ 1); 
definition of <many-valued logic> from "The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy", general 
editor Robert Audi, 1995, p. 461: "propositions may take many values beyond simple truth 
and falsity, values functionally determined by the values of their components"; 
Lukasiewicz considered three values (1, 1/2, 0).  Post considered m values, etc.  But they 
varied in between 0 and 1 only.  In the neutrosophic logic a proposition may take values 
even greater than 1 (in percentage greater than 100%) or less than 0. 
- the paraconsistent logic (for n > 1 and i = 0, with both t, f < 1);  
- the dialetheism, which says that some contradictions are true (for t = f = 1 and i = 0; some 
paradoxes can be denoted this way too); 
-  the faillibilism, which says that uncertainty belongs to every proposition (for i > 0); 
- the paradoxist logic, based on paradoxes (i > 1); 
- the pseudoparadoxist logic, based on pseudoparadoxes (0 < i < 1, t + f > 1); 
- the tautologic logic, based on tautologies (i < 0, t > 1). 
Compared with all other logics, the neutrosophic logic and intuitionistic fuzzy logic introduce 
a percentage of "indeterminacy" - due to unexpected parameters hidden in some 
propositions, or unknowness, or God’s will, but only neutrosophic logic let each 
component t, i, f be even boiling over 1 (overflooded) or freezing under 0 (underdried): to 
be able to make distinction between relative truth and absolute truth, and between relative 
falsity and absolute falsity.  
For example:  in some tautologies t > 1, called "overtrue".  Similarly, a proposition may be 
"overindeterminate" (for i > 1, in some paradoxes), "overfalse" (for f > 1, in some 
unconditionally false propositions);  or "undertrue" (for t < 0, in some unconditionally 
false propositions), "underindeterminate" (for i < 0, in some unconditionally true or false 
propositions), "underfalse" (for f < 0, in some unconditionally true propositions). 
This is because we should make a distinction between unconditionally true (t > 1, and f < 0 or 
i < 0) and conditionally true propositions (t [ 1, and f [ 1 or i [ 1).  
 
 
3  NEUTROSOPHIC SET: 
  
 
3.1  Definition:  
Let T, I, F be real standard or non-standard subsets of ]-0, 1+[, 
with sup T = t_sup, inf T = t_inf, 
                 sup I  = i_sup, inf I  = i_inf, 
                 sup F = f_sup, inf F = f_inf, 
   and        n_sup = t_sup+i_sup+f_sup,  
                 n_inf  = t_inf+i_inf+f_inf. 
Let U be a universe of discourse, and M a set included in U.  An element x from U is noted 
with respect to the set M as x(T, I, F) and belongs to M in the following way: 
it is t% true in the set, i% indeterminate (unknown if it is) in the set, and f% false, where t 
varies in T, i varies in I, f varies in F.  
Statically T, I, F are subsets, but dynamically the components T, I, F are set-valued vector 
functions/operators depending on many parameters, such as: time, space, etc. (some of them 
are hidden parameters, i.e. unknown parameters). 
  
3.2  General Examples: 
Let A and B be two neutrosophic sets. 
One can say, by language abuse, that any element neutrosophically belongs to any set, due to 
the percentages of truth/indeterminacy/falsity involved, which varies between 0 and 1 or even 
less than 0 or greater than 1. 
Thus: x(50,20,30) belongs to A (which means, with a probability of 50% x is in A, with a 
probability of 30% x is not in A, and the rest is undecidable); or y(0,0,100) belongs to A 
(which normally means y is not for sure in A); or z(0,100,0) belongs to A (which means one 
does know absolutely nothing about z's affiliation with A). 
More general, x( (20-30), (40-45)4[50-51], {20,24,28} ) belongs to the set A, which means: 
- with a probability in between 20-30% x is in A (one cannot find an exact approximate 
because of various sources used); 
- with a probability of 20% or 24% or 28% x is not in A; 
- the indeterminacy related to the appurtenance of x to A is in  between 40-45% or between 50-
51% (limits included); 
The subsets representing the appurtenance, indeterminacy, and falsity may overlap, and n_sup 
= 30+51+28 > 100 in this case. 
 
3.3  Physics Examples: 
a)  For example the Schrodinger’s Cat Theory says that the quantum state of a photon can 
basically be in more than one place in the same time, which translated to the neutrosophic set 
means that an element (quantum state) belongs and does not belong to a set (one place) in the 
same time; or an element (quantum state) belongs to two different sets (two different places) in 
the same time.  It is a question of “alternative worlds” theory very well represented by the 
neutrosophic set theory. 
In Schroedinger’s Equation on the behavior of electromagnetic waves and “matter waves” in 
quantum theory, the wave function Psi that describes the superposition of possible states may 
be simulated by a neutrosophic function, i.e. a function whose values are not unique for each 
argument from the domain of definition (the vertical line test fails, intersecting the graph in 
more points). 
  
Don’t we better describe, using the attribute “neutrosophic” than “fuzzy” or any others, a 
quantum particle that neither exists nor non-exists? 
b)    How to describe a particle ? in the infinite micro-universe that belongs to two distinct 
places P1 and P2 in the same time?  ? c P1 and ? v P1 as a true contradiction, or ? c P1 and ? 
c ÕP1. 
 
3.4  Philosophical Examples: 
Or, how to calculate the truth-value of Zen (in Japanese) / Chan (in Chinese) doctrine 
philosophical proposition: the present is eternal and comprises in itself the past and the future? 
In Eastern Philosophy the contradictory utterances form the core of the Taoism and Zen/Chan 
(which emerged from Buddhism and Taoism) doctrines. 
How to judge the truth-value of a metaphor, or of an ambiguous statement, or of a social 
phenomenon which is positive from a standpoint and negative from another standpoint? 
 
There are many ways to construct them, in terms of the practical problem we need to simulate 
or approach.  Below there are mentioned the easiest ones: 
 
3.5  Application: 
A cloud is a neutrosophic set, because its borders are ambiguous, and each element (water 
drop) belongs with a neutrosophic probability to the set (e.g. there are a kind of separated water 
drops, around a compact mass of water drops, that we don't know how to consider them: in or 
out of the cloud).  
Also, we are not sure where the cloud ends nor where it begins, neither if some elements are or 
are not in the set.  That's why the percent of indeterminacy is required and the neutrosophic 
probability (using subsets - not numbers - as components) should be used for better modeling:  
it is a more organic, smooth, and especially accurate estimation.  Indeterminacy is the zone of 
ignorance of a proposition’s value, between truth and falsehood. 
 
3.6  Neutrosophic Set Operations: 
One notes, with respect to the sets A and B over the universe U,   
   x = x(T1, I1, F1) c A and x = x(T2, I2, F2) c B, by mentioning x’s neutrosophic membership 
appurtenance. 
And, similarly,  y = y(T', I', F') c B. 
For all neutrosophic set operations: if, after calculations, one obtains numbers < 0 or > 1, one 
replaces them by –0 or 1+  respectively. 
 
3.6.1  Complement of A: 
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c A,  
then x( {1+}0T1, {1+}0I1, {1+}0F1 ) c C(A). 
 
3.6.2  Intersection: 
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c A, x( T2, I2, F2 ) c B, 
then x( T1?T2, I1?I2, F1?F2 ) c A 3 B. 
 
3.6.3  Union: 
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c A, x( T2, I2, F2 ) c B, 
then x( T1/T20T1?T2, I1/I20I1?I2, F1/F20F1?F2 ) c A 4 B. 
  
 
3.6.4  Difference: 
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c A, x( T2, I2, F2 ) c B, 
then x( T10T1?T2, I10I1?I2, F10F1?F2 ) c A \ B, 
because A \ B = A 3 C(B). 
 
3.6.5  Cartesian Product: 
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c A,  y( T', I', F' ) c B,  
then ( x( T1, I1, F1 ), y( T', I', F' ) ) c A % B. 
 
3.6.6  M is a subset of N:  
If  x( T1, I1, F1 ) c M u x( T2, I2, F2 ) c N,  
where inf T1 [ inf T2, sup T1 [ sup T2, and inf F1 m inf F2, sup F1 m sup F2. 
 
3.7  Generalizations and Comments: 
     From the intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logic, dialetheism, faillibilism, paradoxes, 
pseudoparadoxes, and tautologies we transfer the  "adjectives" to the sets, i.e. to 
intuitionistic set (set incompletely known), paraconsistent set, dialetheist set, faillibilist set 
(each element has a percenatge of indeterminacy), paradoxist set (an element may belong 
and may not belong in the same time to the set), pseudoparadoxist set, and tautologic set 
respectively. 
Hence, the neutrosophic set generalizes: 
- the intuitionistic set, which supports incomplete set theories (for 0 < n < 1 and i = 0, 0 [ t, i, 
f [ 1) and incomplete known elements belonging to a set; 
- the fuzzy set (for n = 1 and i = 0, and 0 [ t, i, f [ 1); 
- the classical set (for n = 1 and i = 0, with t, f either 0 or 1); 
- the paraconsistent set (for n > 1 and i = 0, with both t, f < 1);  
- the faillibilist set (i > 0); 
- the dialetheist set, which says that the intersection of some disjoint sets is not empty (for t = 
f = 1 and i = 0; some paradoxist sets can be denoted this way too); 
- the paradoxist set (i > 1); 
- the pseudoparadoxist set (0 < i < 1, t + f > 1); 
- the tautological set (i < 0). 
Compared with all other types of sets, in the neutrosophic set each element has three 
components which are subsets (not numbers as in fuzzy set) and considers a subset, 
similarly to intuitionistic fuzzy set, of "indeterminacy" - due to unexpected parameters 
hidden in some sets, and let the superior limits of the components to even boil over 1 
(overflooded) and the inferior limits of the components to even freeze under 0 
(underdried).  
For example:  an element in some tautological sets may have t > 1, called "overincluded".  
Similarly, an element in a set may be "overindeterminate" (for i > 1, in some paradoxist 
sets), "overexcluded" (for f > 1, in some unconditionally false appurtenances);  or 
"undertrue" (for t < 0, in some unconditionally false appurtenances), "underindeterminate" 
(for i < 0, in some unconditionally true or false appurtenances), "underfalse" (for f < 0, in 
some unconditionally true appurtenances). 
  
This is because we should make a distinction between unconditionally true (t > 1, and f < 0 or 
i < 0) and conditionally true appurtenances (t [ 1, and f [ 1 or i [ 1).  
 
In a rough set RS, an element on its boundary-line cannot be classified neither as a member of 
RS nor of its complement with certainty.  In the neutrosophic set a such element may be 
characterized by x(T, I, F), with corresponding set-values for T, I, F ` ]-0, 1+[. 
 
 
4.   NEUTROSOPHIC PROBABILITY:  
 
4.1  Definition: 
Let T, I, F be real standard or non-standard subsets included in ]-0, 1+[,   
with sup T = t_sup, inf T = t_inf, 
            sup  I = i_sup,  inf I = i_inf, 
            sup F = f_sup, inf F = f_inf, 
and      n_sup = t_sup+i_sup+f_sup,  
            n_inf  = t_inf+i_inf+f_inf. 
The neutrosophic probability is a generalization of the classical probability and imprecise 
probability in which the chance that an event A occurs is t% true - where t varies in the 
subset T, i% indeterminate - where i varies in the subset I, and f% false - where f varies in 
the subset F.  Statically T, I, F are subsets, but dynamically the components T, I, F are set-
valued vector functions/operators depending on many parameters, such as: time, space, 
etc. (some of them are hidden parameters, i.e. unknown parameters). 
In classical probability n_sup [ 1, while in neutrosophic probability n_sup [ 3+. 
In imprecise probability: the probability of an event is a subset T _ [0, 1], not a number p c 
[0, 1], what’s left is supposed to be the opposite, subset F (also from the unit interval [0, 1]); 
there is no indeterminate subset I in imprecise probability.  
 
One notes NP(A) = (T, I, F), a triple of sets.  
 
4.2  Neutrosophic Probability Space: 
The universal set, endowed with a neutrosophic probability defined for each of its subset, 
forms a neutrosophic probability space.  
 
Let A and B be two neutrosophic events, and NP(A) = (T1, I1, F1), NP(B) = (T2, I2, F2) their 
neutrosophic probabilities.  Then we define: 
(T1, I1, F1) F (T2, I2, F2) = (T1/T2, I1/I2, F1/F2), 
(T1, I1, F1) H (T2, I2, F2) = (T10T2, I10I2, F10F2), 
 (T1, I1, F1) E (T2, I2, F2) = (T1?T2, I1?I2, F1?F2). 
 
NP(A3B) = NP(A) E NP(B); 
NP(ÕA)  = {1+} H NP(A),  [this second axiom may be replaced, in specific applications,                                
with NP(ÕA) = (F1, I1,T1)]; 
NP(A4B) = NP(A) F NP(B) H NP(A) E NP(B). 
 
  
Neutrosophic probability is also a non-additive probability, like the classical probability, but 
even for independent events, i.e. P(A4B) ! P(A)+P(B).  We have equality only when A or B 
are impossible events. 
A probability-function P is called additive if P(A4B) = P(A)+P(B), sub-additive if  P(A4B) 
[ P(A)+P(B), and super-additive if P(A4B) m P(A)+P(B). 
In the Dempster-Shafer Theory P(A) + P(ÕA) may be g 1, in neutrosophic probability almost 
all the time P(A) + P(ÕA) g 1.   
 
1. NP(impossible event) = (Timp, Iimp, Fimp),  
where sup Timp [ 0, inf Fimp m 1; no restriction on Iimp. 
   NP(sure event) = (Tsur, Isur, Fsur), 
where inf Tsur m 1, sup Fsur [ 0.  
   NP(totally indeterminate event) = (Tind, Iind, Find); 
where inf Iind m 1; no restrictions on Tind or Find. 
2. NP(A) c {(T, I, F), where T, I, F are real standard or non-standard subsets included in  
]-0, 1+[ that may overlap}. 
3. NP(A4B) = NP(A) F NP(B) H NP(A3B). 
4. NP(A) = {1} H NP(ÕA).   
 
4.3  Applications: 
#1. From a pool of refugees, waiting in a political refugee camp in Turkey to get the American 
visa, a% have the chance to be accepted - where a varies in the set A, r% to be rejected - where 
r varies in the set R, and p% to be in pending (not yet decided) - where p varies in P. 
Say, for example, that the chance of someone Popescu in the pool to emigrate to USA is 
(between) 40-60% (considering different criteria of emigration one gets different percentages, 
we have to take care of all of them), the chance of being rejected is 20-25% or 30-35%, and the 
chance of being in pending is 10% or 20% or 30%.  Then the neutrosophic probability that 
Popescu emigrates to the Unites States is  
       NP(Popescu) = ( (40-60), (20-25)U(30-35), {10,20,30} ), closer to the life. 
This is a better approach than the classical probability, where 40 [ P(Popescu) [ 60, because 
from the pending chance - which will be converted to acceptance or rejection - Popescu might 
get extra percentage in his will to emigration, 
and also the superior limit of the subsets sum 
       60+35+30 > 100 
and in other cases one may have the inferior sum < 0, 
while in the classical fuzzy set theory the superior sum should be 100 and the inferior sum m 0. 
In a similar way, we could say about the element Popescu that 
Popescu( (40-60), (20-25)U(30-35), {10,20,30} ) belongs to the set of accepted refugees. 
#2. The probability that candidate C will win an election is say 25-30% true (percent of people 
voting for him), 35% false (percent of people voting against him), and 40% or 41% 
indeterminate (percent of people not coming to the ballot box, or giving a blank vote - not 
selecting anyone, or giving a negative vote - cutting all candidates on the list). 
Dialectic and dualism don't work in this case anymore. 
#3. Another example, the probability that tomorrow it will rain is say 50-54% true according to 
meteorologists who have investigated the past years' weather, 30 or 34-35% false according to 
today's very sunny and droughty summer, and 10 or 20% undecided (indeterminate). 
  
#4. The probability that Yankees will win tomorrow versus Cowboys is 60% true (according to 
their confrontation's history giving Yankees' satisfaction), 30-32% false (supposing Cowboys 
are actually up to the mark, while Yankees are declining), and 10 or 11 or 12% indeterminate 
(left to the hazard: sickness of players, referee's mistakes, atmospheric conditions during the 
game).  These parameters act on players' psychology. 
 
4.4  Remarks:  
     Neutrosophic probability are useful to those events which involve some degree of 
indeterminacy (unknown) and more criteria of evaluation - as above.  This kind of probability 
is necessary because it provides a better approach than classical probability to uncertain events.   
 This probability uses a subset-approximation for the truth-value (like imprecise probability), 
but also subset-approximations for indeterminacy- and falsity-values. 
 Also, it makes a distinction between “relative sure event”, event which is sure only in some 
particular world(s): NP(rse) = 1, and “absolute sure event”, event which is sure in all possible 
worlds: NP(ase) = 1+; similarly for “relative impossible event” / “absolute impossible event”, 
and for “relative indeterminate event” / “absolute indeterminate event”.  
     In the case when the truth- and falsity-components are complementary, i.e. no 
indeterminacy and their sum is 100, one falls to the classical probability.  As, for example, 
tossing dice or coins, or drawing cards from a well-shuffled deck, or drawing balls from an urn. 
 
4.5  Generalizations: 
An interesting particular case is for n = 1, with 0 [ t, i, f [ 1, which is closer to the classical 
probability.   
For n = 1 and i = 0, with 0 [ t, f [ 1, one obtains the classical probability. 
If I disappear and F is ignored, while the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[ is transformed 
into the classical unit interval [0, 1], one gets the imprecise probability. 
 
From the intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logic, dialetheism, faillibilism, paradoxism, 
pseudoparadoxism, and tautologism we transfer the  "adjectives" to probabilities, i.e. we 
define the intuitionistic probability (when the probability space is incomplete), 
paraconsistent probability, faillibilist probability, dialetheist probability, paradoxist 
probability, pseudoparadoxist probability, and tautologic probability respectively. 
Hence, the neutrosophic probability generalizes: 
- the intuitionistic probability, which supports incomplete (not completely 
known/determined) probability spaces (for 0 < n < 1 and i = 0, 0 [ t, f [ 1) or incomplete 
events whose probability we need to calculate; 
- the classical probability (for n = 1 and i = 0, and 0 [ t, f [ 1); 
- the paraconsistent probability (for n > 1 and i = 0, with both t, f < 1);  
- the dialetheist probability, which says that intersection of some disjoint probability spaces 
is not empty (for t = f = 1 and i = 0; some paradoxist probabilities can be denoted this 
way); 
- the faillibilist probability (for i > 0); 
- the pseudoparadoxism (for n_sup > 1 or n_inf < 0); 
- the tautologism (for t_sup > 1). 
Compared with all other types of classical probabilities, the neutrosophic probability 
introduces a percentage of "indeterminacy" - due to unexpected parameters hidden in 
  
some probability spaces, and let each component t, i, f be even boiling over 1 
(overflooded) or freezing under 0 (underdried).  
For example: an element in some tautological probability space may have t > 1, called 
"overprobable".  Similarly, an element in some paradoxist probability space may be 
"overindeterminate" (for i > 1), or "overunprobable" (for f > 1, in some unconditionally 
false appurtenances);  or "underprobable" (for t < 0, in some unconditionally false 
appurtenances), "underindeterminate" (for i < 0, in some unconditionally true or false 
appurtenances), "underunprobable" (for f < 0, in some unconditionally true 
appurtenances). 
This is because we should make a distinction between unconditionally true (t > 1, and f < 0 or 
I < 0) and conditionally true appurtenances (t [ 1, and f [ 1 or I [ 1).  
 
 
5  NEUTROSOPHIC STATISTICS: 
Analysis of events, described by the neutrosophic probability, means neutrosophic statistics. 
This is also a generalization of classical statistics. 
 
In accordance with the development of neutrosophic probability the neutrosophic statistics 
could be better studied.  Here, above, it is only a definition in order to give scientists an 
impulse for research. 
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Combination of paradoxical sources of information
within the neutrosophic framework
Dr. Jean Dezert
Abstract - The recent emergence of Smarandache’s logic as foundations for a new general unifying theory for uncertain reasoning
is becoming both a new philosophical and mathematical research field and could modify deeply our perception and understanding
of our outer and inner worlds in coming years. The ability for neutrosophy to include all existing logics as special cases is undoubt-
edly appealing. Beside of all potential advantages of neutrosophy to handle antinomies and uncertainties, the current mathematical
neutrosophic logic, does not deal directly with the important problem of combination of evidences provided by different bodies of
evidence. This paper is the first attempt to develop new foundations for the combination of sources of information in a very general
framework where information can be both uncertain and paradoxical. We develop a new rule of combination close to the ad-hoc
Dempster-Shafer rule of combination where both conjunctions and disjunctions of assertions are explicitly taking into account
in the fusion process. Through several simple examples, we show the efficiency of this new theory of plausible and paradoxical
reasoning to solve problems where the Dempster-Shafer theory usually fails. Finally a theoretical bridge between the neutrosophic
logic and our new theory is presented, in order to solve the delicate problem of the combination of neutrosophic evidences. The
neutrosophic logic seems to be an appealing general framework (prerequesite) for dealing with uncertain and paradoxical sources
of information through this new theory.
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1 Introduction
The processing of uncertain information has always been a hot topic of research since mainly the 18th century. Up
to middle of the 20th century, most theoretical advances have been devoted to the theory of probabilities through the
works of eminent mathematicians like J. Bernoulli (1713), A. De Moivre (1718), T. Bayes (1763), P. Laplace (1774), K.
Gauss (1823), S. Poisson (1837), I. Todhunter (1873), J. Bertrand (1889), E. Borel (1909), R. Fisher (1930), F. Ramsey
(1931), A. Kolmogorov (1933), H. Jeffreys (1939), R. Cox (1946), I. Good (1950), R. Carnap (1950), G. Polya (1954),
R. Jeffrey (1957), B. De Finetti (1958), M. Kendall (1963), L. Savage (1967),T. Fine (1973), E. Jaynes (1995) to name
just few of them. With the development of the computers, the last half of the 20th century has became very prolific for
the development new original theories dealing with uncertainty and imprecise information. Mainly three major theories
are available now as alternative of the theory of probabilities for the automatic plausible reasoning in expert systems:
the fuzzy set theory developed by L. Zadeh in sixties (1965), the Shafer’s theory of evidence in seventies (1976) and
the theory of possibilities by D. Dubois and H. Prade in eighties (1985). Only recently a new general and original
theory, called neutrosophy, has been developed by F. Smarandache to unify all these existing theories in a common global
framework. This paper is focused on the development of a new theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning within the
neutrosophical framework. After a brief presentation of probability and Dempster-Shafer theories in sections 2 and 3, we
propose the foundations for a new theory in section 4 and discuss about the justification of our new rule of combination of
uncertain and paradoxical sources of evidences. Several examples of our new inference will also been presented. In the
last section of this paper, we will show how our theory can serve as theoretical tool for the problem of the combination of
neutrosophical evidences.
2 The probability theory
Let  = f
i
; i = 1; : : : ; ng be a finite discrete set of exhaustive and exclusive hypotheses or outcomes of a random
experiment. The probabilityP (A) of A   has been defined and interpreted differently (mainly through the geometrical
approach, the subjective approach and the frequency approach [35]) since the seventieth century. The frequency approach
PfAg is defined as the ratio of the number of possible outcomes for event A to the total number of possible outcomes for
space . This is still now the easiest approach to introduce the notion of probability (chance) at a low mathematical level.
The foundations of the probability theory with a new interpretation as the logic of science can be found through the works
of E.T. Jaynes in [27, 25, 26].
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2.1 Axiomatic approach of the theory of probabilities
Within the frequency approach of probability, one implicitly assumes that each elementary element of  is equally prob-
able. Hence the definition of probabibility itself turns to fall actually in a vicious circle definition. Moreover the principle
of sufficient reason (the hypothesis of equiprobable repartition for elementary components of  in case of no prior infor-
mation), called also the principle of indifference, has been strongly critized especially for cases involving infinitely many
possible outcomes because this can lead to confusing paradoxes. That is why, since the work of A. Kolmogorov in 1933,
the axiomatic of the probability theory based on -algebras and measure theory has been definitely adopted. We remind
now the four axioms of modern theory of probability:
A1: (Nonnegativity)
0  PfAg  1 (1)
A2: (Unity) Any sure event (the sample space) has probability one
Pfg = 1 (2)
A3: (Finite additivity) If A
1
; : : : ; A
n
are disjoint events, then
PfA
1
[ : : :[A
n
g = PfA
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g+ : : :+ PfA
n
g (3)
A4: (countable additivity) If A
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1
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1
X
i=1
PfA
i
g (4)
2.2 Consequences of axioms and bayesian inference
From these axioms, all other probability laws (especially total probability theorem and Bayes’s rule) can be derived. In
particular,
Pf;g = 0 and PfAcg = 1  PfAg (5)
A  B ) PfAg  PfBg (6)
8A;B  ; PfA[Bg = PfAg+ PfBg   PfA\Bg (7)
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g (Boole’s inequality) (8)
More precisely, in the general case, one has the Poincare´’s equality
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which can be also written under a more compact form as
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i2I
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The probability of an event A under the condition that event B has occured (with probability PfBg 6= 0) is called the
conditional (or a posteriori) probability of A given B and is defined as
PfA j Bg =
PfA \Bg
PfBg
(11)
Events A and B are said to be independent if PfA \ Bg = PfAgPfBg or equivalently PfA j Bg = PfAg and
PfB j Ag = PfBg.
The probability of any event B can be recovered from any partition (i.e. a set of exhaustive and disjoint events)
A
1
; : : : ; A
n
of sample space  by the total probability theorem
PfBg =
n
X
i=1
PfB j A
i
gPfA
i
g (12)
Since PfA j BgPfBg = PfA \Bg = PfB j AgPfAg, one gets the famous Baye’s formula, also called the Bayesian
inference [4]
PfA j Bg =
PfB j AgPfAg
PfBg
(13)
2.3 Bayesian rule of combination
Suppose now that M independent sources of information (bodies of evidence) B
1
; : : : ;B
M
provide M subjective prob-
ability functions P
1
f:g; : : : ; P
M
f:g over the same space , then the optimal bayesian fusion rule is obtained as follows
(see [13] for a more general and theoretical justification).
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where p
i
is the prior probability of 
i
. This bayesian fusion rule of combination is however not defined when the sources
are in full contradiction because in such case the normalization constant
P
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p
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g = 0. When the fusion is possible and when
all the prior probabilities p
i
are unknown, one has then to use the principle of indifference by setting all p
i
= 1=n and the
bayesian rule of combination reduces to
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The Bayesian inference (13) can be interpreted as a special case of bayesian rule of combination (15) between two sources
of information (prior and posterior information).
3 The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence
We present now the basis of the Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) or the Mathematical Theory of Evidence (MTE) [48, 11]
called also sometimes the theory of probable or evidential reasoning. The DST is usually considered as a generalization
of the bayesian theory of subjective probability [52] and offers a simple and direct representation of ignorance. The DST
has shown its compatibility with the classical probability theory, with boolean logic and has a feasible computational
complexity [46] for problems of small dimension. The DST is a powerful theoretical tool which can be applied for the
representation of incomplete knowledge, belief updating, and for combination of evidence [42, 17] through the Demspter-
Shafer’s rule of combination presented in the following. The Dempster-Shafer model of representation and processing of
uncertainty has led to a huge number of practical applications in a wide range of domains (technical and medical diagnosis
under unreliable measuring devices, information retrieval, integration of knowledge from heterogeneous sources for object
identification and tracking, network reliability computation, multisensor image segmentation, autonomous navigation,
safety control in large plants, map construction and maintenance, just to mention a few).
3.1 Basic probability masses
Definition
Let  = f
i
; i = 1; : : : ; ng be a finite discrete set of exhaustive and exclusive elements (hypotheses) called elementary
elements.  has been called the frame of discernment of hypotheses or universe of discourse by G. Shafer. The cardinality
(number of elementary elements) of  is denoted jj. The power set P() of  which is the set of all subsets of  is
usually notedP() = 2 because its cardinality is exactly 2jj. Any element of 2 is then a composite event (disjunction)
of the frame of discernment. The DST starts by defining a map associated to a body of evidence B (source of information),
called basic assignment probability (bpa) or information granule m(:) : 2 ! [0; 1] such that
m(;) = 0 (16)
XA22

m(A) 
X
A
m(A) = 1 (17)
m(:) represents the strength of some evidence provided by the source of information under consideration. Condition (16)
reflects the fact that no belief ought to be committed to ; and condition (17) reflects the convention that one’s total belief
has measure one [48]. The quantity m(A) is called A’s basic probability number or sometimes A’s basic mass. m(A)
corresponds to the measure of the partial belief that is committed exactly to A (degree of truth supported exactly by A)
by the body of evidence B but not the total belief committed to A. All subsets A for which m(A) > 0 are called focal
elements of m. The set of all focal elements of m(:) is called the coreK(m) of m. Note that m(A
1
) and m(A
2
) can both
be 0 even ifm(A
1
[A
2
) 6= 0. Even more peculiar, note that A  B ; m(A) < m(B). Hence, the bpam(:) is in general
different from a probability distribution p(:).
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3.2 Belief functions
To obtain the measure of the total belief committed to A 2 2, one must add to m(A) the masses m(B) for all proper
subsets B  A. G. Shafer has defined the belief (credibility) function Bel(:) : 2 ! [0; 1] associated with bpa m(:) as
Bel(A) =
X
BA
m(B) (18)
Bel(A) summarizes all our reasons to believe in A (i.e. the lower probability to believe in A). More generally, a belief
function Bel(:) can be characterized without reference to the information granule m(:) if Bel(:) satisfies the following
three conditions
Bel() = 1 (19)
Bel(;) = 0 (20)
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For any given belief function Bel(:), one can always associate an unique information granule m(:), called the Mo¨bius
inverse of belief function [44], and defined by [48]
8A  ; m(A) =
X
BA
( 1)
jA BjBel(B) (22)
The vacuous belief function having Bel() = 1 but Bel(A) = 0 for all A 6=  describes the full ignorance on the frame
of discernment . The corresponding bpa m
v
(:) is such that m
v
() = 1 and m
v
(A) = 0 for all A 6= .
For any given belief function Bel(:) defined on frame , the following inequality holds
8A;B  ; max(0;Bel(A) + Bel(B)   1)  Bel(A \B)  min(Bel(A);Bel(B)) (23)
Bayesian belief functions
Any belief function satisfying Bel(;) = 0, Bel() = 1 and Bel(A [ B) = Bel(A) + Bel(B) whenever A;B   and
A \ B = ; is called a Bayesian belief function. In such case, relation (21) coincides exactly with (10) and a probability
function P (:) is only a particular Dempster-Shafer’s belief function. In this sense, the Dempster-Shafer theory can be
considered as a generalization of the probability theory.
If Bel(:) is a bayesian belief function, then all focal elements are only single points of P(). The basic probability
mass assignement m(:) commits a positive number m(
i
) only to some elementary 
i
2  (possibly all 
i
) and zero to
all possible disjunctions of 
1
; : : : ; 
n
. In other words there exists a bayesian bpa m(:) : ! [0; 1] such that
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i
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3.3 Plausibility functions
Since the degree of belief Bel(A) does not reveal to what extent one believes its negation Ac, Shafer has introduced the
degree of doubt of A as the total belief of Ac. The degree of doubt is less useful than the plausibility (credibility) Pl(A)
of A which measures the total probability mass that can move intoA. Pl(A) can be interpreted as the upper probability of
A. More precisely Pl(A) is defined by
Pl(A) , 1  Dou(A) = 1  Bel(Ac) =
X
B
m(B)  
X
BA
c
m(B) =
X
B\A6=;
m(B) (25)
More generally, the dual of (21) implies
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The direct comparison of (18) with (25) indicates that
8A  ; Bel(A)  Pl(A) (27)
For any given plausibility function Pl(:) defined on frame , the following inequality holds
8A;B  ; max(Pl(A); Pl(B))  Pl(A [B)  min(1; Pl(A) + Pl(B)) (28)
Let  be a given frame of discernment and m(:) a general bpa (neither a vacuous bpa, nor a bayesian bpa) provided by a
body of evidence, then it is always possible to build the following pignistic probability [63] (bayesian belief function) by
choosing 8
i
2 ; Pf
i
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P
Bj
i
2B
1
jBj
m(B). In such case, one always has
8A  ; Bel(A)  [P (A) =
X
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i
g]  Pl(A) (29)
Since Bel(A) summarizes all our reasons to believe in A and Pl(A) expresses how much we should believe in A if all
currently unknown were to support A, the true belief in A is somewhere in the interval [Bel(A); Pl(A)]. Now suppose
that the true value of a parameter under consideration is known with some uncertainty [Bel(A); Pl(A)]  [0; 1], then its
corresponding bpa m(A) can always be constructed by choosing
m(A) = Bel(A) m(A [Ac) = Pl(A)   Bel(A) m(Ac) = 1  Pl(A) (30)
3.4 The Dempster’s rule of combination
Glenn Shafer has proposed the ad-hoc Dempster’s rule of combination (orthogonal summation), symbolized by the op-
erator , to combine two so-called distinct bodies of evidences B
1
and B
2
over the same frame of discernment . Let
Bel
1
(:) and Bel
2
(:) be two belief functions over the same frame of discernment  and m
1
(:) and m
2
(:) their correspond-
ing bpa masses. The combined global belief function Bel(:) = Bel
1
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2
(:) is obtained from the combination of the
information granules m
1
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The summation notation
P
A\B=C
must be interpreted as the sum over all A;B   such that A \B = C (interpre-
tation for other summation notations follows directly by analogy). The orthogonal sum m(:) is a proper basic probability
assignment if K , 1  
P
A\B=;
m
1
(A)m
2
(B) 6= 0. If K = 0,which means
P
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(B) = 1 then orthog-
onal sum m(:) does not exist and the bodies of evidences B
1
and B
2
are said to be totally (flatly) contradictory or in full
contradiction. Such case arises whenever the cores of Bel
1
(:) and Bel
2
(:) are disjoint or equivalently when there exists
A   such that Bel
1
(A) = 1 and Bel
2
(A
c
) = 1. The same problem of existence has already been pointed out previously
in the presentation of the optimal Bayesian fusion rule.
The quantity log 1=K is called the weight of conflict between the the bodies of evidences B
1
and B
2
. It is easy to show
that the Dempster’s rule of combination is commutative (m
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 m
2
= m
2
 m
1
) and associative ([m
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]  m
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for  binary operator, i.e. m
v
m = m m
v
 m. If Bel
1
(:) and Bel
2
(:) are two combinable belief functions and if
Bel
1
(:) is Bayesian, then Bel
1
 Bel
2
is a bayesian belief function.
This rule of combination, initially proposed by G. Shafer without a strong theoretical justification (it’s only an ‘’ad-hoc
justification”), has been criticized in the past decades by many disparagers of this theory. Nowadays, this rule of com-
bination has however been fully justified by the axiomatic of the transferable belief model developed by Ph. Smets in
[59, 60, 61, 63]. We mention the fact that such theoretical justification had been already attempted by Cheng and Kashyap
in [7]. Discussions on justifications and interpretations of the DST and the Dempster’s rule of combination can be found
in [16, 30, 31, 32, 42, 45, 68]. An interesting discussion on the justification of Dempster’s rule of combination from the
information entropy viewpoint based on the measurement projection and balance principles can be found in [66]. Connec-
tion of the DST with the Fuzzy Set Theory can be found in [5, 64]. The relationship between experimental observations
and the DST belief functions is currently a hot topic of research. Several models have been developed for fitting belief
functions with experimental data. A very recent detailed presentation and discussion on this problem can be found in [69].
We can see a very close similitude between the Dempster’s rule and the optimal bayesian fusion rule (15). Actually
these two rules coincides exactly when m
1
(:) and m
2
(:) become bayesian basic probability assignments and if we accept
the principle of indifference within the optimal Bayesian fusion rule.
The complexity of DS rule of combination is important in general with large frames of discernment since the computa-
tional burden of finding all pairs A and B of subsets of  such that A\B = C is o(2jj jCj 2jj jCj) which is a large
number. For example, if jj = 10 and jCj = 2, we will have o(216) = o(65536) tests to do to find fA \BjA \B = Cg
A simple example of the Dempster’s rule of combination
Consider the simple frame of discernment  = fS(unny); R(ainy)g about the true nature of the weather at a given
location L for the next day and let consider two independent bodies of evidence B
1
and B
2
providing the following
weather forecasts at L
m
1
(S) = 0:80 m
1
(R) = 0:12 m
1
(S [R) = 0:08
m
2
(S) = 0:90 m
2
(R) = 0:02 m
2
(S [R) = 0:08
Applying Dempster’s rule of combination yields the following result
m(S) = (m
1
m
2
)(S) = (0:72 + 0:072 + 0:064)=(1  0:108  0:016)  0:9772
m(R) = (m
1
m
2
)(R) = (0:0024 + 0:0096 + 0:0016)=(1  0:108  0:016)  0:0155
m(S [R) = (m
1
m
2
)(S [R) = 0:0064=(1  0:108  0:016)  0:0073
Hence, in this example, the fusion of the two sources of evidence reinforces the belief that tomorrow will be a sunny day
at location L (assuming that both bodies of evidence are equally reliable).
Another simple but disturbing example
L. Zadeh has given the following example of a use of the Dempster’s rule which shows an unexpected result. Two
doctors examine a patient and agree that it suffers from either meningitis (M), concussion (C) or brain tumor (T). Thus
 = fM;C; Tg. Assume that the doctors agree in their low expectation of a tumor, but disagree in likely cause and
provide the following diagnosis
m
1
(M ) = 0:99 m
1
(T ) = 0:01
m
2
(C) = 0:99 m
2
(T ) = 0:01
If we now combine beliefs using Dempster’s rule of combination, one gets the unexpected final conclusion m(T ) =
[m
1
 m
2
](T ) =
0:0001
1 0:0099 0:0099 0:9801
= 1 which means that the patient suffers with certainty from brain tumor !!!.
This unexpected result arises from the fact that the two bodies of evidence (doctors) agree that patient does not suffer
from tumor but are in almost full contradiction for the other causes of the disease. This very simple but practical example shows 
the limitations of practical use of the DS theory for automated reasoning. Some care must always be taken about the degree of 
conflict between sources before taking final decision from the result of the Dempster’s rule of combination. A justification of non 
effectiveness of the Dempster’s rule in such kind of example based on an information entropy argument has already been 
presented in [66]. 
 
Conditional Belief functions 
 
Let mB(A) = 1 if B ⊆ A and mB(A) =0 for if B ⊄ A (the subset B is the only focal element of BelB and its basic probability number 
is one).  Then BelB is a belief function that focuses all of the belief on B (note that BelB is not in general a Bayesian belief 
function unless B=1).  If we now consider another belief function Bel over Θ combinable with BelB, then the orthogonal sum 
of Bel with BelB denoted as Bel(.B) =Bel ⊕ BelB is defined for all A ⊂ Θ by [48] 
                                                                      
( ) ( ) ( )( )c
cc
BBel
BBelBABelBABel
−
−∪
=
1
                                                   (32)                                
and 
                                                                               ( ) ( )( )BPl
BAPlBAPl ∩=                                                                       (33) 
If Bel is a Bayesian belief function, then 
                                                               ( ) ( )( ) ( )BAPlBBel
BABelBABel =∩=                                                         (34) 
which coincides exactly with the classical conditional probability P(AB) defined in (11). 
 
4  A new theory for plausible and paradoxical reasoning [DSmT]* 
 
4.1  Introduction 
As seen in the previous Zadeh’s troubling example, the use of the DST must be done only with extreme caution if one has to take 
a final and important decision with the result of the Dempter’s rule of combination. In most (if not all) of practical applications 
based on the DST, some ad-hoc or heuristic recipes are added to the fusion process to correctly manage or reduce the possibility 
of high degree of conflict between sources.  Otherwise, the fusion results lead to unreliable/dangerous conclusion or cannot 
provide a result at all when the degree of conflict becomes high.  Even if the DST provides fruitful results in many applications 
(mainly in artificial intelligence and systems expert areas) in past decades, we argue that this theory is still too limited because it 
is based on the following very restrictive constraints : 
 
C1- The DST considers a discrete and finite frame of discernment based on a set of exhaustive and exclusive elementary      
elements. 
 
C2- The bodies of evidence are assumed independent (each source of information does not take into account the knowledge of 
other sources) and provide a belief function on the power set 2Θ. 
 
These two constraints are very strong in many practical problems involving uncertain and probable reasoning and dealing with 
fusion of uncertain and imprecise information. A discussion about this important remark had already been discussed earlier in 
[33, 34, 47].  In [47], the author proposed a new partitioning management technique to overcome mainly the C2 constraint. The 
first constraint is very severe actually since it does not allow paradoxes on elements of the frame of discernment Θ.  The DST 
accepts as foundation the commonly adopted principle of the third exclude.  Even if at first glance, it makes sense in the 
traditional classical thought, we can develop a new theory that does not accept the principle of the third exclude and accepts and 
deals with paradoxes. This is the main purpose of this paper. 
 
    The constraint C1 assumes that each elementary hypothesis of the frame of discernment Θ is finely and precisely well defined 
and we are able to discriminate between all elementary hypotheses without ambiguity and difficulty.  We argue that this 
constraint is too limited and that it is not always possible in practice to model a frame of discernment satisfying C1 even for some 
very simple problems where each elementary hypothesis corresponds to a fuzzy concept or attribute.  In such cases, the 
elementary elements of the ”frame of discernment” cannot be precisely separated without ambiguity such that no refinement of 
the frame of discernment satisfying the first constraint is possible.  As a simple example, consider an armed robbery situation 
having a witness and the frame of discernment (associated to the possible size of the thief) having only two elementary imprecise 
classes Θ ={θ1= small, θ2 = tall}.  An investigator asks the witness about the size of the thief and the witness declares that the 
thief was tall with bpa number m(θ1) = 0.80, small with bpa number 
 
* This has been called Dezert-Smarandache Theory for Plausible and Paradoxical Reasoning [ref.]. 
m(
2
) = 0:15 and is uncertain (either tall or small) with m(
1
[ 
2
) = 0:05. The investigator will have to deal only with
this information although the smallness and the tallness have not been precisely defined. The use of this testimony by the
investigator (having in other side extra-information about the thief from other sources of information) to infer on the true
size of the thief is delicate especially with the important missing information about the size of the witness (who could be
either a basketball player, a dwarf or most probably has a size on the average as you and me - assuming you are neither a
dwarf or a basketball player. These both hypotheses are not incompatible actually since some dwarfs really enjoy to play
basketball).
In many situations, we argue that the frame of discernment  can only be described in terms of imprecise elements
which cannot be clearly separated and which cannot be considered as fully disjoint and that the refinement of initial frame
into a new one satisfying C1 is like a graal quest and cannot be accomplished. Our last remark about C1 constraint
concerns the universal nature of the frame of discernment. As shown in our previous simple example, it is clear that, in
general, the ”same” frame of discernment is interpreted differently by the bodies of evidence. Some subjectivity, or at
least some fortuitious biases, on the information provided by a source of information is almost unavoidable, otherwise
this would assume (as foundation for the DST) that all bodies of evidence have an objective/universal (possibly uncertain)
interpretation or measure of the phenomena under consideration. This vision seems to be too excessive because usually
independent bodies of evidence provide their beliefs about some hypotheses only with respect to their own worlds of
knowledge and experience. We don’t go deeper here in the techniques of refinements and coarsenings of compatible
frame of discernments which is a prerequesite to the Dempster’s rule of combination. This has already been presented in
details in chapter 6 of [48]. We just want to emphaze here that these nice appealing techniques cannot be used at all in all
cases where C1 cannot be satisfied and we have more generally to accept the idea to deal with paradoxical information.
To convince the reader to accept our radical new way of thought, just think about the true nature of a photon? For experts
working in particle physics, photons look like particles, for physicists working in electromagnetic field theory, photons
are considered as electromagnetic waves. Both interpretations are true, there is no unicity on the true nature of the photon
and actually a photon holds both aspects which appears as a paradoxe for most of human minds. This notion has been
accepted in modern physics only with great difficulty and many vigourous discussions about this fondamental question
have held at the beginning of the 20th century between all eminent physicists at that time.
The constraint C2 hides a strong difficulty already discussed in the previous paragraph. In order to apply the Dempter’s
rule of combination of two independent bodies of evidence B
1
and B
2
), it is necessary that both frames of discernment

1
and 
2
(related to each source B
1
and B
2
) have to be compatible and to correspond to the same ”universal vision” of
the possibilities of the answer of the question under consideration. This constraint is itself very difficult to satisfy actually
since each source of information has usually only a personal (and maybe biaised) interpretation of elements of frame of
discernment. The belief provided by each local source of information mainly depends on the own knowledge frame of
the source without reference to the (inaccessible) absolute truth of the space of possibilities. Therefore, C2 is in many
cases also a too strong hypothesis to accept for foundations of a general theory of probable and paradoxical reasoning. A
general theory should include the possibility to deal with evidences arising from different sources of information which
have no access to absolute interpretation of the elements of the frame of discernment  under consideration. This yields to
accept paradoxical information as basis for a new general theory of probable reasoning. Actually we will show in the first
example on section 4.3 that paradoxical information resulting of fusion of several bodies of evidence is very informative
and can be used to help us to take legitimous final decision.
In other words, this new theory can be interpreted as a general and direct extension of probability theory and the
Dempster-Shafer theory in the following sense. Let  = f
1
; 
2
g be the simpliest frame of discernment involving only
two elementary hypotheses (with no more additional assumptions on 
1
and 
2
), then
 the probability theory deals with basic assignment masses m(:) 2 [0; 1] such that
m(
1
) +m(
2
) = 1
 the Dempster-Shafer theory extends the probability theory by dealing with basic assignment masses m(:) 2 [0; 1]
such that
m(
1
) +m(
2
) +m(
1
[ 
2
) = 1
 our general theory extends the two previous theories by accepting the possibility of paradoxical information and
deals with new basic assignment masses m(:) 2 [0; 1] such that
m(
1
) +m(
2
) +m(
1
[ 
2
) +m(
1
\ 
2
) = 1
4.2 Hyper-power set and general basic probability assignment m(:)
4.2.1 Hyper-power set definition
Let  = f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g be a set of n elementary elements considered as exhaustive which cannot be precisely defined
and separated so that no refinement of  in a new larger set 
ref
of disjoint elementary hypotheses is possible and let’s
consider the classical set operators [ (disjunction) and \ (conjunction). The exhaustive hypothesis about  is not a strong
constraint since when 
i
; i = 1; n does not constitute an exhaustive set of elementary possibilities, we can always add an
extra element 
0
such that 
i
; i = 0; n describes now an exhaustive set. We will assume therefore, from now on and in the
following, that  characterizes an exhaustive frame of discernment.  will be called a general frame of discernment in
the sequel to emphaze the fact that  does not satisfy the Dempster-Shafer C1 constraint.
The classical power set P() = 2 has been defined as the set of all proper subsets of  when all elements 
i
are disjoint.
We extend here this notion and define now the ”hyper-power” set D as the set of all composite possibilities build from 
with [ and \ operators such that 8A 2 D; B 2 D; (A[B) 2 D and (A \B) 2 D. Obviously, one would always
have D  2ref if the refined power set 2ref could be defined and accessible which is unfortunately not possible in
general as already argued. The cardinality of hyper-power set D is majored by 22n when Card() =j  j= n. The
generation of hyper-power set D corresponds to the famous Dedekind’s problem on enumerating the set of monotone
Boolean functions (i.e., functions expressible using only AND and OR set operators) [10]. This problem is also related
with the Sperner systems [65, 37] based on finite poset (called also as antichains in literature) [8]. The number of
antichains on the n-set  are equal to the number of monotonic increasing Boolean functions of n variables, and also the
number of free distributive lattices with n generators [18, 20, 28, 29, 38, 54]. Determining these numbers is exactly the
Dedekind’s problem. The choice of letter D in our notation D to represent the hyper-power set of  is in honour of
the great mathematician R. Dedekind. The general solution of the Dedekind’s problem (for n > 10) has not been found
yet. We just know that the cardinality numbers of D follow the integers of the Dedekind’s sequence minus one when
Card() = n increases.
Examples
1. If we consider  = fg (empty set) then D = f;g and j D j= 1
2. If we consider  = f
1
g then D = f;; 
1
g and j D j= 2
3. If we consider  = f
1
; 
2
g then D = f;; 
1
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2
; 
1
[ 
2
; 
1
\ 
2
g and j D j= 5
4. If we consider  = f
1
; 
2
; 
3
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D

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and j D j= 19
It is not difficult, although tedious, to check that 8A 2 D ; B 2 D; (A [ B) 2 D and (A \ B) 2 D. The
extension to larger frame of discernment is possible but requires a higher computational burden. The general and
direct analytic computation of j D j for a n-set  with n > 10 is not known and is still under investigations
in the mathematical community. Cardinality numbers j D j follow the Dedekind’s sequence (minus one), i.e.
1; 2; 5; 19; 167;7580; 7828353; : : : when Card() = n = 0; 1; 2; 3; 4;5; 6; : : :.
4.3 General basic assignment numbers
4.3.1 Definition
Let  be a general frame of discernment of the problem under consideration. We define a map m(:) : D ! [0; 1]
associated to a given body of evidence B which can support paradoxical information, as follows
m(;) = 0 (35)
X
A2D

m(A) = 1 (36)
The quantity m(A) is called A’s general basic probability number. As in the DST, all subsets A 2 D for which
m(A) > 0 are called focal elements of m(:) and the set of all focal elements of m(:) is also called the coreK(m) of m.
The belief and plausibility functions are defined in the same way as in the DST, i.e.
Bel(A) =
X
B2D

;BA
m(B) (37)
Pl(A) =
X
B2D

;B\A6=;
m(B) (38)
Note that, we don’t define here explicitly the complementary Ac of a proposition A since m(Ac) cannot be precisely
evaluated from [ and \ operators on D since we include the possibility to deal with a complete paradoxical source of
information such that 8A 2 D; 8B 2 D;m(A \ B) > 0. These definitions are compatible with the DST definitions
when the sources of information become uncertain but rational (they do not support paradoxical information). We still
have 8A 2 D ;Bel(A)  Pl(A).
4.3.2 Construction of pignistic probabilities from general basic assignment numbers
The construction of a pignistic probability measure from the general basic numbers m(:) over D with jj = n is still
possible and is given by the general expression of the form
8i = 1; : : : ; n Pf
i
g =
X
A2D



i
(A)m(A) (39)
where 

i
(A) 2 [0; 1] are weighting coefficients which depend on the inclusion or non-inclusion of 
i
with respect to
propositionA. No general analytic expression for 

i
(A) has been derived yet even if 

i
(A) can be obtained explicitely
for simple examples. When general bpa m(:) reduces to classical bpa (i.e. the DS bpa without paradoxe), then 

i
(A) =
1
jAj
if 
i
 A and therefore one gets
8i = 1; : : : ; n Pf
i
g =
X
Aj
i
2A
1
jAj
m(A) (40)
We present now two examples of pignistic probabilities reconstruction from a general and non degenerated bpa m(:) (i.e.
@A 2 D
 withA 6= ; such thatm(A) = 0) over D.
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The evaluation of weighting coefficients αθi(A) has been obtained from the geometrical interpretation of the relative contribution 
of the distinct parts of A with proposition θi under consideration.  For example, consider A = (θ1∩θ2)∪θ3 which corresponds to 
the area a1∪a2∪a3∪a4∪a5 on the following Venn diagram. 
                                          
Figure 1: Representation of A = (θ1∩θ2)∪θ3 ≡ a1 ∪ a2 ∪ a3 ∪ a4 ∪ a5 
 
a1 which is shared only by θ3 will contribute to θ3 with weight 1; a2 which is shared by θ1 and θ3 will contribute to θ3 with weight 
1/2; a3 which is not shared by θ3 will contribute to θ3 with weight 0; a4 which is shared by θ2 and θ3 will contribute to θ3 with 
weight 1/2; a5 which is shared by both θ1, θ2 and θ3 will contribute to θ3 with weight 1/3.  Since moreover, one must have 
∀A∈DΘ with m(A)≠0, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )AmAmAAm n
i i
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=1
,0 αθ , it is necessary to normalize αθi(A).  Therefore αθi(A) is 
given by  
( ) ( ) ( )
5
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All αθi(A), ∀A∈DΘ entering in derivation of P{θi} can be obtained using similar process. 
 
4.4  General rule of combination of paradoxical sources of evidence* 
 
4.4.1  The rule of combination 
Let’s consider now two distinct (but potentially paradoxical) bodies of evidences B1 and B2 over the same frame of discernment θ 
with belief functions Bel1(.) and Bel2(.) associated with information granules m1(.) and m2(.).  The combined global belief 
function Bel(.) =Bel1(.) ⊕ Bel2(.) is obtained through the combination of the granules m1(.) and m2(.) by the simple rule 
                                       
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( )BmAmCmmCmDC
CBADBA
2
,,
121, ∑
=∩
=⊕∆∀
θε
θε                                                      (41) 
Since DΘ is closed under ∪ and ∩ operators, this new rule of combination guarantees that m(.) : DΘ → [0, 1] is a proper general 
information granule satisfying (35) and (36).  The global belief function Bel(.) is then obtained from the granule m(.) through 
(37).  This rule of combination is commutative and associative and can always be used for fusion of paradoxical and/or rational 
sources of information (bodies of evidence).  Obviously, the decision process will have to be made with more caution to take 
final decision based on the general granule m() when internal paradoxical conflicts arise.  
It is important to note that any fusion of sources of information generates either uncertainties, paradoxes or in general both.  This 
is intrinsic to the general fusion process itself.  For instance, let’s consider the frame of discernment Θ = {θ1, θ2}and the 
following very simple examples:  
*This has been called Dezert-Smarandache Rule of Combination of Paradoxical Sources of Evidence [ref.]. 
 If we consider the two rational information granules
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 If we consider the two uncertain information granules
m
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 If we consider the two paradoxical information granules
m
1
(
1
) = 0:80 m
1
(
2
) = 0:15 m
1
(
1
[ 
2
) = 0 m
1
(
1
\ 
2
) = 0:05
m
2
(
1
) = 0:90 m
2
(
2
) = 0:05 m
2
(
1
[ 
2
) = 0 m
2
(
1
\ 
2
) = 0:05
then
m(
1
) = 0:72 m(
2
) = 0:0075 m(
1
[ 
2
) = 0 m(
1
\ 
2
) = 0:2725
 If we consider the two uncertain and paradoxical information granules
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Note that this general fusion rule can also be used with intuitionist logic in which the sum of bpa is allowed to be
less than one (Pm(A) < 1) and with the paraconsistent logic in which the sum of bpa is allowed to be greater than
one (Pm(A) > 1) as well. In such cases, the fusion result does not provide in general Pm(A) = 1. By example,
let’s consider the fusion of the paraconsistent source B
1
with m
1
(
1
) = 0:60, m
1
(
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) = 0:30, m
1
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m
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) = 0:10. In such case, the fusion result of these two sources of information yields the following global
paraconsistent bpa m(:)
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X
m = 1:08 > 1
In practice, for the sake of fair comparison between several alternatives or choices, it is better and simplier to deal with
normalized bpa to take a final important decision for the problem under consideration. A nice property of the new rule of
combination of non-normalized bpa is its invariance to the pre- or post-normalization process as we will show right now.
In the previous example, the post-normalization of bpa m(:) will yield the new bpa m0(:)
m
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The fusion of pre-normalization of bpa m
1
(:) and m
2
(:) will yield the same normalized bpa m0(:) since
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It is easy to verify from the general fusion table that the pre or post normalization step yields always the same global
normalized bpa even for the general case (when jj = n) because the post-normalization constant Pm(A) is always
equal to the product of the two pre-normalization constants
P
m
1
(A) and
P
m
2
(A).
4.4.2 Justification of the new rule of combination from information entropy
Let’s consider two bodies of evidence B
1
and B
2
characterized respectively by their bpa m
1
(:),m
2
(:) and their cores
K
1
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2
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2
). Following Sun’s notation [66], each source of information will be denoted
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where f (1)
i
; i = 1; k are focal elements of B
1
and f (2)
j
; j = 1; l are focal elements of B
2
.
Let’s consider now the combined information associated with a new body of evidence B resulting from the fusion of
B
1
and B
2
having bpa m(:) with core K. We denote B as
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The fusion of 2 informations granules can be represented with the general table fusion as follows
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We look for the optimal rule of combination, i.e. the bpa m(:) = m
1
(:)  m
2
(:) which maximizes the joint entropy of
the two information sources. The justification for the Maxent criteria is discussed in [24, 27]. Thus, one has to find m(:)
such that [66, 67].
max
m
[H(m)]  max
m
2
4
 
k
X
i=1
l
X
j=1
m(f
(1)
i
\ f
(2)
j
) log[m(f
(1)
i
\ f
(2)
j
)]
3
5
  min
m
[ H(m)] (45)
satisfying both
 the measurement projection principle (marginal bpa), i.e. 8i = 1; : : : ; k and 8j = 1; : : : ; l
m
1
(f
(1)
i
) =
l
X
j=1
m(f
(1)
i
\ f
(2)
j
) and m
2
(f
(2)
j
) =
k
X
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m(f
(1)
i
\ f
(2)
j
) (46)
These constraints state that the marginal bpa m
1
(:) is obtained by the summation over each column of the fusion
table and the marginal bpa m
2
(:) is obtained by the summation over each row of the fusion table.
 the measurement balance principle (the sum of all cells of the fusion table must be unity)
k
X
i=1
l
X
j=1
m(f
(1)
i
\ f
(2)
j
) = 1 (47)
Using the concise notationm
ij
, m(f
(1)
i
\f
(2)
j
), the Lagrangian associated with this optimization problem under equality
constraints is given by (we consider here the minimization of  J(m) appearing in r.h.s of (45))
L(m;) =
k
X
i=1
l
X
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m
ij
ln[m
ij
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which can be written more concisely as
L(m;) =  H(m) + 
0
g(m) (49)
where m = [m
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Following the classical method of Lagrange multipliers, one has to find optimal solution (m; ) such that
@L
@m
(m

; 

) = 0 and @L
@
(m

; 

) = 0 (51)
The first k l equations express the general solutionm[] and the k+ l+ 1 last equations determine  and therefore by
substitution into m[], the optimal solutionm = m[]. One has to solve
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which yields 8i; j,
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The last constraint in (54) can also be written as
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Now with basic algebraic manipulation, the optimal global bpa m
ij
8i; j we are searching for, can be expressed as
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Thus, the solution of the maximisation of the joint entropy is obtained by choosing 8i; j
m
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i
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(2)
j
) = m
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i
)m
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Since it may exist several combinations yielding to the same focal element, the bpa of all focal elements equal to f (1)
i
\f
(2)
j
over the fusion space is
m(f
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i
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(2)
j
) =
X
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m
1
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(1)
i
)m
2
(f
(2)
j
) (57)
which coincides exactly with the new rule of combination expressed previously.
4.4.3 Numerical example of entropy calculation
We present here a very simple numerical example of the derivation of entropies of individual sources of informations and
the combined (joint) entropy of combined sources. Let’s consider the simple frame of discernment  = f
1
; 
2
g and the
two following (uncertain and paradoxical) information granules
m
1
(
1
) = 0:60 m
1
(
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) = 0:20 m
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2
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2
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1
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2
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2
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1
\ 
2
) = 0:20
The fusion rule can be described through the following fusion table
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(58)
Each cell of the table provides a part of the global bpa m(:) contribution for the corresponding proposition M indicated
between parentheses. The entropies of individual sources are given by
H(M
1
) =  0:60 ln(0:60)  0:20 ln(0:20)  0:10 ln(0:10)  0:10 ln(0:10) = 1:0889 nats
H(M
2
) =  0:50 ln(0:50)  0:20 ln(0:20)  0:10 ln(0:10)  0:20 ln(0:20) = 1:2206 nats
The conditional entropies H(M
1
jM
2
) and H(M
2
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1
) are given by [9]
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=(0:5 1:0889) + (0:2 1:0889) + (0:1 1:0889) + (0:2 1:0889)
=1:0889 nats
H(M
2
jM
1
) =m
1
(M
1
= 
1
)H(M
2
jM
1
= 
1
) +m
1
(M
1
= 
2
)H(M
2
jM
1
= 
2
)
+m
1
(M
1
= 
1
\ 
2
)H(M
2
jM
1
= 
1
\ 
2
) +m
1
(M
1
= 
1
[ 
2
)H(M
2
jM
1
= 
1
[ 
2
)
=0:6H

(
0:30
0:60
;
0:12
0:60
;
0:06
0:60
;
0:12
0:60
)

+ 0:2H

(
0:10
0:20
;
0:04
0:20
;
0:02
0:20
;
0:04
0:20
)

+ 0:1H

(
0:05
0:10
;
0:02
0:10
;
0:01
0:10
;
0:02
0:10
)

+ 0:1H

(
0:05
0:10
;
0:02
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Therefore, one has
H(M
1
) = H(M
1
jM
2
) = 1:0889 nats and H(M
2
) = H(M
2
jM
1
) = 1:2206 nats
The joint entropyH(M ) = H(M
1
;M
2
) is directly obtained from the cells of the fusion table and one gets
H(M ) = H[(0:3; 0:1;0:05; 0:05;0:12;0:04;0:02; 0:02;0:06;0:02;0:01; 0:01;0:12;0:04;0:02; 0:02)] = 2:3095 nats
Hence, one has verified the classical result (chain rule) of the information theory, i.e.
H(M ) = H(M
1
) +H(M
2
jM
1
) = H(M
2
) +H(M
1
jM
2
)
or more specially because of the independence of the two sources of information
H(M ) = H(M
1
) +H(M
2
)
Note that H(M ) must be evaluated using the full description of the fusion table (from all the cells of the table) and not
from the global bpa m(:). Otherwise a smaller value for H(M ) is deduced, as it can be easily shown. From the fusion
table, one gets the final bpa m(:) with
m(
1
) = 0:41 m(
2
) = 0:08 m(
1
[ 
2
) = 0:01 m(
1
\ 
2
) = 0:50
The evaluation of H(M ) from bpa m(:) yields the value
~
H(M ) = H[(0:41; 0:08;0:01;0:50)] = 0:96023 nats < H(M )
Remark
Note that in this example, the combination of the two sources reduces the uncertainty of judgment of each local infor-
mation sources since ~H(M ) < H(M
1
) and ~H(M ) < H(M
2
). This is unfortunalely not a valid conclusion in general as
many people (wrongly) think. We argue that the fusion of independent sources of information does not necessarly reduces
the uncertainty of judgment. To convince the reader, just take the similar example with the following new information
granules
m
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) = 0:090 m
2
(
2
) = 0:900 m
2
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2
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\ 
2
) = 0:001
It is not too difficult to check that global bpa m(:) is
m(
1
) = 0:08991 m(
2
) = 0:08991 m(
1
[ 
2
) = 0:000081 m(
1
\ 
2
) = 0:820099
with corresponding entropies
H(M
1
) = H(M
2
) = 0:36084 nats and ( ~H(M ) = 0:59659) < (H(M ) = 0:72168)
but ~H(M ) > H(M
1
) and ~H(M ) > H(M
2
). Thus in this case, the fusion increases actually the uncertainty of the final
judgment.
4.4.4 Definition for the generalized entropy of a source
The evaluation of the entropyH(m) of a given source from the direct extension of its classical definition, with convention
(see [9]) 0 ln(0) = 0 and with bpa m(:), i.e.
H(m) =  
X
A2D

m(A) ln(m(A))
seems to not be the best measure for the self-information of a general (uncertain and paradoxical) source of information
because it does not catch the intrinsic informational strength (i.i.s. for short) s(A) of the propositions A. An extension
of the classical entropy in the DST framework had already been proposed in 1983 by R. Yager based on the weight of
conflict between the belief function Bel and the certain support function Bel
A
focused on each propositionA (see [70] for
details). In the classical definition (based only on probability measure), one always has s(A)  jAj = 1. This does not
hold in our general theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning and we propose to generalize the notion of entropy in
the following manner to measure correctly the self-information of a general source :
H
g
(m) =  
X
A2D

1
s(A)
m(A) ln(
1
s(A)
m(A)) (59)
H
g
(m) will be called the generalized entropy of the source associated with bpa m(:). This general definition introduces
the cardinality of a general (irreductible) propositionA which can be derived from the two following important rules
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(61)
It is very important to note that these rules apply only on irreductible propositions (logical atoms) A. A propositionA is
said to be irreductible (or equivalently has a compact form) if and only if it does not admit other equivalent form with a
smaller number of operands and operators. For example (
1
[ 
3
) \ (
2
[ 
3
) is not an irreductible proposition since it
can be reduced to its equivalent logical atom (
1
\ 
2
) [ 
3
. To compute the i.i.s. s(A) of any proposition A using the
rules (60) and (61), the proposition has first to be reduced to its minimal representation (irreductible form).
Examples
Here are few examples of the value of the cardinality for some elementary and composite irreductible propositionsA. We
recall that 
i
involved in A are singletons such that j
i
j = 1.
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) [ (
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)) s(A) = 1
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) \ (
3
[ 
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)) s(A) = 1
A = (
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\ 
2
) [ (
3
\ 
4
\ 
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)) s(A) = 5=6
A = (
1
[ 
2
) \ (
3
[ 
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[ 
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)) s(A) = 6=5
Thus the evaluation of s(A) for any general irreductible proposition A can always be obtained from the two basic rules
(60) and (61). This generalized definition makes sense with the notion of entropy and is coherent with classical definition
(i.e. H
g
(m)  H(m) when m(:) becomes a bayesian bpa p(:)). Let  = f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g be a general frame of discern-
ment of the problem under consideration and a general body of evidence with information granule m(:) on D, then
the generalized entropy H
g
(m) takes its minimal value  n ln(n) when the source provides the maximum of paradoxe
which is obtained when m(
1
\ : : : \ 
n
) = 1. It is important to note that the maximum of uncertainty is not obtained
when m(
1
[ : : :[ 
n
) = 1 but rather for a specific m() which distributes some weight of evidence assignment to each
propositionA 2 D because there is less information (from the information theory viewpoint) when there exists several
propositions with non nul bpa rather than one. One has also to take into account the intrinsic self-information of the
propositions to get a good measure of global information provided by a source. The generalized entropy includes both
aspects of the information (the intrinsic and the classical aspect). The uniform distribution for m(:) does not generate the
maximum generalized-entropy because of the different intrinsic self-information of each proposition (see next example).
We argue that the generalized entropy of any source defined with respect to a frame  appears to be a very useful tool to
measure the degree of uncertainty and paradoxe of any given source of information.
Example
We give here some values of H
g
(m) for different sources of information over the same frame  = f
1
; 
2
g. The
sources have been classified from the most informative one B
1
up to the less informative one B
16
. B
16
corresponds to the
source containing minimal information on the hyper-power set of the frame  (thus B
16
has the minimal discrimination
power between all possible propositions). There does not exist a source B
k
such that HBk
g
(m) > H
B
16
g
(m) for this
simpliest example. Findingm(:) such that H
g
(m

) takes its maximal value for a general frame  with jj = n is called
the general whitening source problem. No solution for this problem has been obtained so far.
m(
1
) m(
2
) m(
1
[ 
2
) m(
1
\ 
2
) H
g
(m)
B
1
0 0 0 1  1:386
B
2
0 0 0:3 0:7  0:186
B
3
1 0 0 0 0
B
4
0 1 0 0 0
B
5
0:1 0:2 0 0:7 0:081
B
6
0 0 1 0 0:346
B
7
0:8 0:2 0 0 0:500
B
8
0 0 0:7 0:3 0:673
B
9
0:5 0:5 0 0 0:693
B
10
0:7 0:2 0:1 0 0:721
B
11
0:7 0:2 0 0:1 0:893
B
12
0:1 0:2 0:7 1 0:919
B
13
0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 1:015
B
14
0:1 0:2 0:4 0:3 1:180
B
15
0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25 1:299
B
16
0:25 0:25 0:35 0:15 1:359
B
1
is the most informative source because all the weights of evidence about the truth are focused only on the smaller
element 
1
\ 
2
of hyper-powerset D . B
2
is less informative than B
1
because there exists an ambiguity between the
two propositions 
1
[ 
2
and 
1
\ 
2
. B
3
and B
4
are less informative than B
1
because the weights of evidence about
the truth are focused on larger elements (
1
or 
2
respectively) of D. B
6
is less informative than B
3
or B
4
because the
weight of evidence about the truth is focused on a bigger element 
1
[ 
2
of D. B
7
is less informative than previous
sources since there exists an ambiguity between the two propositions 
1
and 
2
but it is more informative than B
9
since
the discrimination power (our easiness to decide which proposition supports the truth) is higher with B
7
than with B
9
.
Note that even if in this very simple example, it is not obvious to see that B
16
is the less informative (white) source of
information. Most of readers would have probably thought to choose either B
6
or B
15
. This comes from the confusion
between the intrinsic information supported by the proposition itself and the information supported by the whole bpa
m(:).
4.4.5 Zadeh’s example
Let’s take back the disturbing Zadeh’s example given in section 3.4. Two doctors examine a patient and agree that it
suffers from either meningitis (M), concussion (C) or brain tumor (T). Thus  = fM;C; Tg. Assume that the doctors
agree in their low expectation of a tumor, but disagree in likely cause and provide the following diagnosis
m
1
(M ) = 0:99 m
1
(T ) = 0:01 and 8A 2 D ; A 6= T;A 6= M; m
1
(A) = 0
m
2
(C) = 0:99 m
2
(T ) = 0:01 and 8A 2 D ; A 6= T;A 6= C; m
2
(A) = 0
The new general rule of combination (41), yields the following combined information granule
m(M \C) = 0:9801 m(M \ T ) = 0:0099 m(C \ T ) = 0:0099 m(T ) = 0:0001
From this granule, one gets
Bel(M ) = m(M \C) +m(M \ T ) = 0:99
Bel(C) = m(M \C) +m(T \C) = 0:99
Bel(T ) = m(T ) +m(M \ T ) +m(C \ T ) = 0:0199
If both doctors can be considered as equally reliable, the combined information granule m(:) mainly focuses weight of
evidence on the paradoxical proposition M \ C which means that patient suffers both meningitis and concussion but
almost surely not from brain tumor. This conclusion is coherent with the common sense actually. Then, no therapy for
brain tumor (like heavy and ever risky brain surgical intervention) will be chosen in such case. This really helps to take
important decision to save the life of the patient in this example. A deeper medical examination adapted to both meningitis
and concussion will almost surely be done before applying the best therapy for the patient. Just remember that in this
case, the DST had concluded that the patient had brain tumor with certainty : : : .
4.4.6 Mahler’s example revisited
Let’s consider now the following example excerpt from the R. Mahler’s paper [36]. We consider that our classification
knowledge base consists of the three (imaginary) new and rare diseases corresponding to following frame of discernment
 = f
1
= kotosis; 
2
= phlegaria; 
3
= pinpoxg
We assume that the three diseases are equally likely to occur in the patient population but there is some evidence that
phlegaria and pinpox are the same disease and there is also a small possibility that kotosis and phlegaria might be the
same disease. Finally, there is a small possibility that all three diseases are the same. This information can be expressed
by assigning a priori bpa as follows
m
0
(
1
) = 0:2 m
0
(
2
) = 0:2 m
0
(
3
) = 0:2
m
0
(
2
\ 
3
) = 0:2 m
0
(
1
\ 
2
) = 0:1 m
0
(
1
\ 
2
\ 
3
) = 0:1
Let Bel(:) the prior belief measure corresponding to this prior bpa m(:). Now assume that Doctor D
1
and Doctor D
2
examine a patient and deliver diagnoses with following reports:
 Report for D
1
: m
1
(
1
[ 
2
[ 
3
) = 0:05 m
1
(
2
[ 
3
) = 0:95
 Report for D
2
: m
2
(
1
[ 
2
[ 
3
) = 0:20 m
2
(
2
) = 0:80
The combination of the evidences provided by the two doctorsm0 = m
1
m
2
obtained by the general rule of combination
(41) yields the following bpa m0(:)
m
0
(
2
) = 0:8 m
0
(
2
[ 
3
) = 0:19 m
0
(
1
[ 
2
[ 
3
) = 0:01
The combination of bpa m0(:) with prior evidence m
0
(:) yields the final bpa m = m
0
m
0
= m
0
 [m
1
m
2
] with
m(
1
) = 0:002 m(
2
) = 0:200 m(
3
) = 0:040
m(
1
\ 
2
) = 0:260 m(
2
\ 
3
) = 0:360 m(
1
\ 
2
\ 
3
) = 0:100
m(
1
\ (
2
[ 
3
)) = 0:038
Therefore the final belief function given by (37) is
Bel(
1
) = 0:002+ 0:260 + 0:100 + 0:038 = 0:400
Bel(
2
) = 0:200+ 0:260 + 0:360 + 0:100 = 0:920
Bel(
3
) = 0:040+ 0:360 + 0:100 = 0:500
Bel(
1
\ 
2
) = 0:260 + 0:100 = 0:360
Bel(
2
\ 
3
) = 0:360 + 0:100 = 0:460
Bel(
1
\ (
2
[ 
3
)) = 0:038 + 0:100 = 0:138
Bel(
1
\ 
2
\ 
3
) = 0:100
Thus, on the basis of all the evidences one has, we are able to conclude with high a degree of belief that the patient has
phlegaria which is coherent with the Mahler’s conclusion based on his Conditioned Dempster-Shafer theory developed
from his conditional event algebra although a totally new and simpliest approach has been adopted here.
4.4.7 A thief identification example
Let’s revisit a very simple thief identification example. Assume that a 75 years old grandfather is taking a walk with his
9 years old grandson in a park. They saw at 50 meters away, a 45 years old pickpocket robbering the bag of an old lady.
A policeman looking for some witnesses of this event asks separately the grandfather and his grandchild if they have seen
the thief (they both answer yes) and how was the thief (a young or an old man). The grandfather (source of information
B
1
reports that the thief was a young man with high confidence 0.99 and with only a low uncertainty 0.01. His grandson
reports that the thief was a old man with high confidence 0.99 and with only a low uncertainty 0.01. These two witnesses
provide fair reports (with respect to their own world of knowledge) even if apparently they appear as paradoxical. The
policeman then send the two reports with only minimal information about witnesses (saying only their names and that they
were a priori fully trustable) to an investigator. The investigator has no possibility to meet or to call back the witnesses in
order to get more details.
Under such condition, what would be the best decision to be taken by the investigator about the age of the thief to
eventually help to catch him? Such kind of simple examples occur quite frequently in witnesses problems actually. A
rational investigator will almost surely suspect a mistake or an error in one or both reports since they appear apparently
in full contradiction. The investigator will then try to take his final decision with some other better information (if any).
If the investigator uses our new plausible and paradoxical reasoning, he will defined the following bpa with respect to the
frame of discernment  = f
1
= young; 
2
= oldg and the available reports B
1
and B
2
with following bpa
m
1
(
1
) = 0:99 m
1
(
2
) = 0 m
1
(
1
[ 
2
) = 0:01 m
1
(
1
\ 
2
) = 0
m
2
(
1
) = 0 m
2
(
2
) = 0:99 m
2
(
1
[ 
2
) = 0:01 m
2
(
1
\ 
2
) = 0
The fusion of these two sources of information yields the global bpa m(:) with
m(
1
) = 0:0099 m(
2
) = 0:0099 m(
1
[ 
2
) = 0:0001 m(
1
\ 
2
) = 0:9801
Thus, from this global information, the investigator has no better choice but to consider with almost certainty that the thief
was both a young and old man. By assuming that the expected life duration is around 80 years, the inspector will deduce
that the true age of the thief is around 40 years old which is not too far from the truth. At least, this conclusion could be
helpful to interrogate some suspicious individuals.
4.4.8 A model to generate information granules m(:) from intervals
We present here a model to generate information granules m(:) from information represented by intervals. It is very com-
mon in practice that uncertain sources of information provide evidence on a given proposition in term of basic intervals
[

; 

]  [0; 1] rather than a direct bpa m(:). In such cases, some preprocessing must be done before applying the general
rule of combination between such sources to take the final decision.
In the DST framework, we recall that the simpliest and easiest transformation to convert [

; 

] into bpa has already
been proposed by A. Appriou in [3]. The basic idea was to interpret 

as the minimal credibility committed to A and 
as the plausibility committed to A. In other words, the Appriou’s transformation model within the DST is the following
one


= m(A)


= 1 m(A
c
)


  

= m(A [A
c
)
This model can be directly extended within our new theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning by setting now.


= m(A) +
1
2
m(A \A
c
)


= 1 m(A
c
)  
1
2
m(A \A
c
)


  

= m(A [A
c
)
or equivalently
m(A) +
1
2
m(A \A
c
) = 

(62)
m(A
c
) +
1
2
m(A \A
c
) = 1  
 (63)
m(A [A
c
) = 

  

(64)
This appealing model presents nice properties specially when  = 

= 0 or when  = 

= 1. This model is moreover
coherent with the previous Appriou’s model whenever the source becomes rational (i.e m(A\Ac) = 0). This new model
presents however a degree of freedom since one has only two constraints (62) and (63) for three unknownsm(A), m(Ac)
and m(A \Ac). Thus in general, without an additional constraint, there exists many possible choices for m(A), m(Ac)
and m(A \ Ac) and therefore there exists several bpa m(:) satisfying this transformation model. Without extra prior
information, it becomes difficult to justify the choice of a specific bpa versus all other admissible possibilities for m(:).
To solve this important drawback, we propose to add the constraint on the maximization of the generalized-entropy
H
g
(m). This will allow us to obtain from [

; 

] the unique bpa m(:) having the minimum of specificity and admissible
with our transformation model. From definition of H
g
(m) and previous equations (62)-(64), one gets
H
g
(m) =   (

 m(A \A
c
)=2) ln(

 m(A \A
c
)=2)  (1  

 m(A \A
c
)=2) ln(1  

 m(A \A
c
)=2)
 
1
2
(

  

) ln(
1
2
(

  

))   2m(A \A
c
) ln(2m(A \A
c
))
The maximization of H
g
(m) is obtained for the optimal value m?(A \Ac) such that @Hg
@m(A\A
c
)
(m
?
(A \A
c
)) = 0 and
@
2
H
g
@m(A\A
c
)
2
(m
?
(A \A
c
)) < 0. The annulation of the first derivative is obtained by the solution of the equation
1
2
ln(

 m
?
=2) +
1
2
ln(1  

 m
?
=2)  2m
?
ln(2m
?
)  1 = 0
or equivalently after basic algebraic manipulations
64e
2
(m
?
)
4
  (m
?
)
2
+ 2(1  

+ 

)m
?
  4(1  

)

= 0 (65)
The solution of this equation does not admit a simple analytic expression but can be easily found using classical numerical
methods. It is also easy to check that the second derivative is always negative and therefore H
g
(m) reaches its maximal
value when
m(A) +
1
2
m
?
(A \A
c
) = 

(66)
m(A
c
) +
1
2
m
?
(A \A
c
) = 1  
 (67)
m(A [A
c
) = 

  

(68)
This completes the definition of our new transformation model. Note that [

; 

] can also be generated from bpa m(:)
through (62)-(64).
Numerical examples
 [

; 

] = [0:0; 0:0] m(A \A
c
) = 0:000 m(A) = 0:000 m(A
c
) = 1:000 m(A [A
c
) = 0:000
 [

; 

] = [0:2; 0:2] m(A \A
c
)  0:164 m(A)  0:118 m(A
c
)  0:718 m(A [A
c
) = 0:000
 [

; 

] = [0:5; 0:5] m(A \A
c
)  0:192 m(A)  0:404 m(A
c
)  0:404 m(A [A
c
) = 0:000
 [

; 

] = [0:8; 0:8] m(A \A
c
)  0:164 m(A)  0:718 m(A
c
)  0:118 m(A [A
c
) = 0:000
 [

; 

] = [1:0; 1:0] m(A \A
c
) = 0:000 m(A) = 1:000 m(A
c
) = 0:000 m(A [A
c
) = 0:000
 [

; 

] = [0:2; 0:4] m(A \A
c
)  0:152 m(A)  0:124 m(A
c
)  0:524 m(A [A
c
) = 0:200
 [

; 

] = [0:6; 0:8] m(A \A
c
)  0:152 m(A)  0:524 m(A
c
)  0:124 m(A [A
c
) = 0:200
 [

; 

] = [0:4; 0:6] m(A \A
c
)  0:170 m(A)  0:315 m(A
c
)  0:315 m(A [A
c
) = 0:200
 [

; 

] = [0:3; 0:9] m(A \A
c
)  0:100 m(A)  0:250 m(A
c
)  0:050 m(A [A
c
) = 0:600
 [

; 

] = [0:0; 1:0] m(A \A
c
) = 0:000 m(A) = 0:000 m(A
c
) = 0:000 m(A [A
c
) = 1:000
5 Plausible and paradoxical reasoning in the neutrosophy framework
5.1 Neutrosophy and the neutrosophic logic
The neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy, introduced by Florentin Smarandache in 1980, which studies the origin,
nature and scope of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra. Neutrosophy considers a
proposition, theory, event, concept, or entitity, A in relation to its opposite, anti-A and that which is not A, non-A, and
that which is neither A nor anti-A, denoted by neut-A. Neutrosophy serves as the basis for the neutrosophic logic [22].
The Neutrosophic Logic (NL) or Smarandache’s logic is a general framework for the unification of all existing logics
[56, 57, 58]). The main idea of NL is to characterize each logical statement in a 3D neutrosophic space where each
dimension of the space represents respectively the truth (T), the falsehood (F) and the indeterminacy (I) of the statement
under consideration where T, I and F are standard or non-sandard real subsets of ] 0; 1+[. Moreover in NL, each statement
is allowed to be over or under true, over or under false and over or under inderterminate by using hyper real numbers
developed in the non-standard analysis theory [43, 14]. The neutrosophical valueN(A) = (T (A); I(A); F (A)) in a frame
of discernment (world of discourse)  of a statement A is then defined as a subset (a volume not necessary connexe;
i.e. a set of disjoint volumes) of the neutrosophic space. Any statement A represented by a triplet N(A) is called a
neutrosophic event or N   event. The subset N
t
, T (A) characterizes the truth part of statement A. N
i
, (A)
and N
f
, F (A) represent the inderterminacy and the falsehood of A. This Smarandache’s representation is close to
the human reasoning. It characterizes and catches the imprecision of knowledge or linguistic inexactitude received by
various observers, uncertainty due to incomplete knowledge of acquisition errors or stochasticity, and vagueness due to
lack of clear contours or limits. This approach allows theoretically to consider any kinds of logical statements. For
example, the fuzzy set logic or the classical modal logic (which works with statements verifying T (A), I(A)  0,
F (A) = 1   T (A), where T is a real number belonging to [0; 1]) are included in NL. The neutrosophic logic can easily
handle also paradoxes. We emphaze the fact that in general the neutrosohic valueN(A) of a propositionA can also depend
on dynamical parameters which can evolve with time, space, etc. For seak of concise notation, we omit to introduce this
dependence in our notations in the sequel.
Basic operations on sets
Beside this modelling, F. Smarandache has introduced the following operations on sets. Consider S
1
and S
2
be two
(unidimensional) standard or non-standard real subsets. The addition, substraction, multiplication and division (by a non
null finite number) of these sets are defined as follows :
 Addition
S
1
 S
2
= S
2
 S
1
, fx j x = s
1
+ s
2
; 8s
1
2 S
1
; 8s
2
2 S
2
g (69)
 Substraction
S
1
	 S
2
=  (S
2
	 S
1
) , fx j x = s
1
  s
2
; 8s
1
2 S
1
; 8s
2
2 S
2
g (70)
For real positive subsets, the Inf and Sup values of S
1
	 S
2
are given by
Inf[S
1
	 S
2
] = Inf[S
1
]  Sup[S
2
] and Sup[S
1
	 S
2
] = Sup[S
1
]  Inf[S
2
]
 Multiplication
S
1
 S
2
= S
2
 S
1
, fx j x = s
1
 s
2
; 8s
1
2 S
1
; 8s
2
2 S
2
g (71)
For real positive subsets, one gets
Inf[S
1
 S
2
] = Inf[S
1
]  Inf[S
2
] and Sup[S
1
 S
2
] = Sup[S
1
]  Sup[S
2
]
 Division of a set by a non null standard number
Let k 2 R, then
S
1
 k , fx j x = s
1
=k; 8s
1
2 S
1
g (72)
Neutrosophic topology
Let’s construct now a neutrosophic topology (NT) [56] on interval ] 0; 1+[, by considering the associated family of
standard or non-standard subsets included in ] 0; 1+[ and the empty set ;, which is closed under set union and finite
intersection. The union and intersection of two any propositions A and B (corresponding to either the part of truth,
indeterminacy or falsehood of a given assertion defined on ] 0; 1+[) are defined as follows
A [B = (A B) 	 (A B) and A \B = A B (73)
The neutrosophic complement of A is defined as A = f1+g 	 A and theN  value of an assertion A is characterized by
a mapping functionN(:) such that
N : A 7! N(A) = (T (A); I(A); F (A)) ]
 
0; 1
+
[
3 (74)
The interval ] 0; 1+[, endowed with this topology, forms a neutrosophic topological space.
Consider now two statements A
1
and A
2
, then one defines the following basic neutrosophic operators:
N(A
1
)N(A
2
) =(T
1
 T
2
; I
1
 I
2
; F
1
 F
2
) (75)
N(A
1
)N(A
2
) =(T
1
	 T
2
; I
1
	 I
2
; F
1
	 F
2
) (76)
N(A
1
) N(A
2
) =(T
1
 T
2
; I
1
 I
2
; F
1
 F
2
) (77)
where T
i
= T (A
i
), I
i
= I(A
i
), F
i
= F (A
i
) for i = 1; 2.
Since the truth, falsehood and indeterminacy of any statement must belong to ] 0; 1+[, the result of each previous operator
,  and   must be in ] 0; 1+[3. Therefore upper and lower bounds of T
1
 T
2
must be set respectively to  0 and 1+
whenever inf(T
1
 T
2
) < 0 or sup(T
1
 T
2
) > 1. The same remark applies for  and   operators and for falsehood
and inderterminacy part of compounded statement.
All classical logical operators and connectors can be extented in the N {Logic. For notation convenience, we will
identify logical operators with their classical counterpart in set theory as pointed out in [35] (hence the following equiv-
alences will be used :A  A, A
1
^ A
2
 A
1
\ A
2
and A
1
_ A
2
 A
1
[ A
2
throughout this paper). We recall here
only important operators used in the sequel. Additional neutrosophic logical operators like (strong disjunction, implica-
tion, equivalence, Sheffer’s and Pierce’s connectors) and general, physics and philosophical examples of application of
neutrosophic operators can be found in [56, 58].
 Negation
N(

A) = (f1g 	 T (A); f1g 	 I(A); f1g 	 F (A)) (78)
 Conjunction
N(A
1
\ A
2
) = N(A
1
) N(A
2
) = (T
1
 T
2
; I
1
 I
2
; F
1
 F
2
) (79)
 Disjunction
N(A
1
[ A
2
) = (T
1
[ T
2
; I
1
[ I
2
; F
1
[ F
2
)
= ((T
1
 T
2
) 	 (T
1
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2
); (I
1
 I
2
)	 (I
1
 I
2
); (I
1
 I
2
)	 (I
1
 I
2
))
= [N(A
1
)N(A
2
)]  [N(A
1
) N(A
2
)] (80)
N { Membership function over a neutrosophic set
Let  be a world of discourse (called frame of discernment in the DST). Each N element x of  is characterized by its
own neutrosophical basic assignment (N { value)N(x) , (T (x); I(x); F (x)) with T (x),I(x) and F (x) ] 0; 1+[. The
N { membership function of any neutrosophical element x with any subset M   is defined in similar way by
N(x jM ) , (T
M
(x); I
M
(x); F
M
(x)) (81)
with T
M
(x),I
M
(x) and F
M
(x) ]
 
0; 1
+
[. The N { value of x over M can be interpreted, by abuse of language, as
its membership function to M in the following sense: x is t% true in the set M , i% indeterminate (unknown if it is)
in M , and f% false in M , where t varies in T , i varies in I, f varies in F . The standard notation x 2 M will be
used in the sequel to denote the neutrosophical membership of x to M . One can say actually that any element x of a
given frame of discernment supported by a body of evidence neutrosophically belongs to any set, due to the percentages
of truth/indeterminacy/falsity involved, which varies between 0 and 1 or even less than 0 or greater than 1. From this
definition and previous neutrosophic rules, one gets directly the following basic neutrosophical set operations :
 Complement of M
If x 2M withN(x jM ) , (T
M
(x); I
M
(x); F
M
(x)), then x =2M with
N(x j

M ) = (f1g 	 T
M
(x); f1g 	 I
M
(x); f1g	 F
M
(x)) (82)
 Intersection M \N
If x 2 M with N(x j M ) , (T
M
(x); I
M
(x); F
M
(x)) and x 2 N withN
jW
(x j N ) , (T
N
(x); I
N
(x); F
N
(x)),
then x 2M \N with
N(x jM \N ) = (T
M
(x) T
N
(x); I
M
(x) I
N
(x); F
M
(x) F
N
(x)) (83)
 Union M [N
If x 2M withN(x jM ) , (T
M
(x); I
M
(x); F
M
(x)) and x 2 N withN(x j N ) , (T
N
(x); I
N
(x); F
N
(x)), then
x 2M [N with
N(x jM [N ) = (T
M[N
(x); I
M[N
(x); F
M[N
(x)) (84)
where
T
M[N
(x) , [T
M
(x) T
N
(x)] 	 [T
M
(x) T
N
(x)] (85)
I
M[N
(x) , [I
M
(x) I
N
(x)] 	 [I
M
(x) I
N
(x)] (86)
F
M[N
(x) , [F
M
(x) F
N
(x)] 	 [F
M
(x)  F
N
(x)] (87)
 Difference M   N
Since M   N , M   N , if x 2 M with N(x j M ) , (T
M
(x); I
M
(x); F
M
(x)) and x 2 N with N(x j N ) ,
(T
N
(x); I
N
(x); F
N
(x)), then x 2M  N with
N(x jM  N ) = (T
M N
(x); I
M N
(x); F
M N
(x)) (88)
where
T
M N
(x) , T
M
(x) 	 [T
M
(x)  T
N
(x)] (89)
I
M N
(x) , I
M
(x) 	 [I
M
(x) I
N
(x)] (90)
F
M N
(x) , F
M
(x) 	 [F
M
(x) F
N
(x)] (91)
 Inclusion M  N
We will said that M  N if for all x 2 M with N(x j M ) , (T
M
(x); I
M
(x); F
M
(x)) and x 2 N with
N(x j N ) , (T
N
(x); I
N
(x); F
N
(x)), one has jointly T
M
(x)  T
N
(x), I
M
(x)  I
N
(x) and F
M
(x)  F
N
(x).
5.2 Combination of neutrosophic evidences
Let’s consider a general finite frame of discernment  = f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g and two bodies of (neutrosophic) evidence B
1
and B
2
. In the neutrosophic framework, we assume that each body of evidence provides some report of evidence (i.e.
N  value) committed to some elements of the hyper-power set D. In other words, the information one has to deal with
is the reports:
 Report for B
1
: R
1
= fN
1
(A
1
); : : : ;N
1
(A
m
)g for A
1
; : : : ; A
m
2 D

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where each neutrosophic value for a proposition corresponds actually to a given triplet (T (:); I(:); F (:)) ] 0; 1+[3
Within the neutrosophic logic, one has the full degree of freedom between theN  values for a report.
Our major concern now is to solve the difficult question on how to combine such kind of information to get the global
and most pertinent information about the problem under consideration. So, is it possible to construct a new global report
(and hopefully more informative) R from R
1
and R
2
? Unfortunatly, the neutrosophic logic which is a new appealing and
modelling tool to deal with uncertainties on propositions of same universe of discourse does not provide a clear and direct
mathematical mechanism for dealing with combination of such kind of evidences. We propose in this section a possible
issue for this important question based on our new generalization of the DST.
The main idea for combining such kind of evidences is to convert the reports into two proper general bpa m
R
1
(:) and
m
R
2
(:) and then combine them using the general rule of combination (41). The combination of neutrosophic evidences
is a two-level process.
Level 1 : the general bpa transformation
The major difficulty is the mapping of the set of neutrosophic values fN(:)g into a set of corresponding elementary bpa
m(:). Several cases are now examined.
 Case 1 (simpliest case) : We assume that each neutrosophic evidence corresponds only to a triplet of real positive
or null numbers belonging to [0; 1] (i.e. T (:), I(:) and F (:) are restricted to real numbers 2 [0; 1].
Since in the neutrosophic logic, T (:), I(:) and F (:) have no strong mathematical relationships, the easiest solution
within the classical DST would be to use the following transformation
m
(
A) = T (A)=c m(A
c
) = F (A)=c m(A [A
c
) = I(A)=c
where c is a normalization constant such that m
(
A) +m(A
c
) +m(A \A
c
) = 1.
In our general theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning, it seems more judicious to use the following mapping
based on our general modelling of information granule described in section 4.4.8. Thus, we are now able to construct
from T (:), I(:) and F (:) the three corresponding elementary bpa as follows for any propositionC 2 D involved
in a given report :
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(:) comes from the
necessity to not assign a prior preference to A rather than to Ac when only indeterminacy is available.
 Case 2 : We assume now that each neutrosophic evidence corresponds only to a triplet of real intervals belonging
to [0; 1]. In this case, the more general mapping is proposed.
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 Case 3 (general case) : We assume now that each component of neutrosophic value (T (A) = S
i
T
i
(A); I(A) =
S
j
I
j
(A); F (A) =
S
k
F
k
(A)) is actually the union of subintervals of [0; 1]. In such general case, we propose
to construct for each possible combinations of (T
i
(A); I
j
(A); F
k
(A)) a corresponding general bpa as for case 2
then combine all bpa using the general rule of combination to get the global bpa relative to the proposition under
consideration.
Level 2 : the combination of evidences
We have just shown how general elementary bpa can be evaluated from each neutrosophic values of a report. For the
report R
1
, we have now in hands a set of bpa m
1
(:); : : :m
m
(:) associated to every proposition in this report. Similarly,
we get also another set of bpa m0
1
(:); : : :m
0
n
(:) for report R
2
. For each set of bpa, we are now able to compute the global
general bpa m
R
1
(:) and m
R
2
(:) from the general rule of combination (41) by
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The next step of the combination is then to combine the bpa m
R
1
with m
R
2
by applying for the last time the general
rule of combination (41) to finally get the global result we are looking for; i.e.
m(:) = m
R
1
m
R
2
From the global bpam(:) defined on the hyper-power set D, we will then be able to evaluate the degree of belief of each
proposition of D which will help us to take the most pertinent decision for the problem under consideration.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, the foundations for a new theory of paradoxical and plausible reasoning has been developed which takes
into account in the combination process itself the possibility for uncertain and paradoxical information. The basis for the
development of this theory is to work with the hyper-power set of the frame of discernment relative to the problem under
consideration rather than its classical power set since, in general, the frame of discernment cannot be fully described in
terms of an exhaustive and exclusive list of disjoint elementary hypotheses. In such general case, no refinement is possible
to apply directly the Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) of evidence. In our new theory, the rule of combination is justified
from the maximum entropy principle and there is no mathematical impossibility to combine sources of evidence even if
they appear at first glance in contradiction (in the Shafer’s sense) since the paradox between sources is fully taken into
account in our formalism. We have also shown that in general, the combination of evidence yields unavoidable paradoxes.
This theory has shown, through many illustrated examples, that conclusions drawn from it, provides results which agree
perfectly with the human reasoning and is useful to take a decision on complex problems where DST usually fails. The
last part of this work has been devoted to the development of a theoretical bridge between the neutrosophic logic and
this new theory, in order to solve the delicate problem of the combination of neutrosophic evidences. The neutrosophic
logic serves here as the most general framework (prerequesite) for dealing with uncertain and paradoxical sources of
information through this new theory.
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Abstract:  This paper presents the concept of Dynamic Fuzzy Set (DFS) as an instance of 
Neutrosophic Set (NS) useful in the modeling of dynamics of mental processes. For each 
element of a NS there is a triple (T, F, I) understood as functions/operators dependent on 
time, space, and other not necessarily known parameters. T determines a degree of truth 
that a given element is in the set, while F and I are for a degree of false and 
indeterminacy, respectively. DFS has been defined as such a set that for each of its 
elements there is a function that for a given time returns a value of membership of a 
given element to the set. Based on DFS one can perform an extraordinary fuzzy 
inferencing as battle between populations of copies of contradictory statements. It has 
been observed that resulting membership values may change in time even when the 
processed data remain constant. Psychological justification of DFS came from 
empirically confirmed fact that that subject’s feelings about a perceived person or social 
situation can oscillate from a highly positive value to a highly negative value and back 
even in absence of new data about related objects.  
1  INTRODUCTION 
The concept of the fuzzy set, invented in the 60’s [8] has proved to reflect the way 
humans categorize [4]. However, while categorization is an important determinant of 
human behavior, it is not the only determinant. In order to model mental mechanisms 
underlying human interactions with surrounding reality a number of logics has been 
invented, however each of them deals rather with a selected isolated facet of mental 
activity. Neutrosophic approach proposed by Florentin Smarandache tries to bring all the 
logics together towards a unitary, formally analyzable, general model of reality [5]. A 
part of the neutrosophic model called Neutrosophic Set (NS) intended to generalize fuzzy 
set. From another attempt to generalize the concept of fuzzy set the idea of Dynamic 
Fuzzy Set (DFS) emerged. Let as, therefore, compare the two definitions: 
 
Definition 1 (Smarandache [5: 77]): 
Neutrosophic Set is a set such that an element belongs to the set with a 
neutrosophic probability, i.e. t% is true that the element is in the set, f% false, 
and i% indeterminate. 
Definition 2 (based on Buller [1]): 
Dynamic Fuzzy Set is a fuzzy set such that an element belongs to the set with a 
membership value that changes in time. 
In [5: 78] some examples of NS application suggesting that NS much better than classic 
fuzzy set reflect complex truth about reality one can find can be found. Nevertheless, the 
early definition of NS cited above says nothing about a space to which t%, f% and i% 
  
belong. If t%, f% and i% were interpreted as real numbers, DFS could be treated as a 
different sort of generalization of fuzzy set, not included in the concept of NS. But the 
concept of NS evolved. Let’s present another definition: 
 
Definition 3 (based on Smarandache [8: 111] and Smarandache [9]): 
Neutrosophic Set included in a universe of discourse is a set such that an 
element from the universe belongs to the set in such a way that  t% is true that 
the element is in the set, f% false, and i% indeterminate, where t varies in T, f 
varies in F, i varies in I, where T, I, F are functions/operators depending on 
many known and unknown parameters; here T(…), I(…), F(…) are standard or 
non-standard subsets included in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[. 
Compared to the Fuzzy Set, the Neutrosophic Set can distinguish between 
‘absolute membership’ (appurtenance) of an element to a set (T=1+), and 
‘relative membership’ (T=1), whereas the ‘partial membership’ is represented by 
0 < T < 1.  Also, the sum of neutrosophic membership components (truth, 
indeterminacy, falsehood) are not required to be 1 as in fuzzy membership 
components, but may be any number between 0 and 3. 
Since Definition 3 allows T, I and F to be dependent on time (as one of the known 
parameters), DFS may be recognized as an instance of NS such that, for example, t% : T 
→ [0, 1], i = 0 = const., f% : T → [0, 1], ∀t∈T f% = 1 – t%, where T is a space of integers 
representing moments in time. 
 
The importance of DFS comes from increasing interest in dynamic processes in 
psychology.  The development of social cognition caused in the 90’s an increasing 
interest in intrinsic dynamics of human categorization. Experiments confirmed that when 
judging a perceived person or social situation people sometimes oscillate from highly 
positive feelings to highly negative feelings even in absence of new data [3]. Similar 
oscillations were demonstrated by computational models of human working memory that 
treated mental process as a “debate” in a “society of memes” in a cellular working 
memory [2]. The idea of Dynamic Fuzzy Calculus (DFC) based on DFS emerged from 
the research on the models.  
2  Dynamic Fuzzy Calculus 
Let E = {∅, e1, ¬e1, e2, ¬e2, …} be the space of particular notions, where ∅ denotes a 
notion of reference while ¬ is the operator of negation. Let T be the space of integers 
representing time, while A be a space of functions such that ∀µ∈A µ : E2 → [0, 1]K, where 
K is a positive integer. 
   Let the entity of interest be a space B° such that  
∀a∈B° a : T → A 
Any element of B° may be considered as a system of relationships between notions. Each 
of the relationships applies to a pair of notions and expresses itself as a K-element vector 
of real numbers not lesser than 0 not greater than 1. Elements of the vector can be 
interpreted as strengths of several sorts of memberships of the second notion in a pair to a 
DFS represented by the first notion in the pair. Each of the strengths may, by definition, 
change over time.  
  
   When a system consists of a set of related notions and the relationships between the 
notions change in time we say could say that in the system a kind of mental activity takes 
palace. Buller [1] argues that thinking is nothing but changing relationships between 
notions, and concludes that any element of the space B° could be considered to be a 
model of a mind or even to be a mind itself. The thing that is the source of inconstancy of 
the relationships within B° is a brain that can be understood as any machine dedicated to 
a given a∈B° that processes every at onto at+1.  
   The space B′ contains minds that use brains understood as external devices to 
determine relationships between specific notions for consecutive moments of time. 
Formally: 
a∈B′ ⇔ ( a∈B°, ∃〈x, F〉 x = (x0, x1, x2, …, xN), 
x : T → MN, F : A × MN → A × MN, 
(at+1, xt+1) = F(at, xt) ), 
where M = E2 is the space of memes, while N is a positive integer. The brain may be, 
therefore, considered as the couple 〈x, F〉. 
   Appendix contains a description of an instance of a∈B′ reflecting an isolated process of 
social judgment. Some simulation results appeared to fit the psychological evidence that 
subjects may oscillate from highly positive feelings to highly negative feelings without 
new data about objects of reference, i.e. based exclusively on intrinsic dynamics of 
mental process. It has been suggested that the membership of reference tended to a 2-
state limit cycle attractor.  
Neurotrophic dynamics 
Let us consider a situation wherein somebody becomes a victim of a sexual assault. 
Among a number of possible plots of the victim’s feelings towards the perpetrator let us 
consider: (a) start from extreme hatred in t0 and then a linear decay of the hatred towards 
indifference in tk, and (b) constant extreme hatred that in 0.75 tk turns suddenly into 
perverse love. In terms of DFS we can describe each of the cases via providing of 
appropriate formula for function µH,t, where µH,t=1 means that the perpetrator in time t 
fully belongs to the dynamic fuzzy set of people extremely hated by the victim, µH,t=0 
may mean that the perpetrator in time t fully belongs to the dynamic fuzzy set of people 
extremely loved by the victim, while µH,t=0.5 may mean that the perpetrator in time t is 
perfectly indifferent to the victim. If one wanted to describe the victim’s feelings for t∈[ 
t0, tk] in terms of classic fuzzy sets, the simplest solution would be to provide µH  as the 
average value of µH,t in the period [ t0, tk]. The unavoidable price for this simplicity is loss 
of the knowledge ablot the essence of the victim’s mental states. Indeed, in both 
considered cases the µH would take the same value 0.75. As for full neutrosophic 
generalization, much more knowledge about subjects’ mental states could be added to the 
model if the neutrosophic component I were included and allowed to change in time. 
However, the question how to measure subjects’ indeterminacy, especially in reference to 
social judgment, remains open.  
Conclusions 
  
Psychological evidence provides justification for cognitive models based on Dynamic 
Fuzzy Sets (DFS) and Dynamic Fuzzy Calculus that deal with membership values 
changing over time. Subjects’ oscillation from highly positive feelings to highly negative 
ones and back when knowledge about an object of interest remains constant can be 
interpreted in terms of membership to a dynamic fuzzy set tending to a 2-state limit cycle 
attractor. DFS-based modeling also seems to lead to the philosophical thesis that mind is 
nothing but relationships that occur between certain notions, and that change over time. 
Neutrosophic approach intends to generalize existing logics to the most possible extent. 
DFS can be assumed to be an instance of Neutrsophic Set. A possibility generalization of 
DFS in the course of adding of more neutrosophic components, for example, 
indeterminacy factor, encourages to search for new ways of experimental exploration of 
dynamics of social judgment and for new ways of mathematical description of mental 
processes. 
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Appendix. Dynamic Fuzzy Calculus in a model of social judgment (based on [1]) 
Let us consider an instance of a∈B′ such that: 
1. K=2; 
2. E = {∅, N, n, R, r, A, a}, where  n=¬N, r=¬R, a= ¬A; 
3. ∀t∈T m∉{〈s|m〉∈E2 | m≠∅ ⇒ s∉{∅, m}} ⇒ µs,t(m) = 0; 
4. ∀t∈T µs,t(¬m) = 1 - µs,t(m); 
5. ∀t∈T  x0,t = 〈∅|∅〉, 
  
6. if ui,t = 〈∅|∅〉 then xi,t = νt, while if ui,t ≠ 〈∅|∅〉 then xi,t  = ui,t, where 
7. ∀m′∈M P(νt = m′ ) = µ1(m′, t)µ2(m′, t) / ∑m∈M µ1(m, t)µ2(m, t),  where ∀Z P(Z) is 
probability of Z; 
8. ui,t : ZN × T → M, ∀ i,j,k∈ZN, ui,t = ψ(xj,t, xk,t), where j=Li(xt), k=Ri(xt), where ZN = 
{ι∈I | 0≤ι≤N}, where Z is the space of integers, while 
9. ψ : M2 → M, ∀m∈M ∀α,β∈E | α≠β, ¬α≠β 
m ∈{ 〈β|α〉, 〈¬α|∅〉 } ⇒ ψ(〈α|∅〉, m) = 〈∅|∅〉; 
m ∉{ 〈β|α〉, 〈¬α|∅〉 } ⇒ ψ(〈α|∅〉, m) = 〈α|∅〉; 
m ∉{ 〈α|∅〉, 〈¬α|∅〉 } ⇒ ψ(〈β|α〉, m) = 〈β|α〉; 
ψ(〈β|α〉, 〈α|∅〉) = 〈β|∅〉; ψ(〈β|α〉, 〈¬α|∅〉) = 〈¬β|∅〉; 
10. L, R : ZN × MN → ZN,  
xp, t ≠ 〈∅|∅〉  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
xq, t ≠ 〈∅|∅〉 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
xr, t ≠ 〈∅|∅〉 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Lw(ϕ,λ,0)(xt)       r p r p r p p p 
Rw(ϕ,λ,0)(xt)       q q p q p q r r 
Lw(ϕ,λ,1)(xt)       q q q q q q q q 
Rw(ϕ,λ,1)(xt)       p p p p p p p 0 
Lw(ϕ,λ,2)(xt)       r r r r p r r r 
Rw(ϕ,λ,2)(xt)       p p q q q q p p 
where p = w(ϕp, λ p, 2), q = w(ϕq, λq, 1), r = w(ϕr, λr, 0), ϕp = (ϕ + ϕmax) mod ϕmax + 1, ϕq 
= ϕ,  ϕr = (ϕ + 1) mod ϕmax + 1, λq = (λ + λmax) mod λmax + 1, if ϕ mod 2 ≠ 0 then λp = λr 
= λ, if ϕ mod 2 = 0 then λp = λr = (λ + λmax) mod λmax + 1, where 
11. w is any one-by-one function such that w : G → ZN, where G = {(ϕ, λ, δ) ∈ Z | 0 ≤ ϕ 
≤ ϕmax, 0 ≤ λ ≤ λmax, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 2} ∪ {e}, (ϕmax, + 1)(λmax + 1) = N, e is any element such 
that e≠∅; 
12. ∀m∉{〈A|∅〉, 〈a|∅〉} µ1(m, t) = const., while µ1(〈A|∅〉, t) = NA / (NA + Na), where for a 
given notion e, Ne = Ce, N, Ce, 0 = 0, Ce, i+1 = Ce, i + j, j = 1 if xi, t = e,  while j = 0 if xi, t ≠ e; 
where CJ, i is an auxiliary counter.  
13. ∀m∈M µ2(m, t) = const. 
Assuming that N and R represent ‘nicety’ and ‘richness’ of a date proponent, respectively, 
while A|∅ is a meme suggesting subject’s readiness to having the date, let us simulate the 
plot of µ1(〈A|∅〉, t). For given constant values µ1(〈N|∅〉, t)=.6, µ1(〈R|∅〉, t)=.4, 
µ1(〈A|N〉, t)=µ1(〈A|R〉, t)=1.0, µ2(〈N|∅〉, t) =µ2(〈R|∅〉, t)=.67, µ2(〈A|N〉, t)=µ2(〈A|R〉, t)=.2, 
F produces a plot of µ1(〈A|∅〉, t) such as, for examle: 
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designed a NeuroFuzzy and Neutrosophic and control system for analysing the 
impact of new economies growth and decline. 
 
1. Introduction: 
In recent years, substantial progress has been made in our ability to model and 
deal with uncertainty through computationally - orientated techniques. In finance, 
there is a long-standing tradition that probability theory is the only available tool 
for dealing with a stochastic nature. Recently, however the validity has been 
called into question by researchers, the development of other tools - centered on 
possibility theory and neurofuzzy control for dealing with uncertainty. Sengupta 
created a model of Shumpeterian Dynamics. In that model, two key variables 
were introduced through a two staged formulation using Schumpeterian 
dynamics. Sengupta formulated a model for innovation input in the form of 
knowledge capitol, the stochastic process followed as a birth and death process 
mechanism, where Bt represents new ideas and Dt represents the relative 
obsolescence or destruction of the old. In this paper we will illustrate a 
comparison of modeling using Schumpeterian dynamics versus Neurofuzzy and 
Neutrosophic control modeling solely emphasizing this application to new 
economies. As we all are aware of the hundreds of new companies entering the 
market - Bt - birth at the same instance there are companies exiting the market Dt 
- death. we will demonstrate the entrance and exiting phenomena using 
Neurofuzzy control. 
 
2. The stochastic model proposed by Sengupta 
Sengupta11,12 has given the mean the variance of the innovation input as follows: 
E(xt+1)= xt e bt-dt= er1 xt , r1= bt-dt (2.1) 
and Var ( xt+1) = bt+dt/bt-dt [ er1-1] er1xt if bt ≠ dt (2.2) 
= 2btdt. One can observe that equation (2.2) does not hold when bt=dt. That is, if 
bt=dt , the variance (xt+1) is not defined and is not equal to 2btdt. The elimination 
of (2.2) will lead to some jump discontinuity of the growth model  
  
Given the stochastic innovation process E(xt+1)=xt+Bt-Dt and using the 
assumption that the birth and death flows are endogenously determined. That is, 
Bt=bo+b1xt+b2xt-1 (2.3) 
Dt=d0+d1xt+d2xt-1 (2.4) 
It is noted that xt= - β o +β 1xt+1 +β 2xt+1.  
The generalized formula of the past history and future expectations given in his 
paper will only consider the case when bt≠ dt. In his model xt has been expressed 
as values of t +1 with different coefficients β 1 and β 2 and in the general form 
which is given by  
xt= -β 0+ Σ mi=1 β 11i xt-i + Σ ni=1β 2 2i xt+i (2.5) 
xt has been expressed as functions of t+1 and t-1. 
Equation (2.5) will lead to some designated path of optimization for only a special 
case when bt≠ dt are and it does not include all the possibilities such as when β 
1=β 2. 
We have shown when bt=dt the variance is not defined and the E(xt+1)=xt. 
It is claimed that when b2>d2 with b1≥ d1 the net result is positive growth and when 
b2<d2 with b1≥ d1 the future impact through demand pull is much stronger than the 
past trend in innovation. This is true only if bt≠ dt. In this model, it is assumed 
that birth and death of new economies take two absolute forms. i.e. being true or 
false. We have considered a Neutrosophic design for three states being T,I,F. 
We have an alternative approach for dealing with this model. In section, 3 we will 
build our NeuroFuzzy and Neutrosophic system.  
 
3. Fuzzy and Neutrosophic rules and three state Design for the birth and death 
rate of new economies 
The fuzzy rules in our model is given as follows: 
IF bt is Positive-Big AND dt is Positive-Small THEN the control output Growth=1 
(T) 
IF bt is Positive-Small AND dt is Positive-Big THEN the control output Growth=2 
(I) 
  
IF is Positive-Small AND dt is Positive-Small THEN the control output Growth=3 
(T) 
IF is Positive-Big AND dt is Positive-Big THEN the control output Growth=3 (F) 
These functions results in a relationship matrix with a membership function 
defined as µ 3R (bt,dt,growth)=µ A x B (bt,dt)-------> µ E(growth)===>( T,I, F) 
µ 3R (bt,dt,growth) is the membership value of error element (bt), change in error 
element (dt) and the resulting control action growth in the three dimensional 
implication function ( A x B---->E). 
The first step is to classify our neural model. We have used 90 samples and 
applied Neutrosophic classification ( T,I,F) in three states ( T.I,F) , the 
Neutrosophic approach is to cast out undesirable clusters in our training data. 
The linguistic variables, terms, membership functions, rule blocks, rules and 
interfaces have been incorporated, in our computation, the winner neuron is 4 
meaning that in every training iteration 4 rules are applied. This was the optimum 
for our model after 40 runs were executed. In our model, the average error of all 
samples is computed and Neutrosophic error of the worse sample is determined. 
These values indicate the dynamical changes of the birth and death of new 
economies can be measured in a set of optimum target shooting in three distinct 
forms ( T,I,F) . We have not included the long computational results in this short 
paper. 
 
4. Computational Method: 
Now we need to build our NeuroFuzzy system. We have run 10000 iteration 
using Fuzzytech software and as a result the parameters of our system has been 
chosen as follows: 
Maximum step=200 
Maximum Deviation=3% 
Average Deviation=.1 
Neural network learning method: 
Batch Random  
  
Step width =.03 
Winner Neuron=4 
Isodata cluster configuration 
1 b(t) .03 .90 2 input 
2 d(t) .01 .90 2 input  
3 Growth 1 3 2 output 
1 b(t) .03 .90 2 output 
2 d(t) .01 .90 2 output 
3 Growth 1 3 2 output 
We have defined the defuzzification box and the best compromise is used in 
most control applications. The rule block is 1 with random Dos value generator. 
 
5.Conclusions: 
Qualitatively, these examples demonstrate some of the potential power of 
NeuroFuzzy and Netrosophic control as applied to new economies problems. 
Rapid changes by the introduction of ever changing technology have made the 
use of traditional statistical methods questionable. In financial markets one would 
need to know the rate of growth of new economies at any given time to be able to 
form a dynamical optimization pattern. The fine tuning of NeroFuzzy and 
Neutrosophic controllers are intuitive and would likely further benefit from 
automatic processing by neural networks or genetic algorithms. Future research 
will focus on finding a systematic approach to tuning the NeuroFuzzy and 
Neutrosophic controllers, which would be of great use in financial engineering 
and risk optimizations and analyzing stock price behavior.  
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Introduction: 
As a consequence to [1], [3], [4-7] we display the below unusual 
extensions of definitions resulted/deviated from neutrosophics in  
the Set Theory, Probability, and Logic.  Some of them are listed  
in the Dictionary of Computing [2].  Further development of these  
definitions (including properties, applications, etc.) is in our  
research plan. 
 
 
1. Definitions of New Sets 
 
==================================================== 
 
1.1. Neutrosophic Set: 
  
  
 <logic, mathematics> A set which generalizes many existing classes  
 of sets, especially the fuzzy set.  
  
 Let U be a universe of discourse, and M a set included in U.  
 An element x from U is noted, with respect to the set M, as x(T,I,F),  
 and belongs to M in the following way: it is T% in the set  
 (membership appurtenance), I% indeterminate (unknown if it is in the  
 set), and F% not in the set (non-membership);  
 here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the  
 non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
 indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.  
  
Therefore: -0 # inf(T) + inf(I) + inf(F) # sup(T) + sup(I) + sup(F) # 3+. 
 
 Generalization of {classical set}, {fuzzy set}, {intuitionistic set},  
{paraconsistent set}, {faillibilist set}, {paradoxist set},  
{tautological set}, {nihilist set}, {dialetheist set}, {trivialist}.  
 
 Related to {neutrosophic logic}. 
  
==================================================== 
 
1.2. Intuitionistic Set: 
 
<logic, mathematics> A set which provides incomplete  
information on its elements. 
 
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x is  
incompletely known, i.e. x(T,I,F) such that  
sup(T)+sup(I)+sup(F)<1;  
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in  
the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively. 
 
Contrast with {paraconsistent set}. 
 
Related to {intuitionistic logic}. 
 
==================================================== 
 
1.3. Paraconsistent Set: 
 
<logic, mathematics> A set which provides paraconsistent information  
on its elements. 
 
  
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x(T,I,F) has the  
property that sup(T)+sup(I)+sup(F)>1;  
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the  
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth, indeterminacy,  
and falsity percentages respectively. 
 
Contrast with {intuitionistic set}. 
 
Related to {paraconsistent logic}. 
 
==================================================== 
 
1.4. Faillibilist Set: 
 
<logic, mathematics> A set whose elements are uncertain. 
 
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x has a  
percentage of indeterminacy, i.e. x(T,I,F) such that inf(I)>0;  
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included  
in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively. 
 
Related to {faillibilism}. 
 
==================================================== 
 
1.5. Paradoxist Set: 
 
<logic, mathematics> A set which contains and doesn't contain  
itself at the same time. 
 
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x(T,I,F) has 
the form x(1,I,1), i.e. belongs 100% to the set and doesn't  
belong 100% to the set simultaneously; 
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in  
the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[ , representing truth,  
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively. 
 
Related to {paradoxism}. 
 
==================================================== 
 
1.6. Pseudo-Paradoxist Set: 
 
<logic, mathematics> A set which totally contains and partially doesn't contain  
itself at the same time,  
  
or partially contains and totally doesn’t contain itself at the same time. 
 
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x(T,I,F) has 
the form x(1,I,F) with 0<inf(F)[sup(F)<1 or x(T,I,1) with 0<inf(T)[sup(T)<1, 
i.e. belongs 100% to the set and doesn't belong F% to the set simultaneously, with 
0<inf(F)[sup(F)<1, 
or belongs T% to the set and doesn't belong 100% to the set simultaneously, with 
0<inf(T)[sup(T)<1; 
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in  
the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively. 
 
Related to {pseudo-paradoxism}. 
 
==================================================== 
 
1.7. Tautological Set: 
 
<logic, mathematics> A set whose elements are absolutely  
determined in all possible worlds. 
 
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x has the  
form x(1+,-0,-0), i.e. absolutely belongs to the set; 
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included  
in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively. 
 
Contrast with {nihilist set} and {nihilism}. 
 
Related to {tautologism}. 
 
==================================================== 
 
1.8. Nihilist Set: 
 
<logic, mathematics> A set whose elements absolutely  
don’t belong to the set in all possible worlds. 
 
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x has the  
form x(-0,-0,1+), i.e. absolutely doesn’t belongs to the set; 
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included  
in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively. 
 
The empty set is a particular set of {nihilist set}. 
 
  
Contrast with {tautological set}. 
 
Related to {nihilism}. 
 
==================================================== 
 
1.9. Dialetheist Set:  
  
  <logic, mathematics> /di:-al-u-theist/ A set which contains at  
least one element which also belongs to its complement.  
  
 A class of {neutrosophic set} which models a situation  
 where the intersection of some disjoint sets is not empty.  
 
 There is at least one element x(T,I,F) of the dialetheist set  
 M which belongs at the same time to M and to the set C(M),  
 which is the complement of M;  
 here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the  
 non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
 indeterminacy, and  falsity percentages respectively.  
  
 Contrast with {trivialist set}. 
 
 Related to {dialetheism}.  
  
 ==================================================== 
 
1.10. Trivialist Set:  
  
 <logic, mathematics>  A set all of whose  elements also belong  
to its complement.  
  
 A class of {neutrosophic set} which models a situation  
 where the intersection of any disjoint sets is not empty.  
 
 Every element x(T,I,F) of the trivialist set M belongs at the  
 same time to M and to the set C(M), which is the  
 complement of M; 
 here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets,  
 included in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing  
 truth, indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.  
  
 Contrast with {dialetheist set}.  
 
 Related to {trivialism}. 
  
 ==================================================== 
  
 
2. Definitions of New Probabilities and Statistics 
 
==================================================== 
 
2.1. Neutrosophic Probability: 
 
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is (T, I, F), 
where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the  
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.  
  
Therefore: -0 # inf(T) + inf(I) + inf(F) # sup(T) + sup(I) + sup(F) # 3+. 
 
Generalization of {classical probability} and {imprecise probability},  
{intuitionistic probability}, {paraconsistent probability}, {faillibilist 
probability}, {paradoxist probability}, {tautological probability}, 
{nihilistic probability}, {dialetheist probability}, {trivialist probability}. 
 
Related with {neutrosophic set} and {neutrosophic logic}. 
 
The analysis of neutrosophic events is called Neutrosophic Statistics. 
 
==================================================== 
 
2.2. Intuitionistic Probability: 
 
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is (T, I, F), 
where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the  
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively, 
and n_sup = sup(T)+sup(I)+sup(F) < 1, 
i.e. the probability is incompletely calculated.  
 
Contrast with {paraconsistent probability}. 
 
Related to {intuitionistic set} and {intuitionistic logic}.  
 
The analysis of intuitionistic events is called Intuitionistic Statistics. 
 
==================================================== 
 
2.3. Paraconsistent Probability: 
 
  
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is (T, I, F), 
where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the  
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively,  
and n_sup = sup(T)+sup(I)+sup(F) > 1, 
i.e. contradictory information from various sources. 
 
Contrast with {intuitionistic probability}. 
 
Related to {paraconsistent set} and {paraconsistent logic}. 
 
The analysis of paraconsistent events is called  
Paraconsistent Statistics. 
 
==================================================== 
 
2.4. Faillibilist Probability: 
 
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is (T, I, F), 
where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the  
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively,  
and inf(I) > 0, 
i.e. there is some percentage of indeterminacy in calculation. 
 
Related to {faillibilist set} and {faillibilism}. 
 
The analysis of faillibilist events is called Faillibilist Statistics. 
 
==================================================== 
 
2.5. Paradoxist Probability:  
 
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is (1, I, 1), 
where I is a standard or non-standard subset, included in the  
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing indeterminacy. 
 
Paradoxist probability is used for paradoxal events (i.e. which  
may occur and may not occur simultaneously). 
 
Related to {paradoxist set} and {paradoxism}. 
 
The analysis of paradoxist events is called Paradoxist Statistics. 
 
==================================================== 
  
 
2.6. Pseudo-Paradoxist Probability:  
 
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is either (1, I, F) with 
0<inf(F)[sup(F)<1, or (T, I, 1) with 0<inf(T)[sup(T)<1, 
where T,I,F are standard or non-standard subset, included in the  
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing the truth, indeterminacy, and  
falsity percentages respectively. 
 
Pseudo-Paradoxist probability is used for pseudo-paradoxal events (i.e. which  
may certainly occur and may not partially occur simultaneously, 
or may partially occur and may not certainly occur simultaneously). 
 
Related to {pseudo-paradoxist set} and {pseudo-paradoxism}. 
 
The analysis of pseudo-paradoxist events is called Pseudo-Paradoxist Statistics. 
 
==================================================== 
 
2.7. Tautological Probability:  
 
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is more than one, 
i.e. (1+, -0, -0).  
 
Tautological probability is used for universally sure events (in all  
possible worlds, i.e. do not depend on time, space, subjectivity, etc.). 
 
Contrast with {nihilistic probability} and {nihilism}. 
 
Related to {tautological set} and {tautologism}. 
 
The analysis of tautological events is called Tautological Statistics. 
 
==================================================== 
 
2.8. Nihilist Probability:  
 
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is less than zero, 
i.e. (-0, -0, 1+).  
 
Nihilist probability is used for universally impossible events (in all  
possible worlds, i.e. do not depend on time, space, subjectivity, etc.). 
 
Contrast with {tautological probability} and {tautologism}. 
  
 
Related to {nihilist set} and {nihilism}. 
 
The analysis of nihilist events is called Nihilist Statistics. 
 
==================================================== 
 
2.9. Dialetheist Probability:  
  
<probability> /di:-al-u-theist/ A probability space where at least  
one event and its complement are not disjoint. 
 
A class of {neutrosophic probability} that models a situation  
 where the intersection of some disjoint events is not empty.  
 
 Here, similarly, the probability of an event to occur is (T, I, F),  
 where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included  
 in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
 indeterminacy, and  falsity percentages respectively.  
 
Contrast with {trivialist probability}. 
 
Related to {dialetheist set} and {dialetheism}. 
 
The analysis of dialetheist events is called Dialetheist Statistics. 
 
==================================================== 
 
2.10. Trivialist Probability:  
  
<probability> A probability space where every event and its  
complement are not disjoint. 
 
A class of {neutrosophic probability}which models a situation  
 where the intersection of any disjoint events is not empty.  
 
 Here, similarly, the probability of an event to occur is (T, I, F),  
 where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included  
 in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
 indeterminacy, and  falsity percentages respectively.  
 
Contrast with {dialetheist probability}. 
 
Related to {trivialist set} and {trivialism}. 
 
The analysis of trivialist events is called Trivialist Statistics. 
  
 
==================================================== 
 
3. Definitions of New Logics 
 
==================================================== 
This definition is not quite new but because the next ones are connected to  
it we recall it: 
3.1. Neutrosophic Logic: 
  
 <logic, mathematics> A logic which generalizes many existing classes  
 of logics, especially the fuzzy logic.  
  
 In this logic each proposition is estimated to have the percentage of truth in  
 a subset T, the percentage of indeterminacy in a subset I, and the percentage  
 of falsity in a subset F;  
 here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the  
 non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,  
 indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.  
  
Therefore: -0 # inf(T) + inf(I) + inf(F) # sup(T) + sup(I) + sup(F) # 3+. 
 
 Generalization of {classical or Boolean logic}, {fuzzy logic},  
{multiple-valued logic}, {intuitionistic logic}, {paraconsistent logic},  
{faillibilist logic, or failibilism}, {paradoxist logic, or paradoxism},  
{pseudo-paradoxist logic, or pseudo-paradoxism}, {tautological logic, or  
tautologism}, {nihilist logic, or nihilism}, {dialetheist logic, or dialetheism},  
{trivialist logic, or trivialism}.  
 
 Related to {neutrosophic set}. 
  
==================================================== 
 
3.2. Paradoxist Logic (or Paradoxism): 
  
 <logic, mathematics> A logic devoted to paradoxes, in which each  
 proposition has the logical vector value (1, I, 1);  
 here I is a real standard or non-standard subset, included in the  
 non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing the indeterminacy.  
  
As seen, each paradoxist (paradoxal) proposition is true and false  
simultaneously. 
 
Related to {paradoxist set}. 
  
    ====================================================     
  
 
3.3. Pseudo-Paradoxist Logic (or Pseudo-Paradoxism): 
  
 <logic, mathematics> A logic devoted to pseudo-paradoxes,  
 in which each proposition has the logical vector value: 
 either (1, I, F), with 0<inf(F)[sup(F)<1,  
 or (T, I, 1), with 0<inf(T)[sup(T)<1;  
 here I is a real standard or non-standard subset, included in the  
 non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing the indeterminacy.  
  
As seen, each pseudo-paradoxist (pseudo-paradoxal) proposition is:  
either totally true and partially false simultaneously, 
or partially true and totally false simultaneously. 
 
Related to {pseudo-paradoxist set}. 
  
    ====================================================     
 
3.4. Tautological Logic (or Tautologism): 
  
 <logic, mathematics> A logic devoted to tautologies, in which each  
 proposition has the logical vector value (1+, -0, -0).  
  
As seen, each tautological proposition is absolutely true (i. e, true in all 
possible worlds). 
 
Related to {tautological set}. 
  
    ====================================================     
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Abstract:  
This study actually draws from and builds on  “Benford’s law and its application in 
financial misrepresented of a data  ” (Kumar and Bhattacharya, 2001). here we have 
simply added a neutrosophic dimension to the problem of determining the conditional 
probability that a financial misrepresentation of the data set, has been actually committed, 
given that no Type I error occurred while rejecting the null hypothesis H0: the observed 
first-digit frequencies approximate a benford distribution; and accepting the alternative 
hypothesis H1: the observed first-digit frequencies do not approximate a benford 
distribution.  
 
Keywords: Financial misrepresented data set, Benford’s law, probability distributions, 
neutrosophic probability 
 
Introduction: 
 
1. Testing for manipulation in a set of accounting data. 
Kumar and Bhattacharya, 2001, proposed a Monte Carlo adaptation of Benford’s law. 
There has been some research already on the application of Benford’s law. However, 
most of the practical work in this regard has been concentrated in detecting the first digit 
frequencies from the account balances selected on basis of some known audit sampling 
method and then directly comparing the result with the expected Benford frequencies. 
We have voiced slight reservations about this technique in so far as that the Benford 
frequencies are necessarily steady state frequencies and may not therefore be truly 
reflected in the sample frequencies. As samples are always of finite sizes, it is therefore 
  
perhaps not entirely fair to arrive at any conclusion on the basis of such a direct 
comparison, as the sample frequencies won’t be steady state frequencies.     
         However, if we draw digits randomly using the inverse transformation technique 
from within random number ranges derived from a cumulative probability distribution 
function based on the Benford frequencies; then the problem boils down to running a 
goodness of fit kind of test to identify any significant difference between observed and 
simulated first-digit frequencies. This test may be conducted using a known sampling 
distribution like for example the Pearson’s χ² distribution. The random number ranges 
for the Monte Carlo simulation are to be drawn from a cumulative probability distribution 
function based on the following Benford probabilities given in Table I. 
  Table I 
First Significant 
Digit 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Benford 
Probability 
0.30
1 
0.17
6 
0.12
5 
0.09
7 
0.07
9 
0.06
7 
0.05
8 
0.05
1 
0.04
6 
 
 The first-digit probabilities can be best approximated mathematically by the log-based 
formula as was derived by Benford: P (First significant digit = d) = log10 [1 + (1/d)]. 
 
2. Computational Algorithm:        
        Define a finite sample size n and draw a sample from the relevant account balances 
using a suitable audit sampling procedure                                                                                                  
  
1. Perform a continuous Monte Carlo run of length λ* ≈ (1/2ε)2/3 grouped in 
epochs of size n using a customized MS-Excel spreadsheet.  
2. Test for significant difference in sample frequencies between the first digits 
observed in the sample and those generated by the Monte Carlo simulation by 
using a “goodness of fit” test using the χ² distribution. The null and alternative 
hypotheses are as follows: 
               H0: The observed first digit frequencies approximate a Benford distribution 
               H1: The observed first digit frequencies do not approximate a Benford 
distribution              
      This statistical test will not reveal whether or not a data misrepresentation has 
actually been committed. All it does is establish at a desired level of confidence, that the 
accounting data has not been manipulated (if H0 cannot be rejected).   
       However, given that H1 is accepted and H0 is rejected, it could imply any of the 
following events: 
I. There is no manipulation - occurrence of a Type I error i.e. H0 rejected when true.     
II. There is manipulation and such manipulation is definitely misrepresented. 
III. There is manipulation and such manipulation may or may not be misrepresented 
IV. There is manipulation and such manipulation is definitely not misrepresented 
 
3. Neutrosophic Extension: 
         Neutrosophic probabilities are a generalization of classical and fuzzy probabilities 
and cover those events that involve some degree of indeterminacy. It provides a better 
approach to quantifying uncertainty than classical or even fuzzy probability theory. 
  
Neutrosophic probability theory uses a subset-approximation for truth-value as well as 
indeterminacy and falsity values. Also, this approach makes a distinction between 
“relative true event” and “absolute true event” the former being true in only some 
probability sub-spaces while the latter being true in all probability sub-spaces. Similarly, 
events that are false in only some probability sub-spaces are classified as “relative false 
events” while events that are false in all probability sub-spaces are classified as “absolute 
false events”. Again, the events that may be hard to classify as either ‘true’ or ‘false’ in 
some probability sub-spaces are classified as “relative indeterminate events” while events 
that bear this characteristic over all probability sub-spaces are classified as “absolute 
indeterminate events”.  
While in classical probability n_sup ≤ 1, in neutrosophic probability n_sup ≤ 3+ where 
n_sup is the upper bound of the probability space. In cases where the truth and falsity 
components are complimentary, i.e. there is no indeterminacy, the components sum to 
unity and neutrosophic probability is reduced to classical probability as in the tossing of a 
fair coin or the drawing of a card from a well-shuffled deck. 
Coming back to our original problem of financial misrepresented of a data set, let E be 
the event whereby a Type I error has occurred and F be the event whereby a 
misrepresented set  is actually detected. Then the conditional neutrosophic probability 
NP (F | Ec) is defined over a probability space consisting of a triple of sets (T, I, U). 
Here, T, I and U are probability sub-spaces wherein event F is t% true, i% indeterminate 
and u% untrue respectively, given that no Type I error occurred. 
The sub-space T within which t varies may be determined by factors such as past records 
of the misrepresented data set in the organization and effectiveness of internal control 
  
systems. On the other hand, the sub-space U may be determined by factors like personal 
track records of the employees in question, the position enjoyed and the remuneration 
drawn by those employees. For example, if the magnitude of the embezzled amount is 
deemed too frivolous with respect to the position and remuneration of the employees 
involved. The sub-space I is most likely to be determined by the mutual inconsistency 
that might arise between the effects of some of the factors determining T and U. 
 
4. Conclusion: 
        No doubt then that the theory of neutrosophic probability opens up a new vista of 
analytical reasoning for the techno-savvy forensic accountant. In this paper, we have only 
posit that a combination of statistical testing of audit samples based on Benford’s law 
combined with a neutrosophic reasoning could help the forensic accountant in getting a 
better fix on the quantitative possibility of actually dealing with misrepresented financial 
data set. This is an emerging science and thus holds a vast potential of future research 
endeavours the ultimate objective of which will be to actually come up with a reliable, 
comprehensive computational methodology to track down the misrepresented financial 
data. We believe our present effort is only one initial step in that direction. 
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Later Trigrams of King Wen in I-ching is meanwhile presented. It is shown that although 
A and Non-A are logically inconsistent, but they are philosophically consistent in the 
sense that Non-A can be the unintentionally instead of negation that leads to confusion. It 
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2. Objective world and subjective world 
 
The common confusion about the objective world is: it is just what we see and feel. This 
is however very wrong. In fact, this is rather a belief than an objective reflection, and 
varies among different people, because none of us can prove it. In his paper “To be or not 
to be, A multidimensional logic approach” Carlos Gershenson [2] has generalized proofs: 
z Everything is and isn't at a certain degree. (i.e., there is no absolute truth or 
false); 
z Nothing can be proved (that it exists or doesn't) (i.e., no one can prove whether 
his consciousness is right); 
z I believe, therefore I am (i.e., I take it true, because I believe so). 
  
It is something, but not that figured in our mind. This is the starting point in Daoism 
(Liu [2]). 
Daodejing begins with: “Dao, daoable, but not the normal dao; name, namable, 
but not the normal name.” We can say it is dao, but it doesn’t mean what we say. 
Whenever we mention it, it is beyond the original sense. 
Daodejing mainly deals with the common problem: “What/who creates 
everything in the world we see and feel?” It is dao: like a mother that bears things 
with shape and form. But what/who is dao? It is just unimaginable, because 
whenever we imagine it, our imagination can never be it (we can never completely 
describe it: more we describe it, more wrong we are). It is also unnamable, because 
whenever we name it, our concept based on the name can never be it. 
Daoism illustrates the origin of everything as such a form that doesn’t show in 
any form we can perceive. This is the reason why it says, everything comes from 
nothingness, or this nothingness creates everything in forms in dynamic change. 
Whatever we can perceive is merely the created forms, rather than its genuine 
nature, as if we distinguish people by their outer clothes. We are too far from 
understanding the nature, even for the most prominent figures like Einstein. 
Therefore Name and Non-Name coexist pertaining to an object: 
Object = both Name and Non-Name. 
Then what should we do subjectively? Very simple: both intentionally and 
unintentionally. Intentional conception relates to all the connotation and extension 
pertaining to Name, and unintentional one to Non-Name. 
z There are alternative interpretations on Non-Name: unintentionally and 
negatively. This is crucial in our confusion. 
This is the contradiction between creativity and implementation, as is stated below. 
 
 
3. Neutrosophy 
 
Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature, and scope 
of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra.  
It is the base of neutrosophic logic, a multiple value logic that generalizes the fuzzy logic 
and deals with paradoxes, contradictions, antitheses, antinomies. 
Characteristics of this mode of thinking: 
- proposes new philosophical theses, principles, laws, methods, formulas, movements; 
- reveals that world is full of indeterminacy; 
- interprets the uninterpretable; 
- regards, from many different angles, old concepts, systems: 
showing that an idea, which is true in a given referential system, may be false in another 
one, and vice versa; 
- attempts to make peace in the war of ideas,  
and to make war in the peaceful ideas; 
- measures the stability of unstable systems,  
and instability of stable systems. 
  
Let's note by <A> an idea, or proposition, theory, event, concept, entity, by <Non-A> 
what is not <A>, and by <Anti-A> the opposite of <A>.  Also, <Neut-A> means what is 
neither <A> nor <Anti-A>, i.e. neutrality in between the two extremes.  And <A'> a 
version of <A>. 
     <Non-A> is different from <Anti-A>.   
Main Principle: 
Between an idea <A> and its opposite <Anti-A>, there is a continuum-power spectrum of 
neutralities <Neut-A>. 
    Fundamental Thesis of Neutrosophy: 
Any idea <A> is T% true, I% indeterminate, and F% false, where T, I, F _ ] -0, 1+ [. 
     Main Laws of Neutrosophy: 
Let <α> be an attribute, and (T, I, F) _ ] -0, 1+ [3.  Then: 
- There is a proposition <P> and a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I% 
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>. 
- For any proposition <P>, there is a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I% 
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>. 
- <α> is at some degree <Anti-α>, while <Anti-α> is at some degree <α>. 
 
 
4. Creativity and implementation 
 
We can model our mind in the alternation of yin and yang that is universal in everything 
(Feng Liu): 
z Yang pertains to dynamic change, and directs great beginnings of things; yin to 
relatively static stage, and gives those exhibited by yang to their completion. 
In the course of development and evolution of everything yang acts as the 
creativity (Feng Liu) that brings new beginnings to it, whereas yin implements 
it in forms as we perceive as temporary states. It is in this infinite parallelism 
things inherit modifications and adapt to changes. 
z On our genuine intelligence — creativity (Liu [4]) 
In the query about the figure on the left, whenever we hold the 
answer as a circle, we are inhibiting our creativity. Nor should we 
hold that it is a cake, a dish, a bowl, a balloon, or the moon, the sun, 
for we also spoil our creativity in this way. Then, what is it? 
“It is nothing.” 
Is it correct? It is, if we do not hold on to the assumption “it is 
something”. It is also wrong, if we persist in the doctrine “the figure is 
something we call nothing.” This nothing has in this way become 
something that inhibits our creativity. How ridiculous! 
Whenever we hold the belief “it is …”, we are loosing our 
creativity. Whenever we hold that “it is not …”, we are also 
loosing our creativity. Our true intelligence requires that we 
completely free our mind — neither stick to any extremity nor to “no 
sticking to any assumption or belief”. This is a kind of genius or gift 
rather than logic rules, acquired largely after birth, e.g., through 
  
Buddhism practice. Note that our creativity lies just between 
internationality and uninternationality. 
 
Not (it is) and not (it is not), 
It seems nothing, but creates everything, 
Including our true consciousness, 
The power of genius to understand all. 
 
z The further insight on contradiction compatible learning 
philosophy inspired from the Later Trigrams of King Wen of I-
ching shows that: 
When something (controversial) is perceived (in Zhen), it is 
referred (in Xun) to various knowledge models and, by 
assembling the fragments perceived from these models, we 
reach a general pattern to which fragments attach (in Li), as 
hypothesis, which needs to be nurtured and to grow up (Kun) in 
a particular environment. When the hypothesis is mature 
enough, it needs to be represented (in Dui) in diverse situations, and to expand 
and contradict with older knowledge (in Qian) to make update, renovation, 
reformation or even revolution in knowledge base, and in this way the new 
thought is verified, modified and substantialized. When the novel thought takes 
the principal role (dominant position) in the conflict, we should have a rest (in 
Kan) to avoid being trapped into depth (it would be too partial of us to persist 
in any kind of logic, to adapt to the outer changes). Finally the end of cycle (in 
Gen). 
I-ching [in Chinese: Yi Jing] means: Yi = change, Jing = scripture.  It 
mainly deals with the creation, evolution (up and down) of everything in such 
perspective that everything is an outer form of a void existence, and that 
everything always exists in the form of unity (compensation, 
complementation) of opposites… 
 
This philosophy shows that contradiction acts as the momentum or 
impetus to learning evolution. No controversy, no innovation. This is the 
essentially of neutrosophy (Florentin Smarandache). 
In the cycle there is unintentionally implied throughout it: 
z Where do the reference models relating to the present default model 
come from? They are different objectively. 
z How can we assemble the model from different or even incoherent 
or inconsistent fragments? 
z If we always do it intentionally, how does the hypothesis grow on 
its own, as if we study something without sleep? 
z How can our absolute intention be complemented without 
contradiction? 
z Is it right that we always hold our intention? 
  
There is only one step between truth and prejudice — when 
the truth is overbelieved regardless of constraint in situations, it 
becomes prejudice. 
z Is there no end for the intention? Then, how can we obtain a 
concept that is never finished? If there is an end, then it should be 
the beginning of unintentionally, as yin and yang in Taiji figure. 
Unintentionally can be alternately derived when the intention 
is repeated over and over so that it becomes an instinct. It is even 
severe that we develop a fallacy instinct. 
 
 
5. Completeness and incompleteness: knowledge and practice 
 
There always is contradiction between completeness and incompleteness of knowledge. 
In various papers presented by Carlos Gershenson he proves this point. Same in Daoism 
and Buddhism. This contradiction is shown in the following aspect: 
a) People are satisfied with their knowledge relative to a default, well-defined 
domain. But later on, they get fresh insight in it. 
b) They face with contradictions and new challenges in their practice and further 
development. 
This reflects in our weakness that: 
z Do we understand ourselves? 
z Do we understand the universe? 
What do we mean by knowledge, complete whole or incomplete? Our silliness 
prompts us to try the complete specifications, but where on earth are they (Gershenson 
[1])? Meanwhile, our effort would be nothing more than a static imitation of some 
dynamic process (Liu [3]), since human understands the world through the 
interaction of the inter-contradictory and inter-complementary two kinds of 
knowledge: perceptual knowledge and rational knowledge - they can’t be split 
apart. 
z In knowledge discovering, there are merely strictly limited condition that focus 
our eyes to a local domain rather than a open extension, therefore our firsthand 
knowledge is only relative to our default referential system, and extremely 
subjective possibly. 
z Is it possible to reach a relatively complete piece at first? No, unless we were 
gods (we were objective in nature). 
z Then we need to perceive (the rightness, falseness, flexibility, limitation, more 
realistic conception, etc.) and understand the real meaning of our previous 
knowledge — how: only through practice (how can we comprehend the word 
“apple” without tasting it?) 
z Having done that, we may have less subjective minds, based on which the 
original version is modified, revised, and adapted as further proposals. 
z Again through practice, the proposals are verified and improved. 
z This cycle recurs to the infinite, in each of which our practice is extended in a 
more comprehensive way; the same to our knowledge. 
z Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and 
develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into 
  
rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide 
revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world. 
Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats 
itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and 
knowledge rises to a higher level. 
z Through practice, we can 
z verify our knowledge 
z find the inconsistency, incompleteness of our knowledge, and face new 
problems, new challenges as well 
z maintain critical thought 
Therefore knowledge is based on the infinite critics and negation (partial or 
revolutionary) on our subjective world. It is never too old to learn. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Whenever we say “it is”, we refer it to both subjective and objective worlds. 
We can creatively use the philosophical expression both A and non-A to describe 
both subjective world and objective worlds, and possibly the neutrality of both. 
Whenever there is “it is”, there is subjective world, in the sense that concepts always 
include subjectivity. So our problem becomes: is “it” really “it”? A real story of Chinese 
Tang dynasty recorded in a sutra (adapted from Yan Kuanhu Culture and Education 
Fund)shows that: 
Huineng arrived at a Temple in Guangzhou where a pennant was being 
blown by wind. Two monks who happened to see the pennant were debating 
what was in motion, the wind or the pennant. 
Huineng heard their discussion and said: “It was neither the wind nor the 
pennant. What actually moved were your own minds.” Overhearing this 
conversation, the assembly (a lecture was to begin) were startled at Huineng’s 
knowledge and outstanding views. 
z When we see pennant and wind we will naturally believe we are right in our 
consciousness, however it is subjective. In other words, what we call “the 
objective world” can never absolutely be objective at all. 
z Whenever we believe we are objective, this belief however is subjective too. 
z In fact, all these things are merely our mental creations (called illusions in 
Buddhism) that in turn cheat our consciousness: There is neither pennant nor 
wind, but our mental creations. 
z The world is made up of our subjective beliefs that in turn cheat our 
consciousness. This is in fact a cumulative cause-effect phenomenon.  
z Everyone can extricate himself out of this maze, said Sakyamuni and all the 
Buddhas, Bodhisattvas around the universe, their number is as many as that of 
the sands in the Ganges (Limitless Life Sutra). 
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1. Background 
 
Although it is commonly believed that intelligence is a social activity, and it is therefore 
represented in multiagent forms, but its kernel, the logic of agents, remains controversial 
with its static, monolateral or homogeneous forms. 
This reflects in their behaviors as: our agents appear social in outer forms but 
autarchic in nature, for this kind of multiagent system can never deal with controversies, 
critics, conflicts or something with flexibility. Our multiagent system has become a sort 
of software engineering or system engineering of fresh forms, failing to implement our 
presumed social intelligence. 
In the long-term exploration, one realizes that the problem takes its root in the 
misleading definition of logic. Even the simplest logic such as “The earth turns around 
the sun” and “I’ll visit him if it doesn’t rain and he is in” can lead to ambiguous or 
contradictory actions of agent (Liu [7]). Limited to the length, I’ll present in this paper 
only a framework to launch our discussion, as follows: 
z Fact: a belief rather than truth  
  
z Logic: dependent of situations, not absolute 
z Logic is negating itself  
z Logic is only one perspective of learning, not an independent entity  
z As a part of learning, logic is dynamic 
z As a part of learning, logic is multilateral 
z Logic is always partial 
z Illusion and creativity 
Many scientists argue about the need to model human intelligence in the general 
level. The argument lies in our vague understanding of intelligent system (Liu [6]). 
Intelligent system should be, in our opinion, a tradeoff machine in order to adapt to its 
environment. Then a specific model becomes such a tradeoff between ideal philosophic 
model and practical system model, in the hierarchy from philosophic layer down to a 
specific application or situation constraint implementation. I’ll show this philosophy in 
step ward way, as follows. 
 
 
2. Neutrosophy 
 
Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature, and scope 
of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra.  
It is the base of neutrosophic logic, a multiple value logic that generalizes the fuzzy logic 
and deals with paradoxes, contradictions, antitheses, antinomies. 
Characteristics of this mode of thinking:  
-    proposes new philosophical theses, principles, laws, methods, formulas, 
movements; 
- reveals that world is full of indeterminacy; 
- interprets the uninterpretable; 
- regards, from many different angles, old concepts, systems: showing that an 
idea, which is true in a given referential system, may be false in another one, and 
vice versa; 
- attempts to make peace in the war of ideas, and to make war in the peaceful 
ideas; 
- measures the stability of unstable systems, and instability of stable systems. 
Let's note by <A> an idea, or proposition, theory, event, concept, entity, by <Non-A> 
what is not <A>, and by <Anti-A> the opposite of <A>.  Also, <Neut-A> means what is 
neither <A> nor <Anti-A>, i.e. neutrality in between the two extremes.  And <A'> a 
version of <A>. 
     <Non-A> is different from <Anti-A>.   
Main Principle: 
Between an idea <A> and its opposite <Anti-A>, there is a continuum-power spectrum of 
neutralities <Neut-A>. 
        Fundamental Thesis of Neutrosophy: 
Any idea <A> is T% true, I% indeterminate, and F% false, where T, I, F _ ] -0, 1+ [. 
Here ] -0, 1+ [ is a non-standard unit interval, with –0={0-ε, ε is a positive infinitesimal 
number} and  1+={1+ε, ε is a positive infinitesimal number}. 
        Main Laws of Neutrosophy: 
  
Let <α> be an attribute, and (T, I, F) _ ] -0, 1+ [3.  Then: 
- There is a proposition <P> and a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I% 
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>. 
- For any proposition <P>, there is a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I% 
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>. 
- <α> is at some degree <Anti-α>, while <Anti-α> is at some degree <α>. 
 
 
3. Fact: a Belief rather than Truth 
 
We start with an ancient problem based on the following contradiction: 
● The sun turns around the earth. 
● The earth turns around the sun. 
Of cause nearly everyone of us would answer: the later is absolute right. Note that this is 
merely a belief, because in Copernicus’s age the majority believed in the former. Has 
anyone proved nowadays whether the former is incorrect? If yes, he must have assumed 
that the sun is relatively fixed. Unfortunately this is also his belief, because none of us 
has ever proved the absoluteness of his consciousness: when we see something, is it 
really something or just we believe that there is something (we really touch something or 
we really believe it is something we touched)? Or more specifically, is it an object or just 
we hold long this same belief? Do we really exist as in form we see or just we believe so? 
I have to introduce a heard experiment to show this point. 
A blindfold person is told to be experimented with an iron burnt hot. And 
through a chronic preparation before him, the iron is burnt fervid, and he is told 
that the iron is gradually moved closer and closer to him. 
“Yes, I am feeling hotter and hotter, …… really hot, extremely, ……” 
The gradual process goes on and on, until suddenly, he is instructed to have his 
skin burnt. 
“Oh……”, his skin really burnt.  
When he opened his eyes, there is nothing but the scorch in him—there is no 
fire nor iron, but merely his imagination—it is strong enough to cause the effect. 
I experienced another experiment in which four of us were pointing to a carefully set 
small wooden stool while rotating around it. According our mutual will, the stool turned 
itself in the same direction we turned! 
Another fact (shown in a qigong journal quite a number of years ago, the following is 
based on our memory) shows the same thing: 
There is a qigong (commonly believed as some mental or physical exercise in 
order to gather the “energy” from nature, qi (there are such a kind of substance in 
Chinese medicine which is  unseen but really affects our body), or the concentrative 
power of will to maintain health from disease, it is not a feasible way to us) expert in 
China who, through chronic practice, can “brake” a steel saw blade with nothing but 
his will, and he had been succeeding in it nearly every time, even in many qigong 
reports. 
Once he re-showed the same talent to the huge audience with great curiosity. He 
ordered: “break”, but unexpectedly, the blade remain exact the same as before, and 
  
the following tries turned out to be the same failures. The atmosphere became 
extremely unfavorable. 
Fortunately however, the chairman of the qigong report is experienced, and asked 
the audience to cooperate: more you are confident, more successful the experiment. 
Magically, the expert broke the blade with a single command. 
Conclusion: 
We have to confess from the three experiments that fact is really our belief—if a 
single belief is not powerful enough to convince us, the mutual belief, especially of all 
the human beings, is definitely strong enough to illude ourselves. While this cause-effect 
goes on and on, we are unconsciously trapped in the inextricable web of deceit designed 
by ourselves. 
Only wise man can see through this kind of deceit, e.g., Master Huineng in Chinese 
Tang dynasty when he saw an argument about a pennant aflutter: whether the wind was 
moving or the pennant. 
“Neither. What actually moved were your own minds.”(Liu [9], see also Yan 
Kuanhu [3]) 
Everyone can become wise when understands this cause-effect, which is the basic 
point of Buddhism (Chin Kung [1]) 
 
 
4. Logic: Dependent of Situations, not Absolute 
 
Take the logic 1+1=2 for example. Is it correct? Consider 
black+white=?,  explosive+fire=?,  warm+cold=?,  theory+practice=?,  and  
yin+yang = ? 
Does the idiom “Blind People Touching an Elephant” really refer to blind men and 
elephant?  
z Blind People Touching an Elephant, a story from the Mahapra Janaparamita 
Sutra: 
The story shows that the same elephant can be interpreted as such 
different things as turnip, dustpan, pestle, bed, jar and rope by different blind 
people who touch it in turn. The first one touches the tusk, the second the ear, the 
third the foot, the fourth the back, the fifth the belly, and the last the tail. 
Based on their different beliefs, the same elephant conveys diverse logics. 
Conclusion:  
Logic is more a kind of mental behavior than an objective understanding, i.e., it is 
more a belief rather than truth; this belief is based on “facts” which are also beliefs. 
This belief is subject to dynamic changes with situations, and more general belief 
(general understanding) relative to more general situations could be too flexible to grasp 
(e.g., Dao=yin+yang), therefore logic suggests varying explanations based on 
particularity of situations. 
 
 
5. Logic is Negating Itself 
 
  
Logic comes as mental reflection and leads to new reflection. So, it is not the problem 
of logic (validity) but the ways we reflect it, otherwise it would become the Chinese 
room experiment. 
z J. R. Searle shows this “Chinese room problem” in his paper “Minds, brains and 
programs”:  
We set an Englishman which does not know Chinese, in a closed room, with 
many symbols of the Chinese language, and a book of instructions in English of 
how to manipulate the symbols when a set of symbols (instructions) is given. So, 
Chinese scientists will give him instructions in Chinese, and the Englishman 
will manipulate symbols in Chinese, and he will give a correct answer in 
Chinese. But he is not conscious of what he did. We suppose that a machine 
behaves in a similar way: it might give correct answers, but it is not conscious of 
what it is doing.  
Another argument on validity of logic is based on a Chinese idiom: Cutting a Mark 
on the Boatside to Retrieve a Sword (Young): 
Once, a man of the State of Chu (ancient China) took a boat to cross a river. It 
so happened that his sword slipped off and fell into the water. Immediately he cut 
a mark on the side of the boat and assured himself: “This is where I have dropped 
my sword.” 
By and by the boat came to the destination and stopped. The man plunged into 
the stream at the point indicated by the incised mark trying to retrieve the lost 
sword. 
The boat has moved on, but not the sword. To recover his sword this way—
the man is indeed muddle-headed . 
This prompts us to doubt whether logic is always applicable to other circumstances as 
we know situation is subjective to constant change. It can be successful in closed systems 
where every state is well defined, but how about open ones?  
Daodejing (Wang Bi, Guo Xiang) begins with: “Dao, daoable, but not the normal 
dao.” Referring to the natural law, we can say it is dao, but it doesn’t mean what we say. 
Whenever we mention it, it is beyond the original sense. 
In Daodejing the creator of everything is defined as dao: like a mother that bears 
things with shape and form. But what/who is dao? It is just unimaginable, because 
whenever we imagine it, our imagination can never be it (we can never completely 
describe it: more we describe it, more wrong we are). Daoism illustrates the origin of 
everything as such a form that doesn’t show in any form we can perceive. Whatever we 
can perceive is merely the created forms, rather than its genuine nature, as if we know 
people by their outer looks rather than by their inner intentions. We are too far from 
understanding the nature. 
Daodejing suggests that logic in the most original extremity is shapeless in 
nature: it is unbodied, invisible, inexpressible, or even intangible. 
● We frequently have such a feeling in learning English as a foreign language that 
there is no fixed meaning but an intangible impression or feeling to a word: the 
meaning varies with situations, contexts or even ages so that we can never assure 
our comprehension. In fact, it is due to the unbridled usage in logic made by 
people of different ages and districts—there is always creativity implied in the 
word so that we can rely on nothing more than our own creativity. 
  
● Wherever there is logic, there is also the corresponding comprehensive 
understanding to logic: also based on our creativity relative to the different 
existences of human beings. Due to the diversity of comprehension, 
interpretation and creativity to the same logic, there are varying versions of 
perception (or conception) to the same logic. 
Whenever we say “it is” by logic, we are subjective—how can we assure our 
objectiveness? We may have developed it from some strictly limited domain under 
constrained conditions, or it is merely a haphazard, because we can only observe limited 
cases in our limited lives. How can we convey the logic to those with different 
backgrounds, even with the slightest difference? How can we then assure the determinacy 
of its truthness? Is that the reason that majority of people hold it (e.g., Darwin’s evolution 
theory and the functional difference between left and right brain—both are controversial 
in fact)? In fact none of the logics can be proved, even of we exist or not (Gershenson). 
There is no truth and false actually: there is because the outcome has to meet 
someone’s desire—they are merely the attributes of a tradeoff. One false dead can be true 
in another perspective, e.g., eating much is good, because of the excellent taste and 
nourishment, but it is also bad when he gets weighted. Neutrosophy (Smarandache) 
shows that a true proposition to one referential system can be false to another. 
 
Conclusion: 
Validity of logic depends on the way we reflect it, not logic itself. Logic never proves 
itself. 
Logic is a matter of tradeoff (balance) between contradictory factors. There 
seems no absolute correctness or falseness independent of environment. 
There is dao, but not the kind we mentioned, accordingly, there is logic but not 
what we specified. 
 
 
6. Logic is only One Perspective of Learning, not an Independent Entity 
 
Logic comes from perception and leads to new perception. It is shown that human 
understands the world through the interaction of the inter-contradictory and inter-
complementary two kinds of knowledge: perceptual knowledge and rational 
knowledge——they can’t be split apart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Logic is created through perception in which void, intangible feelings or 
impressions have been nurtured, brought up and developed into a mental model. 
The logic born is nothing more than a subjective hypothesis at primitive stage—it is 
not within the sense of truthness and falseness. 
However, the terms (symbols) and syntax (rules) is only understood by perception 
through practice. How can we imagine a bookworm who well reads books but has no 
experience? 
Where are truth and false born? There are no such beliefs at the first stage of practice 
in fact (Daodejing): 
When beauty is abstracted (Peter A. Merel) 
Then ugliness has been implied; 
When good is abstracted 
Then evil has been implied. 
 
So alive and dead are abstracted from nature, 
Difficult and easy abstracted from progress, 
Long and short abstracted from contrast, 
High and low abstracted from depth, 
Song and speech abstracted from melody, 
After and before abstracted from sequence. 
 
So it is that existence and non-existence give birth the one to (the idea of) the 
other (James Legge); that difficulty and ease produce the one (the idea of) the 
other; that length and shortness fashion out the one the figure of the other; that 
(the ideas of) height and lowness arise from the contrast of the one with the 
other; that the musical notes and tones become harmonious through the relation 
of one with another; and that being before and behind give the idea of one 
following another. 
Accordingly (back to authors), the division between truth and false comes 
from practice: there is truth, because the outcome is desired, and vice versa to 
false. Furthermore, without false, where comes the truth? And without truth, 
where comes the false? Human has been unintentionally comparing, weighing, 
balancing and trading off between favorable and unfavorable, desired and 
undesired, based on his prompt subjective and objective situations, hence comes 
the abstraction (distinction). 
Therefore, the distinction (or abstraction) of truth and false is nothing 
more than desires that are subject to constant change. 
Conclusion: 
Truth is born from false and false from truth. They are exactly the measurement 
of men’s practice. This measurement is by no means isolated from practical 
situations. 
z Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and 
develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into 
rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide 
revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world. 
  
Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats 
itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and 
knowledge rises to a higher level. 
Accordingly, we need to represent learning in integral form: 
Learning=∫d(perception)·  d(logic)= ∫d(perception(object))·  d(logic(object)) 
in time, space and situation domains, or in compound form: 
Learning=∫d(perception· logic) 
since perception and logic are interchangeable and inter-transformable (they melt each 
other), or they are decomposable in the same manner as learning. 
 
 
7. As a Part of Learning, Logic is Dynamic 
 
Logic depends on perception which is subject to dynamic change with environment, i.e., 
the truth value swings. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the logic (Liu [7]): 
“I’ll visit him if it doesn’t rain and he is in.” 
To avoid being trapped in an instant case that “the clouds promise impending rain” or 
“there is no answer at the moment I ring the door”, we need to learn the long-term trend 
like “does it rain whole day” or “does he keep his promise”, to make a feasible plan (wait 
or return). 
 
Conclusion:    
Learning=∫d(perception· logic) 
in all its time, space and situation domains. Whenever we persist in some instant or 
partial look, we loose the whole. Furthermore, whenever we are satisfied with one-
sided view, we also loose it. 
 
 
8. As a Part of Learning, Logic is Multilateral 
 
Human is normally too confident of himself, no matter how partial or monolateral he is, 
so that he always misleads himself. 
 
 
 
 
A ball with a black hemisphere and a white hemisphere 
 
  
He may then solve such contradiction by standing on some other perspective. 
However, he doesn’t succeed until he reaches the opposite side. This is where our yin-
yang philosophy starts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two kinds of partial reasoning are alternatively fired 
 
The incompleteness of human mind (by no means can we assert the perfectness of 
human being) indicates that human always reasons in partial mode, i.e., positively 
partial at one time and negatively partial at another, as indicated by taiji figure. There 
are plenty of reasons: 
z As a holograph of the universe, human behaves in rhythmed way, e.g.: positive 
mode, negative mode, positive, negative… and so on, with each mode 
complementing and inhibiting the opposite one. 
z Just because human sometimes stands on positive perspective and then the other, 
the truth value (it is, not it is) is in constant change, as shown in dynamic state to 
us. 
z There remains a learning procedure hidden in the above bilateral logic: human has 
to balance the bilateral reasoning to adapt to his present or long-term situations, or 
meet his needs. 
z It is from this inter-complementary and inter-inhibitory contradiction: the bilateral 
model, that multilateral system is generated, according to Chinese yin-yang 
philosophy or I-ching (in Chinese: Yijing, also known as the Book of Changes). 
We can never base intelligence on the individual behavior, and this is the reason why 
we need group or society to exchange our views. This is also the underlying essence of 
multiagent approach that tries to simulate a society. 
Based on our intensive exploration in Chinese philosophic perspective, a prototype of 
logic cell is presented as an inter-complementary pair: the positive and the negative 
logic engines represent positive partial reasoning and negative partial reasoning 
  
respectively, and a learning mechanism tries to assemble them to figure out the trend, 
based on its present and long-term situations, and make choices among various 
possibilities, e.g., to try a plan among a couple of possible plans. Suppose that each logic 
engine is decomposable in the same manner, which clones the entire system. 
It starts with default logic—although believed absolutely valid, it is actually partial in 
nature as we know that human is by no means complete as long as he thinks in logic. This 
partial activity is warmed up and up until some time (one day) contradiction arises. This 
contradiction, growing up and up in previous partial mode, gives rise to negative 
reasoning, which later on inhibits the original logic. This inter-complementary process 
continues as the loop goes on and on, during which the contradiction tends to be 
neutralized. However, this is only a temporary balance when the two engines reach an 
agreement. New contradiction comes with the constant change in environment or 
situations outside. There still remains a chronic cycle hidden in the rhythm for long-term 
resolution. It is also important to note that this is a genetic proliferation in both time and 
space complexity, for it can clone all its subsystems. 
More intensive study is being carried out in neutrosophy. 
 
Conclusion: 
A practical reference frame should originate from a single contradiction or yin-yang 
(see Daodejing or I-ching). 
Every existence is of bilateral character, or double characters, with each 
opposing and complementing the other to form a unity. 
d(object) =       ∂(object)      d(positive engine) +       ∂ (object)      d(negative engine) 
             ∂ (positive perspective)                       ∂ (negative perspective) 
 
= ∂ (object) d(yang) + ∂ (object) d(yin) =      d(object)  ____ d(reference frame) 
                              ∂ (yang)                     ∂ (yin)                 d(reference frame) 
Whenever we hold logic, we have already been standing on a default perspective. Is there 
universal logic? No, unless we reconceptualize it in an opposite perspective, e.g., Daoist 
or Buddhist view.  
 
Conclusion: 
When we hold logic, we have already believed that it is something. This belief in turn 
inhibits our negative consciousness that it may be something else (to some degree) or it 
can be another thing simultaneously (to some extent). We are in this way trapped. So: 
 “It is never too old (for a machine) to learn.” 
 
 
9. Concluding Remarks: Illusion and Creativity 
 
It has long been illustrated in Daodejing (Wang Bi, Guo Xiang) that whenever we capture 
dao as the natural law, universal method or logic, etc., what we capture can never be it. 
Therefore: 
Although we can learn logic, we can never capture it. 
Whenever we do, what we capture is merely a distortion. 
A famous poem from "Topic to Xilin Wall" by Su Shi, a great poet in the Chinese 
Song Dynasty: 
  
A great mountain by vertical and horizontal view,  
Far, near, high, low, and each not same.  
I can't see the true face of Lushan,  
Because I am just in there. 
We cannot criticize ourselves just because we habitually and absolutely believe in 
ourselves. Accordingly, we cannot keep a critical mind to our so called truth just because 
we habitually and absolutely believe in so called truth. Is there really some kind of 
(absolute) truth on earth? 
One time in Tang dynasty China, the Fifth Patriarch of Buddhism announced to 
his disciples that everyone write a verse to show his insight of the Buddhist 
wisdom. 
At this, the most eligible one presented on the wall the verse: 
Our body be a Bodhi tree, 
Our mind a mirror bright, 
Clean and polish frequently, 
Let no dust alight. 
Just as a choreman in the mill of the temple, Huineng answered it with his own: 
There is no Bodhi tree, 
Nor stand of a mirror bright, 
Since all is void, 
Where can the dust alight? 
Whenever we hold the belief “it is …”, we are loosing our creativity. Whenever 
we hold that “it is not …”, we are also loosing our creativity. Our genuine intelligence 
requires that we completely free our mind  - neither stick to any extremity nor to “no 
sticking to any assumption or belief” (Liu [8]). 
As we mentioned previously, whenever there is truth, there is also false that is born 
from/by truth—this abstraction (distinction) is fatal to our creativity. 
Meanwhile, our creativity is nothing similar with things created (i.e., in the sense if 
truth and false). It must be void in form (no definite form), something like dao, since 
whenever we hold it, it is not our creativity. Nor does it mean to destroy everything (there 
is nothing to destroy nor such action, if there was, it is no longer void). 
There is nothing to destroy, nor anything to create. 
If there is, it is rather our illusion than our creativity. 
Because everything believed existing, true or false, is nothing more than our mental 
creation, there is no need to pursuit these illusions, as illustrated in the Heart Sutra [3]: 
When Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara was practicing the profound Prajna 
Paramita, he illuminated the Five Skandhas and saw that they are all empty, and he 
crossed beyond all suffering and difficulty. 
Shariputra, form does not differ from emptiness; emptiness does not differ from 
form. Form itself is emptiness; emptiness itself is form. So too are feeling, 
cognition, formation, and consciousness. 
Shariputra, all Dharmas are empty of characteristics. They are not produced, 
not destroyed, not defiled, not pure; and they neither increase nor diminish. 
Therefore, in emptiness there is no form, feeling, cognition, formation, or 
consciousness; no eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, or mind; no sights, sounds, 
smells, tastes, objects of touch, or Dharmas; no field of the eyes up to and 
  
including no field of mind consciousness; and no ignorance or ending of ignorance, 
up to and including no old age and death or ending of old age and death. There is 
no suffering, no accumulating, no extinction, and no Way, and no understanding 
and no attaining. 
Because nothing is attained, the Bodhisattva through reliance on Prajna 
Paramita is unimpeded in his mind. Because there is no impediment, he is not 
afraid, and he leaves distorted dream-thinking far behind. Ultimately Nirvana! All 
Buddhas of the three periods of time attain Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi through 
reliance on Prajna Paramita. Therefore know that Prajna Paramita is a Great 
Spiritual Mantra, a Great Bright Mantra, a Supreme Mantra, an Unequalled 
Mantra. It can remove all suffering; it is genuine and not false. That is why the 
Mantra of Prajna Paramita was spoken. Recite it like this:  
Gaté Gaté Paragaté Parasamgaté  
Bodhi Svaha! 
Conclusion:  
Everyone can extricate himself out of the maze of illusion, said Sakyamuni and all 
the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas around the universe, their number is as many as that of the 
sands in the Ganges (Limitless Life Sutra, Chin Kung). 
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THE  INTANGIBLE  ABSOLUTE  TRUTH 
 
   Gh. C. Dinulescu-Campina 
Str. Bucea, No. 4, Bl. 38, Ap. 31 
2150 Campina, Prahova, Romania 
 
 
       In the work ″The Modelling of Rationality″ on the basis of my own MESER licence, 
I have raised a new spiritual doctrine sustained by scientific and logical hypotheses. 
The perception of the soundness of the mentioned concept proceeds both from the 
Leibnizian principle concerning the sufficient reason, and from Einstein′s principle 
regarding internal perfection and the external acknowledgement of a new theory but, like 
any responsible ″creators″, I felt the need to also consider the expression of the feeling of 
uncertainty, mine first. 
Although I had found many external confirmations in our great forerunners′ ideas and 
theories, I have not had a proven substantiation yet (which is not by all means necessary 
with philosophical hypotheses) of the hypotheses that I have forwarded, until I got 
acquainted with the ideas of the  mathematician and philosopher Florentin Smarandache - 
the creator of Neutrosophy -  as a branch of Philosophy, that studies the origin, the 
character, the aim and the interactions of the ″objects″ from the idealistic spectre. 
I′ve found out that the Neutrosophy Theory, belonging to the mentioned thinker, based on a 
non-Manichean logic - that is, the trivalent logic- sets up as the scientifically demonstrated 
fundament for the great majority of the hypotheses I have set forth in ″The Modelling of 
Rationality″. 
Essentially, Professor Smarandache′s Neutrosophy stipulates that for any idea <A> there 
is also an idea <Anti-A> that does not mean <Non-A>. The fundamental thesis of 
Neutrosophy is: if <A> is t% true and f% false, as bivalent extremes, it is necessarily i% 
indeterminate (=achievable, to outline its probabilistic connotation), to the effect that, 
t+i+f [ 300+ (or t%+i%+f% [ 3+) which gives a slightly altered meaning to some 
common concepts such as, for example, the one of complementarity.To this effect, the 
complementary of t is not f, but i+f, while the complementary of f is not t, but t+i. 
Florentin Smarandache′s theory of Neutrosophy suggests also the fact that any hypothesis 
has a nature of extremeness (it also allows an anti-hypothesis) which is not bad because 
the law t+i+f=100 must be considered dialectically, where both t and f tend to be 
decreasing (without annuling each other) to the advantage of  i. Far from the idea that any 
hypothesis should not have a nature of extremeness, just such a nature is desirable to 
generate polemics which, in case of confrontation, draws nearer t and f to one another, 
aiming at the neutral equilibrium of the t+f+i=100 relationship, that provides the 
opportunity of accomplishment. (As regards the opportuneness of polemics, I would like 
to mention that the author of neutrosophy hasn′t yet accepted the ″realizable″ alternative 
as ″indeterminate″, nor the impossibility for t and f to make null one another.) 
  
The theory of Neutrosophy makes obvious the relative nature of the truth and the false, 
only the neutral nature tending to the absolute owing to its force of accomplishment. 
THANKS TO THE SPECIFICATIONS THAT ARE STIPULATED IN SMARANDACHE′S 
NEUTROSOPHY, SOME HYPOTHESES OF THE MESER CONCEPT SUCH AS: THE 
COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE, BETWEEN THE DIVINE 
CREATION AND THE INTRA-SPECIFIC EVOLUTION, THE NON-CONTRADICTION BETWEEN 
SCIENCE AND RELIGION, BETWEEN MATERIALISM (SUBSTANTIALISM) AND IDEALISM, 
BETWEEN GNOSTICISM AND AGNOSTICISM, PROVE TO BE RATIONAL AND THEREFORE REAL, 
WHILE THE PARADOXES BECOME JUSTIFIED.  
Directly related to the intangibility of absolute truth, and tackling the issues of the aim of 
knowledge, according to the neutrosophical fashion, the MESER concept identifies two 
modalities: scientific knowledge - that specialised knowledge ″more and more from that 
<<less and less>> and philosophic, encyclopaedic knowledge ″less and less from that 
<<more and more>>″. If the first modality of knowledge is limited especially by the 
possibilities of communication, the second one is also limited by the insufficient power of 
comprehension of the human mind. The equilibrium between the two directions which, in 
the last analysis, signifies the way to the truth, is determined by the divine laws of  
dissociation, purification (the selection and the erasing of the seals) and those of monadic 
recomposition - laws that ascertain for knowledge as a whole, a social character, 
expressed by the syntagm ″more and more from that <<more and more>>, rendered by 
the well-known paradox ″the more you learn, the less you know.″ 
After all, the fundamental law of Neutrosophy is a successful attempt for resolving the 
paradox of  knowledge and confirm the thesis that the absolute truth is intangible not in a 
derogatory way but in an optimistic one, approved and revealed by (and through) the will 
of God. 
Being operative even in the case of particular interpretations, as is the case of the present 
one, Smarandache′s neutrosophy confirms (according to Einstein theory) its validity, be it 
only for the fact that it suggests new methods and modalities for evaluation, new 
interpretative perspectives. 
 
 
On time 
 
In the paradigmatic construction of the spatiotemporality, the MESER concept has 
recourse to the necessary hypothesis according to which substantial reality – the one 
disseminated through the divine will within into material reality and anti-material reality 
possesses that ″retrograde movement″ from right to left, in respect to the spiritual reality. 
Independently of the behaviour of any rational (or not) materialized entity, the above 
mentioned retrograde movement meaning for each of those the outlining of its 
″embodied″ existence, represents what is defined as that impalpable philosophical 
category called TIME. 
One can assume that this movement related to the spiritual reality as a benchmark is 
characterized by uniformity (constant ″speed″) – hence the perception of superior rational 
entities (humanoids) on that uniform ″flow″ of time and on its reversibility. 
  
Physical movement − that movement of any entity in respect to substantial reality as a 
benchmark, with parameters (speed, for example) that cannot be compared to those of the 
hypothetical retrograde movement of substantial reality − cannot change that apodictic 
character of the uniform time flow impression. From the time when physical movement, 
though, acquires parameters comparable to those of the retrograde movement (such as 
one of the so called cosmic speeds), one can speak of a different modality (slowed down) 
of time flow. 
Speculations on time expansion (substantiated by the famous Einsteinian theory of 
relativity), already apodictic by virtue of their scientific support, concede that each entity 
bears its own time. A spaceship wandering through the immensity of substantial reality, 
using that already feasible cosmic speed, is  a bearer of its time − a time characterized by 
an incredible and yet paradoxical dilatation in respect to the time of the departure station. 
Upon return of such a spaceship from a voyage of only a couple of years, one could 
notice that at the departure station several generations have already ″passed″. The 
voyagers of such a spaceship do not notice the dilatation of their own time (the 
spaceship″s time) but, on the contrary, the contraction of the time of the station. 
Each rational entity fails to perceive the change of its own time, it only perceives the 
dilatation and contraction respectively, of the time of another entity in respect to one′s 
own time. 
Admitting that time is the overall movement of substantial (material) reality in respect the 
eminently spiritual (nonsubstantial) reality, but also the movement of any material entity 
in respect to the substantial reality (physical movement) we infer that the former, i.e. 
time, does not exist within the non-substantial reality. What is more, one can state with 
minimal risks, that time and space are ″mere voyagers″ within the spiritual reality. 
The absence of time (and space) from the spiritual reality does not involve the absence of 
movement from that reality. On the contrary, the spiritual reality supposes, of necessity, 
the movement of nonsubstantial entities, that a-causal movement (from the physical point 
of view), the permanent stochastic movement of entities (entelechies), eminently 
spiritual, governed by haphasard (as a perfect law) – the only workable law, both within 
the spiritual reality and within the substantial one (material or anti-material). 
As regards its triple polarity (spatiality, duration and order) one can point out that the 
spatiotemporality is governed by order (resulted from haphazard), time and space being 
the ″gifts″ with which God endowed the spatiotemporality when He created the matter 
and anti-matter, by their dissemination from the spiritual reality. 
In order to tackle the tricky and delicate problem of what is called reversibility of time, 
some considerations stand out: 
− I have defined time as that retrograde movement of substantial reality, having as a 
benchmark the spiritual reality where the material, and antimaterial, respectively, reality 
″floats″ osmotically. According to the MESER axiom for the spatiotemporality, that 
retrograde movement was taken into consideration out of the need to justify the ″voyage″ 
of any entity, specifically of  the ″live″ entity, between the primary limit and the 
secondary limit of material reality, that is from birth to that ″extreme and insurmountable 
possibility″ as Otto Poggeler defines corporeal death, or, in another manner, to justify 
″consumption″ as a duration of that factual experience called DASEIN by M. Heidegger. 
  
− As an element of the spatiotemporality, any rational (or not) entity has, in respect to 
spiritual reality, a ″relative stability″ (besides the inner Brownian movement of those in 
the same Brownnian style due to one′s own will − the free will), having no reasons or 
capabilities to cross the manifest (substantial) reality in between its two limits. 
− The ″retrograde movement″ and the ″relative stability″ confirm the supposition that any 
entity is a bearer of its own time within the material reality and that the former, time, 
does not exist within the spiritual reality. 
− If material reality as a whole has a retrograde motion, any entity (and specifically the 
live one) has a contrary movement. To this effect, one can deem that the entities, 
whichever they are, ″travel″ uniformly towards the future within the substantial reality 
and undergo a perpetual present in respect to the spiritual reality, as long as they are 
embodied (materially split). 
The foregoing considerations lead to the conclusion that the hypothesis of the retrograde 
movement, as a time defining hypothesis, as well as that of the relative stability do not 
grant to an entity the possibility to travel in a retrograde fashion (into the past), thus any 
possibility to explain an assumed temporal reversibility is ruled out. 
By invoking the Einsteinian theory of relativity according to which temporal dilatation by 
travelling with cosmic speeds, or temporal contraction, as perceived by the rational 
entities left behind at the ″station″ (from which the spacecraft departed and to which it 
returned), are possible, there is no way to speak of a hypothetical reversibility of time. 
Indeed, for a rational entity at the station, a travelling entity is by no means ″made 
younger″ and in its turn it sees itself in no other way than ″made older″. The same 
travelling entity has almost null chances to find any living, and by no means younger, 
rational entity from among those left at the station. 
In order to detect in the temporal ″dilatation-contraction″ a reason ″pro″ time 
reversibility, one should image an experiment during which the ″arrival″ from, should 
precede the ″departure″ for, the cosmic journey. This could be ″possible″ if the departure 
and arrival stations were appropriately placed next to the ″line of date change″, if the 
entire journey were to last less than 24 hours (time-keeping at the station) and if the so-
called ″conventional time″ were involved. In real time, this is nevertheless not possible, 
no matter what other additional condition were involved.  
Finally, we come to the stage of assessing what means the hypothetical spiritual journey 
in time (in this case, into the past) − that one made possible by the convenient travel, 
through that plausible time tunnel, of the soul (the eminently spiritual part of the rational 
entity), with the possibility to access a certain moment of the past by that entity. This 
access to the past does not mean a reverse ″restoration″ of time, but, in the best of cases, 
only a re-covering of a duration from the accessed moment towards a possible different 
future (that can be ″past″ in respect to the commencement of the journey through the 
tunnel). Obviously, neither the spiritual journey in time provides any reasons to consider 
that time could be reversible. All (known) modalities of temporal modification that have 
been invoked − retrograde movement, travel with cosmic speeds, spiritual journey in time 
− are nevertheless conductive to the idea that: ″Fugit irreparabile tempus″.  
According to the neutrosophic theory (F. Smarandache: Neutrosophy) based on trivalent 
logic, any scientific hypothesis features an extreme character to the effect that it 
necessarily has also an anti-hypothesis; moreover, to achieve complementarity, the two 
  
extremes must also incorporate that indecisive part. By virtue of the above mentioned 
principle, that is eminently dialectic, the thesis on time irreversibility, as any other one, 
must be deemed merely as a possible truth, becoming such (or the opposite) only after the 
acquisition, by reason of some laws, of that ″neutral equilibrium″ that supposes a possible 
reformulation and necessarily, an extension of the respective theory in as much as 
possible, closely connected domains of definition. From among all involved theories for 
substantiating the thesis on time irreversibility, the one that lends itself mostly to 
reformulation, and that might lead to a contrary conclusion, seems to be exactly the one 
with the soundest scientific rationale − the Einsteinian theory of relativity, that Einstein 
himself did not consider as final. 
If in 1905 the theory of relativity had an unprecedented impact on the scientific world, 
even before the brilliant Niels Bohr could formulate his objections (as Einstein used to 
behave in respect to Bohr), Einstein had an insight that his theory was based on much too 
restrictive ″preliminary conditions″. In 1916 he was ″compelled″ to reformulate his 
hypotheses within the framework of the ″generalized relativity theory″, renaming the 
initial one as ″limited relativity theory″.  
As the relativistic theory of Einstein is based on the hypothesis on the maximum absolute 
value of the ″C″ constant, and as of late (November 2000) three scientists (a Romanian 
and two Americans) have demonstrated that some phenomena take place at speeds 
exceeding that of light, it is predictable that the theory of relativity might be reformulated 
and completed with that part that could be called the ″theory of absolute relativity″ 
dedicated to the phenomena occurring in the ″mega-cosmos″, ″giga-cosmos″ or 
″angstrom-cosmos″ − hypothetical designations of some definition domains different 
from the macrocosmos and microcosmos, already ″covered″ by the Einsteinian theory.  
The extension and possible reformulation of the theory of relativity could supply 
substantiating elements on a thesis on ″temporal reversibility″, but only if ″external 
confirmations″ (according to the Einsteinian principle) and theoretical and practical 
requirements (according to the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason) for such an 
approach are provided. In fact, anything is possible, the only absolute truth (figuratively) 
being that expressed by the syntagm: ″nothing is final″. 
 
 
On death 
 
               “Dasein is factual Being , power of Being, as  anticipation of the extreme  
possibility  that can’t be surpassed – death.”  
                                Otto Poggeler  
 
According to Heidegger in “Sein und Zeit”, the possibility of Being has its origin into an 
ultimate possibility that cancels, post factum even the possibility of Being itself. With his 
term of dasein, Heidegger always brings to the fore existence as a fatality, without 
explicitly denying its fate as an obligation, either imperative or assumed, nevertheless in 
vain.  
Implicitly, Heidegger is preoccupied, concerning the existence, by the sentimental side of  
it, without insisting on its role in showing rationality as a great divine work, thus 
deliberately avoiding to refer to a certain objective aspect.  
  
The MESER concept estimates that sensations as well as feelings, as attributes of 
existence, are not a purpose but a means, which ensures creating products of rationality 
through Being. The products of rationality – which are the purpose of Being, are not 
thwarted, and neither is Being itself, by death; they remain as monadic seals and only the 
divinity decides through its “Last Judgement” if the seal is to be “erased” or redistributed 
towards other new spiritual entities, formed as a primary fund of the intellect of future 
substantially splittable rational entities, which are in turn destined to create new rational 
products.  
While the Heideggerian dasein sees death as a fatality which thwarts the possibility of 
Being, by obsessively bringing it out, the MESER concept (Speculative Existential 
Model of the Rational Entity) considers death as an objective necessity, whose 
imminence must not be pointed out in a paranoiac manner and which doesn’t cancel the 
Being but submits it periodically to God’s judgement in order to be purified and 
harmonized with the purpose of His Great Work.  
As a subsequent theory  to dasein, the MESER concept perceives it (with all due 
consideration) as a model of sentimental approach (subjective and therefore 
psychologistic) of the Being as a purpose ending with death; while the MESER concept 
evaluates itself as an objective, rationalist model, which without denying the purpose 
itself of Being, qualifies it as a path towards  the construction of the divine work which is 
universal rationality.  
        Although they seem to diverge , the two models are contingent and neither one 
won’t be affected if the balance of truth inclines towards one or another.  
Even though the two models would be, judging by bivalent logic, the extremes, each one 
prevails based on an indisputable accurate logic.  
According to the basic law of the Smarandachian neutrosophism (F. Smarandache, 
University of New Mexico:Neutrosophy) t % + i % + f % [ 3+, however t (the undoubted 
truth) and f  (the undoubted falseness) both have the tendency to decrease (without 
annulling) one for the advantage of the other or for the advantage of  i (the irresoluteness, 
the achievable ), having effects on creating a possible model, as much as operable, of 
Being.  Here t = sup T (truth), i = sup I (irresoluteness), f = sup F (falseness).  
 Dasein and MESER are compatible, each of them taking advantage on the other 
one.  
MESER supplies the basic scheme for a bygone Being, from the rational entity point of 
view, as well as for a periodic and permanent Being, referring to rationality as Being in 
general; while dasein refers mostly to the sentimental aspect of Being in its substantial 
sequence. In other words, from the escatological point of view, dasein includes the theory 
of death as final point of a subjective Being, ( which is true), while the MESER concept 
refers to death as an intermezzo, as another beginning of Being in general.  
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Abstract: Neutrosophy’s underlying construction is far more sophisticated than we can 
imagine. I present in this paper a critical analysis on the logical description of <Neut-A> 
based on multicultural joint venture, and reach a contradictory argument that the axiom is 
rather a paradox than a valid definition. Starting with the fundamental issue in Daodejing, 
the paper carries out a widespread discussion on conflicts in denominating things, from 
yinyang philosophy to dialectics, from relativity of being to self-negating effect of 
concepts, exhibiting the genuine essence of philosophy against distortion. Discussion of 
feasible description of <Neut-A>  (neutrosophy) is also presented, followed by a brief 
distinction between human intelligence and machine intelligence. The paper aims to help 
scientists reach the genuine nature hidden in the ideology of neutrosophy. 
 
Keywords: Dao, Genuine Nature, Contradiction, Identity, Self-negation, Partial 
Negation, Neutrosophy 
 
1. Neutrosophy: a joint venture 
 
It is not until recently that I came across the study of neutrosophy introduced by Florentin 
Smarandache (1995). It seems a very brave challenge to a number of developed sciences 
and technologies. However, from its intension and method of approach, I realized that it 
touches the most arcane, abstruse, and mysterious philosophies such as Daoism and 
Buddhism, and the toughest problems in the universe as difficult as uncovering the 
universe. I am afraid how western intelligents can handle such mysteries. 
As a Chinese, I feel obliged to spread out our exploration based on the multicultural 
joint venture, with focus on the paradox “neither <A> nor <Anti-A>”, as illustrated in 
step ward arguments, as shown below. 
 
2. Name, denominable, but not the normal name 
 
Daodejing (Wang Bi, Guo Xiang) begins with: “Dao, daoable, but not the normal dao; 
name, namable, but not the normal name.” We can say it is dao, but it doesn’t mean what 
we say. Whenever we mention it, it is beyond the original sense. 
Daodejing mainly deals with the common problem: “What/who creates everything in 
the world we see and feel?” It is dao: like a mother that bears things with shape and form. 
But what/who is dao? It is just unimaginable, because whenever we imagine it, our 
imagination can never be it (we can never completely describe it: more we describe it, 
more wrong we are). It is also unnamable, because whenever we name it, our concept 
based on the name can never be it. 
  
Daoism illustrates the origin of everything as such a form that doesn’t show in any 
form we can perceive. This is the reason why it says, everything comes from nothingness, 
or this nothingness creates everything in forms in dynamic change. Whatever we can 
perceive is merely the created forms, rather than its genuine nature, as if we distinguish 
people by their outer clothes. We are too far from understanding the nature, even for the 
most prominent figures like Einstein. 
You may then ask whether Laozi was genius enough to express it. Definitely no. It is 
true that he was aware of the problem, or we can assume that he really understood it, 
however, he could never describe it. Although Carlos Gershenson has presented this 
argument in his paper as incomplete language, I am still afraid whether he can catch my 
notion that the most complete and perfect language is no language. 
z An example is described in a story (Lanier Young, 1991) in the Mahapra 
Janaparamita Sutra: 
z The Blind Men Trying to Size Up the Elephant: Once there was a 
king who ordered his minister to bring in an elephant and let some 
blind men touch the animal one by one. After every one of them 
had their turn, the king asked them what they thought the elephant 
was like. The one who had touched its tusk said it was like a turnip; 
the next had touched its ear, and said it was a dustpan; the third its 
foot, and said it was a pestle; the fourth its back, and said it was a 
bed; the fifth its belly, and said it was a jar; and the last its tail, and 
said it was a rope…. 
We can imagine that our perceptions are just as partial as those of the 
blind people, then how can we name things that are believed known to 
everyone but actually as mysterious as the elephant to the blind people? Do 
we understand, for example, 1+1=2? We always believe so although it has 
never been proved by the mathematical world. Even when it were proved, 
how could we explain black+black or black+white? 
z Carlos Gershenson [1] presents: Not only silliness, but all adjectives can 
only be <used|applied> in a relative way, dependant of a context. Language 
is relative as well. How can we speak about absolute being, then? We can 
and we cannot. We speak about it, but in that moment its absolute is relative. 
For us, it is and it is not-incomplete. But that we cannot completely speak 
about it, it is not a reason to stop speaking about it (as Wittgenstein would 
early suggest in his Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus), because we can 
incompletely represent its completeness... As Wittgenstein himself (but not 
most of his followers...) realized, following the ideas in the Tractatus, we 
would not be able to speak about anything... (languages are incomplete). 
Language is used inside a context. Depending of this context the language 
will be different. 
z Can language be completely transferred by telesthesia? Although I 
acknowledge it is a better way of communication, but it also depends. For 
example, how can we understand the hidden, underlying or implied meaning 
of the transferred “words”? Is language transferable? I am afraid there is not 
a definite answer. One reason might be that the same language can be 
interpreted diversely by different people. This should be the reason why 
  
human failed to communicate properly with those in different languages, or 
with other species on earth or in the space, even with Jesus. 
z Telesthesia truly exists universally in the Pure Land described in 
Buddhism: People there communicate with each other by heart rather 
than words. Further more, they can also “speak” to people everywhere 
outside the “Pure Land” World which was founded by Amitabha. A 
recent VCD video from Taiwan shows that a young man really came to 
this world after his medical death, because he really made frequent 
communication, after “death”, with his sister still in Taiwan as a young 
Buddhist nun, not only did he answer all the questions of his sister, but 
also made an unbelievable promise which was later on testified 
astonishingly by his family on earth. 
z Just because there are no perfect words to express the most sincere truth that 
uncovers our genuine nature, we can say nothing than Amitabha to 
communicate. Although we know that in Buddhism it is almost equal to 
saying nothing, but it implies saying everything. 
 
As the conclusion, everything can be named, but never absolutely proper. It is a 
name, but never a perfect name. 
 
3. Name is always subjective, relative to the perception and perspective of observer 
 
Has anyone been confused about “Am myself really myself”? An old person, when 
gazing at the albums of his childhood, he always point to the photos and says: “It is me.” 
How ridiculous! 
z At first, he is pointing to some paper cards rather than humans. 
z Secondly, what he is pointing to is an image of himself, not really himself. 
z Thirdly, provided that he were really pointing to a younger himself, but it 
were really different from what he looks like presently——they are different 
themselves objectively, or there are an infinite number of themselves 
objectively. 
z Even at the present age, a smiling himself and an anxious himself definitely 
look differently objectively. 
z They are all himself because humans subjectively take it for granted and 
firmly believe so. 
z But, are all these pertaining to his body really himself? Definitely no, 
because he will begin another life (in the next life cycle) after his medical 
death. He never dies actually. 
z Incarnation, samsara, wheel of life, transmigration of souls, or eternal 
cycle of birth and death, this is a basic phenomenon of every living 
being in the universe including those in the heaven, except in the 
Buddhist Pure Lands where everyone has escaped from his destiny, 
according to Buddhism. 
z As the result, we don’t actually understand who we are, just use the names 
subjectively. 
 
  
Another example lies in question: “What on earth is the following figure?” 
z To well educated students, it is a circle. 
z But to uneducated kids, it can be: “a cake, a dish, a bowl, 
a balloon…, even the moon, the sun”. 
 
 
 
 
Let’s reach our conclusion that name is merely our mental creation. It is rather a 
belief than an objective being, and varies among different people. 
z We always believe “it is” but can’t prove it. 
z In his paper “To be or not to be, A multidimensional logic approach” 
Carlos Gershenson [2] has generalized the proofs: 
z Everything is and isn't at a certain degree. (i.e., there is no absolute 
truth or false); 
z Nothing can be proved (that it exists or doesn't) (i.e., no one can 
prove whether his consciousness is right); 
z I believe, therefore I am (i.e., I take it true, because I believe so). 
z In fact, this belief of “it is” is always critical (Buddhism). 
z In Buddhist saying, all such beliefs are created by ourselves, for: 
“I am human.” 
I am because I always hold this belief, so persistently that I nearly 
forget I can be Buddha as well. 
Multidimensional logic has been surpassed by infinite-valued logic, then fuzzy logic, and 
ultimately by neutrosophic logic. 
  
 
4. Name itself implies anti-name 
 
Whenever there is a name, it can never be a perfect name. Does it mean we are cheated 
by or trapped in those created by ourselves? It does, and it doesn’t as well. First, there is 
only relative name, no absolute name. Second, name actually acts as a tradeoff to unify 
the diversity of concepts——whenever there is name, there is contradiction as well. 
z We can name something as black, but to distinguish it from white. We can 
name a human, but to distinguish it from others. 
z Names are useful to distinguish things, but don’t absolutely describe natures, 
as stated above. 
z Just because there is no absolute name or universal name, people would 
denominate things in their different perspectives or perceptions. 
z As an example, a modulator/demodulator is named a mouse, just from its 
casing that resembles a toy mouse. 
z Despite all these problems above, we need a common name, however, to 
communicate. Therefore, we have to make balance, in the sense of 
acceptance or rejection, among the diversity. 
z Carlos Gershenson [1] points out that: There will always absolute-be 
injustice, because this one is relative. Since different people have 
  
different contexts (or we can use the word Seelenzustand (soul state), to 
refer to the personal context, to distinguish from a general context)... So, 
since people have different Seelenzustandes, we cannot speak of absolute 
justice, so things will be just for the people with power... The less-
catastrophic panorama (and most naive...) would be that the people in the 
power would have the less-incomplete Seelenzustandes, trying to contain 
and understand as many Seelenzustandes as they can, so, if they are just, 
in spite their relativity, they will be just as well for all the people whose 
Seelenzustandes they contain. 
z Accordingly, contradiction is a universal phenomenon that can never be 
avoided. 
The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is 
that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that 
in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from 
beginning to end. 
    Contradiction is the basis of the simple forms of motion (for instance, 
mechanical motion) and still more so of the complex forms of motion. 
z Despite the anti-name property in space domain we have just discussed, this 
contradiction also exists in time domain. 
z Mao Zedong also states that: 
    We Chinese often say, "Things that oppose each other also 
complement each other." That is, things opposed to each other have 
identity. This saying is dialectical and contrary to metaphysics. "Oppose 
each other" refers to the mutual exclusion or the struggle of two 
contradictory aspects. "Complement each other" means that in given 
conditions the two contradictory aspects unite and achieve identity. Yet 
struggle is inherent in identity and without struggle there can be no 
identity.  
    In identity there is struggle, in particularity there is universality, and in 
individuality there is generality. To quote Lenin, ". . . there is an absolute 
in the relative." 
z He implies such a cycle: conflict——identity——new conflict——new 
identity… to the infinite, in each cycle of which the conception 
undergoes a partial negation of its original stage to a higher level, and in 
this infiniteness of negations we make our revolutionary progresses in 
knowledge, as to negate the original sense of “it is”. Hence comes the 
expression “nothingness” to replace the original meaning “it is 
something”. 
z The Buddhist terms: emptiness, void of the world of senses might 
just come out of the endless negation of our partial consciousness 
that has been believed absolutely valid. 
Once we become aware of it, we are 
awake. And once we keep the genuine 
consciousness (without even the 
  
slightest partialness) in every fraction of moment and forever, we are 
Buddhas. 
z As the result, neutrality comes as the outcome of conflict, and in turn, 
conflict comes as the outcome of neutrality too. As shown in the taiji 
form. 
z The more we hold on to our original belief “it is” (although partial), 
the more mightily conflict arises, since we persist in a more 
incomplete concept, or fragment, to represent the complete. The 
same to the coming cycles. This is reflected in neutrosophy as the 
law of inverse effect (F. Smarandache, 1998).  
 
As conclusion, antagonism and neutrality are cause and effect to each other. 
 
5. Representing the <Neut-A> 
 
<Neut-A> comes as the consequence of the contradiction between <A> and <Anti-A>, 
therefore we can say it is neither <A> nor <Anti-A>, but is it all this simple? 
z Once we finish <Neut-A> as <neither <A> nor <Anti-A>> in the first cycle, 
then in the following cycle we come to the less incomplete concept as <Neut-
<Neut-A>>. However, there must be an element of consistency between 
<Neut-A> and <Neut-<Neut-A>>, i.e., 
between  <Neut-A>  and  <neither <Neut-A> nor <Anti-<Neut-A>>> 
that acts as the gene of reproduction, i.e., there must be a consistency 
between  <B>  and  not <B> and not <C> 
But where is it? Apparently they are not logically consistent! Once there is 
nothing indeterminate that can pass down to the next “generation”, is it a 
feasible philosophy? 
z <Neut-A> would alternately be expressed as both <A> and <Anti-A>, since it 
shares characteristic of both <A> and <Anti-A> to some extent (I prefer 
“extent” than “degree”). 
z Although yin and yang are opposite in taiji figure, they are unbreakable 
friends in giving birth to novel form of development. 
z The point lies in the confusion between absolute-be and partial-be (or 
absolute-not and partial-not). We can confirm or negate a being absolutely 
and partially as well, but I am afraid we can never be genius enough to do it 
absolutely unless in a well defined domain in which our perceptions are 
relatively complete. 
z How can we properly express this partial approval/negation? In percentages? 
Then how can we deal with such partial operations in fuzzy and neutrosophic 
sets? It is quite another task. 
z Provided that a genius giant had successfully settled it in pure mathematics, 
there would be no need then, I am afraid, to employ analog means. How 
incredible! 
z A feasible alternative, I suggest, would be to put dynamic weight on concept 
instead of statistic percentages, to combine neural technology. Or more 
  
specifically, to create a pattern neutrosophically from the threshold ideology 
in neural network approaches. 
As the conclusion, it is never too old for a machine to learn. 
 
6. On our genuine intelligence——creativity 
 
In the previous query about the figure on the left, whenever we hold the answer 
as a circle, we are inhibiting our creativity. Nor should we hold that it is a cake, 
a dish, a bowl, a balloon, or the moon, the sun, for we also spoil our 
creativity in this way. Then, what is it? 
“It is nothing.” 
Is it correct? It is, if we do not hold on to the assumption “it is something”. It is also 
wrong, if we persist in the doctrine “the figure is something we call nothing.” This 
nothing has in this way become something that inhibits our creativity. How ridiculous! 
Whenever we hold the belief “it is …”, we are loosing our creativity. Whenever 
we hold that “it is not …”, we are also loosing our creativity. Our true intelligence 
requires that we completely free our mind——neither stick to any extremity nor to “no 
sticking to any assumption or belief”. This is a kind of genius or gift rather than logic 
rules, acquired largely after birth, e.g., through Buddhism practice. 
 
Not (it is) and not (it is not), 
It seems nothing, but creates everything, 
Including our true consciousness, 
The power of genius to understand all. 
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2. Background 
 
Neutrosophy is defined as a new branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature, and 
scope of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra 
(Florentin Smarandache, 1995). However the term neutrality needs to be discussed, 
explained or redefined in multicultural background, since neutrosophy covers a large area 
of studies and has to be based on the occidental and oriental joint venture (Liu [4]). 
z This mode of thinking includes: 
1. proposes new philosophical theses, principles, laws, methods, formulas, 
movements; 
2. reveals that world is full of indeterminacy; 
3. interprets the uninterpretable; 
4. regards, from many different angles, old concepts, systems: showing 
that an idea, which is true in a given referential system, may be false in 
another one, and vice versa; 
5. attempts to make peace in the war of ideas, and to make war in the 
peaceful ideas; 
6. measures the stability of unstable systems, and instability of stable 
systems. 
z Methods of neutrosophic study involves: 
- mathematization (neutrosophic logic, neutrosophic probability and statistics, 
duality), 
- generalization, complementarity, contradiction, paradox, tautology, analogy, 
- reinterpretation. 
  
z Neutrosophy touches the most arcane, abstruse, and mysterious philosophies 
such as Daoism and Buddhism, and the toughest problems in the universe as 
difficult as uncovering the universe. 
Many issues on the explanation and description concern space domain, where I have 
put my first analysis in a paper based on Daoism and Buddhism (Liu [4]). Here I am 
going to show some points pertaining to time domain. 
 
3. Metabolism in the nature 
 
As known to everybody, metabolism is a basic phenomenon of nature: something is 
dying as the premonitor of another growth, and something growing as the outcome of 
dying of another. 
z When plant is dying, it yields seeds to another growth that adapts more to the 
geological situations like climate, soil and water. 
z Animal is alive when one part of the cells dying and another part growing, which 
inherit its will. 
z Human beings generate themselves in the same way to inherit families, 
knowledge and faith. 
z As in society, e.g., in Chinese dynasties, new forces grow as the dying of old 
ones. 
z It is also said in Buddhism that the earth undergoes such cycles in its evolution: 
the birth, the growing, prosperity, decrepitude and vanish, just as the existence of 
plants in the sequence of spring, summer, autumn and winter. 
More issues can be found in a forthcoming encyclopedia of Buddhism (the only 
one based on modern society)  which I am going to put into English. 
z The alternation of yin and yang is universal in everything: 
z Yin-yang is the basic form of everything and every course. 
It is yin and yang that is meant by Dao (I-ching)). 
z There is Qian, symbolizing Heaven, which directs the great beginnings of 
things, and Kun, symbolizing Earth, which gives them to their completion (I-
ching, James Legge). 
Qian pertains to yang and Kun to yin. In the course of development and 
evolution of everything Qian (yang) acts as the creativity (creativity is 
mentioned in my conference paper, (Liu [4])) that brings new beginnings 
to it, whereas Kun (yin) implements it in forms as we perceive as 
temporary states. It is in this infinite parallelism things inherit 
modifications and adapt to changes (author’s note). 
z There is always contradiction between them, which needs to be neutralized 
in a new form. 
Yin acts as the preservative force (inhibiting yang: when something is 
shaped, it should have its own inertia against immediate change) that 
resists modification, reformation or revolution exhibited by yang, 
therefore, there should be conflict or struggle between these two forces 
(author’s note): 
  
z There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest 
and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle 
between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. 
When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only 
quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents 
the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the 
second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state 
has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the 
dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative 
change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. 
Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, 
deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as 
we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of 
quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity, 
that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, 
balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity 
and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the 
appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the 
transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly 
transforming themselves from the first into the second state of 
motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the 
contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we 
say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and 
relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is 
absolute. (Z. Mao) 
However, there is neutralism in them: 
z The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. 
Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its 
existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing 
or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without 
life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no 
life. Without "above", there would be no "below"; without 
"below", there would be no "above". Without misfortune, there 
would be no good fortune; without good fortune, there would be 
no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; 
without difficulty, there would be no facility. Without landlords, 
there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there 
would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no 
proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. 
Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no 
colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semi-colonies, there 
would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all 
opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed 
to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, 
interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this 
character is described as identity. In given conditions, all 
  
contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and 
hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also 
possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. 
This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies 
"how opposites can be . . . identical". How then can they be 
identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. 
This is the first meaning of identity (Z. Mao). 
As an example, although landlords and tenant-peasants are 
opposites, they have to rely on each other to coexist (author’s 
note). 
z But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory 
aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is 
identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a 
single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their 
dependence on each other for their existence; what is more 
important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in 
given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing 
transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its 
opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of 
contradiction (Z. Mao). 
As an example, landlords can fall into tenant-peasants once 
they loose their fortune and power, and vice versa when tenant-
peasants gain fortune and power (author’s note). Or quite Mao 
Zedong’s, “by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time 
the ruled, is transformed into the ruler”. 
z Neutralism is derived when yin and yang combine each other into 
compounds as illustrated in I-ching in the creation of trigrams, or 
when yin and yang inter-consist each other in an infinite course: 
yin, yang, yin in yang, yang in yin, yang in (yin in yang), yin in 
(yang in yin), …, at last, they reach a balance as the new form or 
new generation. 
 
4. The metabolic universe 
 
As stated in his book Gravitational Measurement in Time and Space — A Hypothesis of 
Life and Sole, Jiang Xiufu has structured a kind of entirely new and total scientific 
theory. Starting from the different theories in principle, he has revised the physical 
theories developed since the 17th century completely and bodily. Also, from Aristotle’s 
mechanics to Einstein’s special theory of relativity and from classical electrodynamics to 
modern quantum mechanics, the book has generalized the thoughts of unified field theory 
in a broadly comprehensive way and made a thoroughgoing change in the concepts of 
today’s natural sciences. Part of the summary is shown bellow: 
Universe is made up of matter: Whirl vortex body is the basic form of matter 
existence. As viewed from its attribution of nature, all the motions are the position 
changes of matter gains in space according to order (time). Whirl vortex bodies are 
in the frictions among matter gains as well as in non-central collision, thus causing 
  
them to move along the inclined direction and also making themselves begin rotate 
“left” or “right”. Thus the turbid, disordered, pointless and random rotating 
motions begin to contract and rotate violently in the dominant “left” or “right” 
whirl vortexes and congregate to form universe various steps and whirl vortex body 
of different sizes… Therefore, the nearer to the center, the larger matter density 
and the faster rotation velocity, the whirl vortex bodies have. And, the whorl vortex 
bodies with small sizes have larger matter density and larger matter gains around 
with the rotating linear velocity. The maximum internal energy is congregated in 
electrons and atoms. In the super-density environment of electrons and atoms, the 
time-space scale structures contracts to their limits. As a result, all the energy 
exchanging process takes places and ends at an instance. 
Whirl vortex steps and stairs in the matter world are in finite in time and space 
so that we regard the universe as self generating and developing system of the 
“left” and ‘right” vortex body in each step or stair. “Left whirling matter” and 
“right whirling matter”----matter and anti-matter are the opposite of two sides 
existed within the matter world. And the interdependence of the two sides upon 
each other as well as both opposite and compensate each other. They 
interdependent upon each other, inter-supply each other with that they need and 
interconsume what they have. Accordingly, they themselves promote their own to 
grow and die as well as change and develop in the eternal cycles. 
Space is the form of matter existence. 
Time is the attribution of matter motion. 
The world unifications are their materiality. 
The law of the unity of opposite is the basic law of the matter world: The 
objects in physics are in continuous changes. On the one hand, they inter-act with 
their surroundings and they have the history of growth and death; on the other 
hand, the occurrence of the natural phenomenum of any kind is constrained by the 
internal inherent contradictions of any matter. Therefore, physics should repel all 
the rigid conceptions. There are no absolute rest and uniform straight line motion; 
there are no motions without resistance, there are no absolute “positive and 
negative as well as left and right”; there are no absolute time and space…; For this 
reason, starting from the fixed facts, it is necessary to study physical logic and 
physical concepts and their connotations and denotations of how to express the 
history of transition, conversion and interaction in time and space, and the history 
of constraining motion progress of conditions. Accordingly, using the dialectical 
viewpoint to study physics is the only one of scientific thinking methods. 
Spirit is the supreme form of matter motion. 
This metabolism of matter exchange is illustrated as the basic form from existence of 
matter (the principle of metabolism of whirl vortex body, of roles of recoil force, 
gravitational field, electrical field, magnetic field, the principle of electromagnetic inter-
compensation, of roles of temperature field, of existence and evolution of whirl vortex 
body), wave mechanics, electrodynamics, motion medium electrodynamics, trajectory of 
stars, thermodynamics, to origin and evolution of life, thinking morphology and 
supernatural sense. It is his most impressive dead to rederive the theory of relativity in the 
simplest mathematical manner: finding the average (I met him once in Xi’an and hence 
got the book). 
  
There are reasons why he failed to implement his hypothesis: he is not specialized in 
physics, or the specialized experts are too materialistic. In fact, our physics uncovers no 
more than ten percent of matter scientists are aware of, said by one of the most famous 
experts in the world, a Nobel Prize winner. Furthermore, what we are studying (including 
this hypothesis the author believes) are merely infant sciences comparative to those in the 
Pure Lands, said by one of the most famous Buddhist masters living in the world. 
 
5. Representing the metabolism 
 
It will be one of the toughest tasks through out the world to maintain feasible 
representations. However it is worthwhile to launch the discussion. 
For an agent, we should distinguish between the subagents (e.g., sub elements, sub 
sets, etc., assuming that the system is decomposable.): what is growing and what is anti-
growing; what (aspects) in the environment contribute to the growth and anti-growth 
respectively and the limits of each. 
For example, how can one pass an exam. Provided that he is an excellent 
student and his teacher is really good. This is his positive aspect in chief. However, 
he is very easily interfered and distracted by things outside, e.g., friends, games, 
music, movie, TV, etc. So the problem is: there are two sources (two kinds) in his 
metabolism of knowledge, one is active and the other is anti-active. Now we 
should focus on these contradictory aspects: positive and anti-positive. 
First, we should analyze the positive aspect by means of learning: whether the 
teacher improved his teaching, or whether the student puts more weight on his 
study, in a dynamic figure. 
Second, analyze the anti-positive aspect: whether he touches less the disturbing 
source, or whether he puts less weight on this aspect, also in dynamic figure. 
Third, simulate the neutral figure or curve by comparison, and/or through 
learning examples in history, as to predict the future behavior. 
This is the general clue presented in my paper Dynamic Modeling of 
Multidimensional Logic in Multiagent Environment (Liu [3]), where “the learning 
curve” is just what I mean by neutral representation. 
This could probably be the conjunction point between neutrosophy and neural 
science. 
As conclusion, we would very likely base neutrosophy on dynamic learning 
background, just as an idiom says: it is never too old to learn. 
 
6. The final remark 
 
I have just presented my discussion on neutrosophy in time domain. However we may 
ask whether there is neutrality between space and time, or whether there is a relativity 
theory that unifies time and space. 
z Limited to my knowledge so far, I can present the only one I know, it is 
Buddhism — which combines time and space domains into a single 
“holograph”, and combines the universe in it as well. 
z Unfortunately, we normally cannot reach that point before we come to the 
Buddhist Pure Lands (as described in Buddhism, also mentioned in (Liu [4])), 
  
where everyone can see/foresee any moment in any life cycle of every being in 
the universe. 
z Far more answers can be found in the encyclopedia mentioned in section 2. 
 
 
References: 
 
[1]  X. Jiang, Gravitational Measurement in Time and Space — A Hypothesis of Life and 
Sole (in Chinese), Tianze Press China, 1990. 
[2]  J. Legge, Book of Changes (ancient written), Hunan Publishing House, 1993. 
[3]  F. Liu,  Dynamic Modeling of Multidimensional Logic in Multiagent Environment, 
2001 International Conferences on Info-tech and Info-net Proceedings, IEEE Press, 
People’s Post & Telecommunications Publishing House China, pp. 241-245, 2001. 
[4]  F. Liu,  Name, Denominable and Undenominable, — On Neither <A> Nor <Anti-
A>, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic 
Logic, Set, Probability and Statistics, University of New Mexico, Gallup, December 
1-3, 2001, http://www.gallup.unm.edu/~smarandache/FengLiu.pdf . 
[5]  Z. Mao (written 1937), On Contradiction, html version from the Selected Works of 
Mao Tse-tung, Foreign Languages Press China, 1967, Vol. I, pp. 311-47, 
http://www.marx2Mao.org//Mao/OC37 . 
[6]  F. Smarandache,  Neutrosophy: A Unifying Field in Logics: Neutrosophic Logic.  
Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Set, Neutrosophic Probability (second edition), American 
Research Press, 1999,  http://www.gallup.unm.edu/~smarandache/eBook-
Neutrosophics2.pdf . 
 
  
A Logic of Complex Values 
 
Chris Lucas 
CALResCo Group 
52 Mount Road, Middleton, Manchester M24 1DZ, U.K. 
clucas@calresco.org 
http://www.calresco.org/ 
 
Abstract 
Our world is run by a logic that has no room for values, by a 
scientific methodology that disdains the very notion. In this paper 
we try to redress the balance, extracting many modern scientific 
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1. Introduction 
As we move into the 21st Century it is opportune to take a look at where we are as 
humans and where we are going. The achievements of the 20th Century in material 
matters are clear, yet this period has done little if anything to improve humanity as a 
species, we still spend inordinate amounts of time on war and similar destructive 
practices. The cry from all quarters seems to be that our lifestyles are becoming 
unsustainable, that we have lost our values. Yet our world is run by a logic that has no 
room for values, by a scientific methodology that disdains the very notion. Here we will 
try to redress the balance, extracting many modern scientific findings and forms of 
philosophical reasoning from the field of complex systems, to show that values can and 
should be made part of an enhanced normative logic derived from Neutrosophy, which 
can then be employed to quantitatively evaluate our beliefs based on their dynamic 
effects on a full set of human values. 
 
We start by looking in Section 2 at how we define values, and outline in Section 3 an 
existing science of values. Section 4 introduces complex systems science and we look in 
Section 5 at the need for a logic of wholes rather than parts. Section 6 looks at non-
Aristotelian logics and what a logic of values would require, whilst Section 7 relates 
paradoxism to complexity notions. In Section 8 we look at the ideas of Neutrosophic 
logic and relate them in Section 9 to synergy and unpredictability. Finally Section 10 
looks at what is still needed to fulfil the goals laid out in this introductory paper. An 
Appendix relates existing logics to the teleological fitness focus that we adopt. 
  
2. Putting Values into Science 
Like most scientists growing up in a 'value-free zone' it has taken much time for me to 
realise the self-deception involved in this stance. A recent paper [Lucas2000c] looks at 
this in detail, and outlines a metascience that includes explicit values to complement the 
implicit ones already included within the 'scientific method'. 
 
Following on from an heavy involvement in the pursuit of complex systems science I 
realised that what we called 'fitness' in our experiments (the same 'reproductive' concept 
that is used in evolutionary biology) was actually a simplified overall value - survival. 
From this it seemed clear that this could be broken down into many related values (water, 
food, warmth etc.) all of which were necessary for survival or reproduction and all 
ignored in the one-dimensional biological practice of 'population genetics'. These form a 
complex of what I shall call ‘primal’ values and necessitate a teleological (agent driven) 
form of science that bridges the objective/subjective divide. In this view these ‘values’ 
are simply ends derived from our evolutionary past, and what we can call ‘needs’ are our 
genetic predispositions to actions (means) that can meet these ends, by enabling us to 
generate fitness enhancing trajectories through life. Thus we can regard ‘values’ as static 
descriptions of an organism’s goals and ‘needs’ as their dynamic equivalents. 
 
From this insight two others followed, firstly that the number of our needs or values 
increases with the complexity of the organism and with experience (adding flexibility to 
better cope with environmental change) - successive stages adding higher values - what 
I've called 'social' and 'abstract' value complexes (inspired by similar work by [Maslow] 
and others). Each again contains many dimensions or variables. Secondly, that all these 
needs need to balance dynamically, they do not exist in isolation but interact in nonlinear 
ways, both amongst themselves and with their environmental contexts (i.e. we cannot 
simply add their 'fitnesses' or fulfilments, they are epistatic).  
3. Axiological Science 
Looking around the Internet to identify work on values led me to discover Robert 
Hartman and his Science of Axiology. Study of this neglected area of science suggests 
that three types of valuing are possible. Firstly, we have the binary logic (classification) 
type of valuing which concentrates on existence or being (ontology). Here we use an 
either/or judgement, for example we ask is there a tree or not; is he an Arab or not ? This 
is the 'label' style most common to our descriptive science and philosophy, where we 
classify objects by lists of such traits or attributes. The second type of value is that of 
quantity, where we define parameters by size or ranking (cardinal or ordinal numbers), 
e.g. how heavy is it; is he taller ? This is the 'quantification' mode of valuing common to 
mathematical science and economics, and is an extrinsic or external (relative fitness) 
approach. For both of these 'objective' dimensions we assume (implicitly) a subject (or 
group of subjects) that are 'doing' the valuing of something outside themselves (which 
may, as in psychology, be another person's 'subjective' experience temporarily regarded 
as an 'object' to be studied).  
 
The third type of valuing is that currently outside most science, and that is the valuing of 
wholes, or uniqueness. Here we treat all the values as a unique set of self-supporting 
  
attributes that contribute to a one-off absolute fitness or 'value-in-itself'. This is the 
valuing we see in such approaches as love or art, where the subject is not broken down 
into parts but ideally is accepted as an self-justifying whole. This is an intrinsic or 
internal perspective and it is this type of overall viewpoint that we will concentrate on 
here in trying to adapt Neutrosophy to valuation, where we will go beyond 'subject' and 
'object' perspectives entirely and identify ourselves with the system from the inside as it 
were - we 'become' the system and can then look towards 'our' self-development as a 
contextually situated or ‘embodied’ entity.  
 
The first thing that strikes about the [Hartman] approach is that it is an attempt to add 
logic to values by using forms of [Cantor]’s transfinite sets (Aleph0, Aleph1 & Aleph2). 
This is ingenious but creates a number of problems which recent work by axiologists 
such as [Edwards], [Forrest] and [Moore] tries to address, the latter by adopting a finite 
version of axiology based upon quantum theory. One of the focuses of such work 
concentrates on ranking combinations of the 3 value dimensions, for example where we 
employ intrinsic valuations of systemic entities (e.g. love of logic), which is denoted as 
SI, or systemic disvaluations of extrinsic entities (e.g. excluding the poor), denoted ES. 
There are 18 combinations of these, the positive aspects are called ‘compositions’ by 
Hartman, the negative aspects ‘transpositions’. Another problem is in differentiating 
between partial and full valuations, i.e. where we have 3 values met in a system 
containing only 3 values, versus 3 values met in a system which has 5 (denoted here as 
3in3 v 3in5). Whilst many aspects of this tradition will be included in what follows, we 
shall instead adopt a different perspective based upon recent developments in the sciences 
of complex systems. 
4. Dynamical Systems and Complexity 
Over the last two decades of the 20th Century considerable work has taken place in 
bringing together and taking forward the study of complex systems, defined as systems 
comprising many autonomous parts and interacting in complex ways. The foundations of 
this transdisciplinary science go back to work in cybernetics (feedback and homeostasis) 
and general systems theory by people such as [Wiener], [Ashby] and [von Bertalanffy] in 
the mid 20th Century, and it was later influenced by work on ‘the pattern that connects’ 
by [Bateson]. Following the advent of inexpensive computers this has joined with 
mathematical dynamical systems theory to form a science of complex systems in their 
own right, with many topologically isomorphic specialisms appearing (e.g. neural 
networks, cellular automata, artificial life, evolutionary computation, production 
systems), for an overview see [Lewin] or [Waldrop]. All these areas consider non-
equilibrium systems, where their histories and future trajectories through the possibilities 
open to them become important, and this demands a more dynamic form of time-critical 
logic, a logic of change. 
 
Analysing such systems makes use of three critical concepts of complex systems, the first 
is ‘state space’ which defines all the possible combinations of the system variables, e.g. 4 
binary variables can combine in 16 ways, so state space (the possibilities) here comprises 
16 points. It can be seen that this space escalates exponentially with both the number of 
variables and number of states available for each variable. The second concept is that of 
  
an ‘attractor’, and here the connectivity of the system causes a subset of state space to be 
preferred, the system will self-organize over time (circular causation) to concentrate on a 
small area of state space which we call the attractor. Within this perspective there are 
three types of attractor: point, cyclic and strange (or chaotic). Simplifying a little, the first 
assumes a static ontology (systemic value); the second a changeable one, one dimension 
plotted against time (extrinsic value); and the third occupies all the dimensions - system 
wide (intrinsic value).  
 
In highly complex (high dimensional) systems however there will be multiple attractors 
present and this brings in the third concept, the idea of ‘edge-of-chaos’. Here the system 
is found to move spontaneously away from either stability or chaos towards a 
dynamically semi-stable intermediate state (equivalent to the phase-boundary in physics) 
which comprises a power-law (fractal) distribution of both temporal fluctuations and 
spatial structure. Analysis of this unstable boundary needs some mathematical 
sophistication, yet mathematics and complex systems enjoy a difficult relationship. In 
truth there is no sign as yet of a maths of complex systems that can adequately deal with 
such complications, just a number of partial mappings that treat abstracted aspects of the 
whole. I look at this in my introduction “Quantifying Complexity Theory” [Lucas2000b]. 
In these scenarios the specific connectivity proves crucial, and we can adopt many 
perspectives, from simple on/off (systemic or Boolean), through weighted (extrinsic or 
neural) to integral (intrinsic or chaotic). In complex systems science we find that a middle 
connectivity (generating the ‘edge-of-chaos’) is needed to obtain the maximum fitness 
from such value combinations [Kauffman]. 
5. The Need for an Intrinsic Logic 
By equating values and complexity here I suggest that a maths for one may also form a 
maths for the other, so we can attempt to evolve such a synthesis. From a psychological 
standpoint we must I think discard infinities, based upon the practical problems for 
humans in using such concepts computationally (and also in the difficulty in getting 
people to relate to such mathematical paradoxes). So what have we left ? The Hartman 3 
value stages is a good start. Systemic values can be regarded as philosophical 
abstractions, my third value complex. Extrinsic values could be regarded as socially 
driven scientific measurements, my second value complex, whilst Intrinsic values could 
be regarded as primal values - the survival of the 'organism-in-itself'. It is interesting to 
note that this way of looking at the matter reverses the standard idea in intellectual circles 
that 'logic' is at the top of the 'pyramid' of our faculties. We see instead that by 
intellectualising we remove value, firstly by neglecting the whole for the part, then by 
reifying the categories into an either/or logic which goes on to form the basis of our 
system of social values embodied in a legalism of dualist 'right' and 'wrong'. We invalidly 
reduce intrinsic values to the lower systemic type in many aspects of our daily lives, as 
seen in our one-dimensional prejudices and our behaviours of conflict and competition.  
 
Given that logic is so highly regarded academically, one way out of this conundrum 
would be to adopt an intrinsic form of logic, in other words one that can accept extrinsic 
and systemic logics as special cases. But can we find one ? Fuzzy Logic, which 
previously many have been inclined to consider, copes well with extrinsic values, we can 
  
specify a half apple logically FL(0.5,0.5), but it seems to deal all too poorly with value 
combinations, a half AND a half = a half (using Zadeh’s intersection operator), i.e. a 
similar problem to that found with adding infinities. Moore makes the point that fuzzy 
logics require time, unlike systemic logics propositions are not universally 'true', logical 
values change over time (a fresh apple FL(1,0) → eaten apple FL(0,1) ). I'd add the idea 
that intrinsic logic requires context, it is dependent upon all the other values present, thus 
needs to be an interactional form of logic, a connectionist logic. In complex systems the 
idea of 'uniqueness' relates to our current specific position on the 'fitness landscape', in 
other words it is dependent upon our history. This can be said to comprise a number of 
systemic dimensions (axes) and a number of displacements (vectors), but the 'now' is 
defined by how these all interact - what I would here call intrinsic fitness. This network 
approach has significant advantages, since the number of extrinsic paths possible through 
the network (the set of possible value relations) grows exponentially with size and 
connectivity - a true measure of such intrinsic value would therefore approach infinity 
(especially in humans), as desired by intuitive axiological approaches to the value of a 
human life. 
 
A further complication however relates to the concept of synergy, the idea that the whole 
is more than the sum of the parts (I look at this in more detail along with fitness in my 
introduction “Fitness and Synergy” [Lucas2000a]) - and this is I think precisely what we 
are really looking for here. It relates to the complex systems notion of emergence, the 
creating of new global properties (values) by the combination of parts. Thus no matter 
how many extrinsic items you add, you don't get the emergent next stage unless you go 
beyond aggregation and create suitable connectivity - a value add step. This idea also 
allows us to compare intrinsic sets, a more ‘developed' person will have more values 
('higher' needs or more discriminative ones), avoiding the ant=human problem of 
equating the value of all life forms. But the potential v actual issue is important here also, 
we  must take into account that experience and education can convert potential (as in a 
baby) into actual (an enlightened adult) and this possibility must also affect valuations. 
 
Making synergy more specific perhaps, we can imagine a 'precision' axis where we can 
specify a value in terms of bits, from 1 bit (binary) to infinite bits (irrational number). We 
can also imagine a 'depth' axis where we can specify the number of values in the system 
(again from 1 bit to infinite). This gives us an integral plane, or map at a single level. But 
such interacting entities generate new emergent levels, so we have a further 'height' 
dimension corresponding to these extra layers (visualise, say, atoms, molecules, cells, 
organisms, societies, ecosystems, planet). We would regard this 'height' as comprising a 
further ‘holarchic’ dimension beyond the three Hartman ones (precision, depth, plane - 
which correspond to extrinsic, systemic and intrinsic values, but all relating to a single 
holon [Koestler]). The size (volume) of this 'box' perhaps corresponds to the overall value 
of the hypersystem [Baas] we are considering. Like the other solutions offered by Forrest 
and Moore however it has a snag, the general idea of network analysis (and specifically 
emergence) has proved to be mathematically intractable using all the normal techniques - 
most complexity problems are related to graph theory and mathematically tend to be NP-
complete, insoluble in polynomial time e.g.[Crescenzi & Kann]. 
  
6. Beyond Aristotle 
For over 2000 years we have used and taught almost exclusively the classical logic of 
Aristotle (and its modern Boolean equivalent), in which all issues must be 100% true or 
100% false and there is no other possibility. That this causes immense problems when 
applied to humans has been known for many decades. [Korsybski] identified this with the 
confusion of ‘map’ and ‘territory’, this means that we try to force a limited model onto an 
unlimited reality. From the discussion in this paper on values, we can see that this relates 
to forcing a 1 bit systemic value (one dimensional) onto a multi-bit extrinsic value (two 
dimensional) to which it cannot relate, and even worst to forcing the same dualist 
evaluations onto intrinsically valued humans (four dimensional), a 2 level ‘category’ or 
‘type’ error  - showing the need for a ‘higher-order logic’ of at least 3 levels, a 
mathematical meta-model [Palmer]. Given our general pre-occupation with Aristotelian 
logic, it is sobering to discover just how many non-standard logics already exist e.g. 
[Suber], so there are a number of less familiar possibilities that might be explored to find 
a suitable method for a logic of values. And what would we want from such a logic ? I'd 
suggest the following at least (taking into account Moore’s criticisms of Hartman): 
 
a) Evaluate to a higher total value the more values (dimensions) exist, i.e. complexity 
matters 
 
b) Value intrinsic systems more than extrinsic variables, and those more than 
systemic distinctions 
 
c) Discard ‘Law of Excluded Middle’ - which prevents us specifying fuzzy truths 
(extrinsic values) 
 
d) Provide adequate resolution to deal with real variables, the full variety 
encountered in life 
 
e) Include a method of treating the ‘many’ as of higher/lower value than the ‘one’ 
(aggregation) 
 
f) Allow for synergy, i.e. A + B can generate an emergent higher value C, a value-
add step 
 
g) Differentiate between possibility, probability and actuality, i.e. future choice & 
past history 
 
h) Be context specific, i.e. allow truth to depend on time, space and 
interactions/connectivity 
 
i) Differentiate positive-sum & negative-sum trajectories, i.e. dynamical fitness 
effects 
 
j) Give an intuitively adequate rank ordering for SI, IE and the rest of the 
combinations 
  
 
k) Add a measure of 'fulfilment' or personal development, i.e. 3in3 v 3in5, actuality 
v possibility 
 
l) Allow for circular causality, the multiple interconnected paths of real systems 
thinking 
 
m) Allow for obligations, the idea that we should not degrade the values of others 
(morality) 
 
This list seems to go beyond most forms of logic and includes aspects of many types of 
logic whose implications and technicalities are a specialist task to unravel (see the 
Appendix for a look at how these relate to our teleologically based fitness viewpoint). 
Only a few attempts have yet been made to try to combine fuzzy thinking and the more 
teleologically oriented logics, e.g. [Gounder & Esterline], which brings us perhaps to a 
novel type of paraconsistent logic (for a quick overview of these see: [Priest & Tanaka]). 
The one I have been looking at especially is Neutrosophic Logic [Smarandache] which is 
unique in that it has three axes of logical validity. One is 'truth', one 'falsity' and one 
'indeterminacy'. Now of course the latter immediately suggests a role for quantum theory, 
and also allows for those paradoxes and contradictions that troubled Frege, Russell and 
Gödel. Additionally in this logic we need not have normalised values (i.e. 0 to 1) we can 
have 1 AND 1 giving 3 (or anything else), thus synergy seems possible, i.e. the 
generation of new niches, new opportunities or alternatives. This logic was intended to 
bridge the gap between literature/arts and science, so is already in the same area as we are 
considering here, and discusses multiple-value sentences and ways of distinguishing 
between relative and absolute truths. 
7. A Philosophy of Stress 
Before I consider this as a logic, perhaps I'd better say something about Neutrosophy as a 
philosophy. The creator, mathematician Florentin Smarandache, was something of an 
anarchist, a Romanian fighting against the repressive communist regime of Ceausescu in 
the 1980's. Living a 'double-life' (the 'spin' culture of deceit now familiar to us all) helped 
him to recognise paradox as crucial, so he came up with a philosophy in which one could 
prove anything - and also disprove it ! He applied it widely to highlight contradictions - 
combinations of opposites in stress, and founded the literary movement known as 
‘paradoxism’. Despite the nihilism suggested, this does have much in common with 
spiritual ideas (the figure/ground or Yin/Yang) and with complexity science (where we 
balance static conscious ‘rational' order and dynamic unconscious 'irrational' chaos), and 
so realise that as Smarandache said, "constants aren't and variables won't" - the two 
descriptions are contextual or transient [Lucas1997]). For humans, if we are too static 
then we stagnate and die, if we are too dynamic then we disintegrate and die, 
paradoxically we must be both somewhat ordered to survive and somewhat chaotic to 
grow. To be human is thus to be indeterminate, to live a contradiction. In an insight from 
Eastern philosophy, we are not ‘either’ order ‘or’ chaos, but ‘both’ and ‘neither’. 
 
  
We could regard these two axes (of chaos and of order) as those of 'generalisation' 
(artistic scope) - where we encompass everything but make no distinctions (mystical 
awareness or intrinsic value perhaps), and 'specialisation' (scientific content) - where we 
make 'cuts' or valuations across infinite reality, this would relate in dynamical systems 
terms to taking Poincaré sections (low dimensional projections from a higher dimensional 
whole). Thus both width and depth can be included, but not at the same time again 
echoing quantum complementarity and granularity [Smith & Brogaard] - we can see 
either the whole (dynamic wave) or the part (static particle). We can view the move from 
'indeterminacy' to 'true/false' as the making of distinctions, the creation of opposite pairs 
or dualisms, i.e. systemic values (something akin to [Spencer-Brown]'s 'Laws of Form'), 
but each such division must exclude all the others in either/or logic. Thus our very act of 
classifying the world generates its own stresses, a problem not unknown even within 
conventional science e.g. [Kuhn], where new paradigms or syntheses are occasionally 
necessary to transcend the tensions of suppressed inconsistencies and contradictions. 
8. Contextual Neutrosophic Logic 
Neutrosophic logic itself allows <A>, <Not-A>, <Anti-A> and <Neut-A>. The first two 
are standard Aristotelian, <Anti-A> is Hegelian (included in <Not-A>) whereas <Neut-
A> includes all the other possibilities, i.e. the set of distinctions ignored when looking at 
opposites (e.g. if <A> is 'white', <Anti-A> is 'black', <Neut-A> includes blue, red, yellow 
etc., <Not-A> is <Neut-A> + <Anti-A>). The values however are neither binary nor 
fuzzy but are intervals, allowing vagueness (e.g. it could be 30-40% 'white', 10-20% 
'black' and 40-60% 'unspecified'). Another idea included is that of Multispace, where a 
set M of structure S1 is said to contain also many subsets with different structures S2..Sk 
not included in S1 - a sort of fractal hierarchy similar both to the layers mentioned earlier 
and to the structure at the ‘edge-of-chaos’. 
 
One of the main tenets of this form of logic is that for any combination of the three 
dimensions NL(T, I, F) a context or 'referential system' can be generated to make the 
statements valid. Thus 'truth' can not be applied to all possible worlds, and whether any 
statement is 'true' in our human world becomes an empirical matter and not an issue of 
logical analysis. This idea allows us I think to effectively distinguish between intrinsic 
and extrinsic/systemic value schemes, in that the set of worlds in which a value is 'true' 
changes with complexity, i.e. context. Within any intrinsic system, any extrinsic value or 
systemic distinction will fail 'truth' in many frames of reference, whilst the intrinsic value 
of 'existence-in-itself' will still hold true. For example, the exact systemic statement ‘I see 
the clock showing 12:00” would fail to be truth a minute later, the fuzzy extrinsic truth “I 
see the time” may hold for many hours, while the intrinsic value “I see” should hold true 
for all my life. Thus we naturally perhaps can justify higher truth values logically both for 
intrinsic values v extrinsic and for extrinsic v systemic, if we include domain-specific 
temporal and (state) spatial context.  
 
In this logic a systemic distinction (a division of the world into system/environment or 
figure/ground) has a value of one bit, no more, no less - either 'in' NL(1,z,0) or 'out' 
NL(0,z,1), where z relates to all the undifferentiated content of the two halves. We can go 
on to make more distinctions, more cuts through the whole. In the limit we obtain a 
  
binary set, corresponding to the number of distinctions made, infinite if we wish. An 
extrinsic value however, a one dimensional measurement, has a variable number of bits 
of precision - a vague value NL(x,z,y,) where x+y is the range and z includes the 
measurement uncertainty. In a Fuzzy Logic reduction z disappears and x+y normalises to 
1. Again we can make more measurements within our whole, we obtain then a set of 
reals. From this perspective we see that systemic values are simply low resolution 
extrinsic ones, crude value distinctions that discard the precision dimension. It may 
perhaps be quite reasonable to equate, say, 8 systemic values with one extrinsic value of 
8 bit resolution (within a linear viewpoint). 
 
Now we take a further step, we group distinctions. We make associations between 
variables, we create an algebraic matrix, a mesh or network of interactions - an intrinsic 
system. Given that every systemic is a 1 bit extrinsic, this is a matrix of extrinsics in the 
limit. Again we see a new perspective, in that extrinsics are just crude intrinsics, low 
resolution views that discard most of the connectivity effects (the two topological 
dimensions), i.e. how values interrelate to support or oppose each other (the ‘higher-
order’ causal terms usually ignored in science). To evaluate this stage logically we 
perhaps may usefully employ a fuzzy matrix logic [Yamauchi] but using neutrosophic 
triples. However due to the nonlinear and nonadditive nature of such value interactions 
we cannot adopt a simple global mathematics, applying standard matrix operators to the 
array. Each intersection pair now may require an individual connective or ‘transition 
function’, a local ‘law’ - reminiscent of a spreadsheet mode (because of the circular 
causality inherent in complex systems this would then ‘hunt’ for a solution - that attractor 
representing the output triple or intrinsic value). It is easy to envisage experimental 
changes to this array in the search for fitter dynamical solutions. This contextual 
perspective has much in common with the ‘constrained generating procedure’ form of 
emergence pioneered by [Holland], which extends our treatment into more general areas 
by implying that we must we formulate a logic that can generate further triples, i.e. be 
creative.  
 
Thus we add another stage, the matrix in systems terms (if sufficiently complex) gives 
rise to emergent properties, a higher level of system, so we have a fourth value 
dimension, the hyperset of systems, which I earlier called an 'holarchic' value level - a 
nested heterarchy of intrinsics made up of systems or 'holons'. To take an example, in a 
rainforest the 'systems' of the geologist, botanist, zoologist, artist and mystic will all see 
(and value) different environmental 'systems'. These may be disjoint (if the experts are 
too single-minded) or may overlap, some may be more complex than others, they may 
differ in 'zoom' ratio (scope in space or time). This is the realm of combinatorics, where 
everything can be permutated from the set of wholes, factorial combinations of intrinsic 
modules at many levels. Evaluating this whole obviously causes immense practical 
difficulties, but we can of course treat relevant subsets as necessary (if we can identify 
them). Thus 'sustainability' in environmental terms would be such an holarchic valuation. 
In these cases we need to move from a 2D (plane) logical matrix to a 3D one which 
includes the various levels, a cubic matrix logic of neutrosophic triples seems required 
  
9. Dynamical Beliefs 
Looking more at the dynamics, we can relate this to tensegrity, the system of balance 
proposed for collections of interacting elements by [Buckminster Fuller] in Synergetics 
(700.00). Here a tension between a continuous 'pull' to truth (an 'attractor' in complex 
systems terms) and a discontinuous 'push' to falsity (a chaotic move or perturbation in 
those terms) relates to a balance between convergence and divergence - our edge-of-
chaos, or semi-stable state. The indeterminacy relates then to the uncertainty as to 
whether a change will create or destroy value (or have no effect) - the 'butterfly effect' 
familiar in chaos theory [Gleick] - this also can include stochastic effects and 
measurement uncertainties. Trajectories can move in two directions therefore, which 
Smarandache relates to 'underhuman' and 'superhuman' behaviours - what in my terms I'd 
call 'dysergy' (negative-sum or sub-animal) and 'synergy' (positive-sum or full human), 
both of course relating to Hartman's idea of transposition and composition. This relates 
also to the idea of cancellation and reinforcement of waves in quantum and 
electromagnetic theory, and we can thus also regard values as being potentially ‘in-phase’ 
or ‘out-of-phase’ with each other. In more general value terms we can say that the three 
neutrosophic axes correspond to values that are 'good' (positive-effects and thus 'true' 
beliefs), 'bad' (negative-effects and thus 'false' beliefs) and 'groundless' (unpredictable and 
thus 'careless' beliefs) - each with respect to a particular situation.  
 
The relation of beliefs to values is a subtle one. We each have a worldview in which we 
believe certain actions to be advantageous to us whilst others are not, and we tend to reify 
those theories that have in the past proved advantageous in meeting our needs as ‘true’, 
whilst those that have failed as ‘false’. But we all have different experiences and 
contexts, so there is always a tension between these two poles, what I see as ‘true’ you 
may see as ‘false’. This relates to our often limited vision, and to correctly evaluate the 
trajectories of an action based upon our beliefs we must take into account how our 
worldview meshes with those of the other entities with whom we interact. Bringing 
together our common beliefs in ‘truth’ generates what we call science, a consensus as to 
which theories have been tested as being generally effective. Yet even here we make 
errors, we do not take into account the full range of interactions involved, we reduce the 
intrinsic whole to extrinsic slices - just as we do individually. It is for this reason that we 
need to formalise a science of values, generating a logic of interactions that can identify 
where our narrower beliefs (scientific or more general) fail to be true in terms of the 
whole. 
 
In such cases the values relate to the hypersystem. i.e. subsets of the whole system may 
have the opposite form, e.g. for a system of 100 people (simplifying each here to just one 
systemic value), what I believe is good for me NL(1,0,0) may be bad for you and for 8 
others NL(0,0,1) and neutral for the remaining 90 NL(0,1,0). So, for the matrixed 
hypersystem of interacting values, the overall result would evaluate as NL(0.01, 0.9, 
0.09), assuming standard arithmetic connectives (summing over a simple diagonal matrix 
of triples) and normalising. We see that in overall utilitarian terms the result is 8% 
negative, thus taking everything into account my belief is proved intrinsically false even 
if it was extrinsically true. We can also see the relative effects of this action, in that 90% 
of our social group are unaffected, thus we are not inclined to escalate the issue out of all 
  
proportion - a major problem in logics based upon only two axes. Note however that this 
simple example is unidirectional, it takes account only of the effects of my belief on the 
group, it doesn’t include the effect of the beliefs of the other 99 members of the group on 
me or on each other. Given better knowledge of what all our values are and how they all 
interact, we can in principle derive a resultant fitness trajectory for the whole. This 
applies equally if the whole is just me and the parts are 100 different personal values. For 
more complex nonlinear connectives the same principle holds, although the mathematical 
difficulties will of course increase considerably. 
10. Towards a Value Formalism 
It is not our intention here to outline a fully working model, simply to establish the 
feasibility of so doing. In this section we largely follow [Krivov] (to whom the reader is 
referred for more technical details) in his attempt to generate a logic based general 
systems theory for multi-agent modelling. We adapt those ideas here to our neutrosophic 
value focus. We take as our starting point the definition, analogous both with the classical 
definition of a Model in predicate calculus and von Bertalanffy’s definition of a System, 
of <Values, Connections>, in other words we have a set of values (function or process) 
plus a set of interconnections or relations (structure). Our ‘agents’ originate internal states 
or goals which must be taken into account, indeed this is our definition of needs - our 
drives to meet a set of internal values. To include such a teleology we add to our Finite 
Protocol Language modal operators and time, i.e. Operator(ValueComplex, Time, State) 
where Operator can be such as needs, prefers, believes, acts etc. and State is the status of 
the value complex (true/false for systemic, variable for extrinsic, set of included 
extrinsics for intrinsic, set of intrinsics for holarchic). A Model of the system contains a 
function stating how the structure and needs will evolve over time, i.e. M(t+1) = F(M(t)), 
this we refer to as a ‘logic machine’ (a predicate automata) and it incorporates the 
connectives or quantifiers that relate values to each other dynamically. The Relations thus 
have the form Relation(Value1, Value2, Affect) where Affect is a connective that relates 
the affect on Value1 of Value2, and the overall function is our matrix. 
 
To clarify the real world systems that we are modelling, we have the following 
progression for any ‘agent’: 
 
Value → Need (for change in that value) → Preference (ranking of alternatives) → 
Belief (fulfilment theory) → Action (environmental output) → Reaction (feedback) → 
Update (belief and need changes). 
 
All agents (and values) may of course act simultaneously, so our model is a 
multiobjective constraint satisfaction problem. The ranking of preferences can cause its 
own problems in the making of decisions [Ha], especially within interconnected 
nonlinear systems where ‘ceteris paribus’ (all else being equal) rarely holds. This brings 
in logical implication in that some values imply others to some extent (e.g. the ability to 
‘philosophise’ implies meeting our primal needs), so a fuzzy implication operator is 
required. The timescales for the evolution of the various components (values, beliefs, 
preferences, needs, actions) vary, so it may be possible to model these separately if we 
wish (given computational resource constraints). Additionally, important aspects of 
  
preferences and beliefs, as well as actions, are determined by social norms, which brings 
in higher-level obligations and canalysation of state space (i.e. [Campbell]’s downward 
causation based constraints on alternatives, e.g. laws), and also by environmental issues 
(resource availability, costs). It is apparent that needs, preferences and beliefs can all be 
fuzzy variables and that we can have considerable uncertainty as to their standing. This 
aspect relates to the standard logical notion of “for all x” (∀x), where uncertainty is zero, 
through “there exists” or “some x” (∃x) which has variable uncertainty, to complete 
undecidability (which we may call Ix). Thus the neutrosophic axis I defines the 
improbability that our T/F axes are correct, in other words the truth value of the 
believability of our assertions is B(1-I), which relates to the approach taken in the k-
calculus in qualitative decision theory [Ha]. 
 
Restricting ourselves just to values, there are in neutrosophic logic many (possibly 
infinite) forms of definable connective which leaves the possibility of finding a 
definitional set that matches what we wish to achieve with values. This is complicated to 
do in formalised logical notation (especially given the open ended set of possible 
systems, values and nonlinear interactions as here), but we can attempt to do so in more 
general terms (it may be possible, more formally, to use genetic algorithms to search the 
space of possible connectives to locate the optimum definitions, given an adequately 
defined set of goals). I'm primarily interested here however in looking at intuitively 
simple ways of combining multiple vectors, i.e. n-Tuples - extrinsic values of the form 
Ei(T,I,F) for i in the set 1..k. If we are to get more from less, i.e. synergy (or conversely 
less from more, i.e. dysergy) then we need it seems a multiplicative form of connective. 
For a simplified 2-value case a form that appeals is R = S(A AND B) where R is the 
resultant value and S is a synergy operator which can vary from zero to plus infinity (or 
take more nonlinear forms). This allows for both cancellation (S = 0) and reinforcement 
(S = +2), matching Moore's quantum wave theory, but also allows for other S values for 
more generality. The AND is our normal logical connective, defined in whatever way we 
choose for fuzzy truth values. This can easily be extended to cover the multivalued case, 
and if necessary we can have separate synergy operators for each interacting value, e.g. 
for 3 values: R = (SAA AND SBB AND SCC ) etc. If we assume normal additivity (e.g. 2 
values are greater than 1) then we can generate a fuzzy truth table as follows (A and B 
both assumed to be 1 here).  
 
S R Comment 
2 4 Synergy, positive-sum, increase factor 2 
(100%) 
√2 2.818 Partial augmentation, 90° in phase 
1 2 Aggregation of values, zero-sum, standard 
maths 
1/√ 2 1.414 Diminution, partially out of phase 
1/ ∑ Vi 1 Normalised disvaluation, classical logic 
0 0 Dysergy, negative-sum, 180° phase 
cancellation 
 
  
Two problems immediately spring to mind, firstly how do we generalise this to 
neutrosophic triples ? There may need to be interchanges between the T, F & I axes as we 
vary S, since this seems to convert between T and F. Secondly, can we generalise further 
to allow for the interaction of a number of input triples to result in the generation of a 
number of new output triples - as needed for the emergence of new values and levels ? 
Here we may possibly make use of [Stern]’s Matrix Logic, which uses two by two truth 
table operators comprising the values true, false, both (synergy) and neither (dysergy) 
spanning the logical levels of scalar, vector and matrix, and capable of generating 
autopoietic emergent systems. By generalising these values to fuzzy values and adding 
the indeterminacy axis we naturally seem to end up with a 3 x 3 neutrosophic matrix 
logic operator. 
 
It will be noted that our approach to logic isn’t static, we move through time - either 
discretely or continuously, and to cover the increasing generality we need at least a 4th-
order predicate calculus of triples. Our viewpoint throughout blurs the distinction 
between logic and mathematics, and sees logic as simply a 1 bit version of mathematics, 
whilst mathematics is an infinite bit version of logic. Whether the two can be successfully 
merged dynamically with values, using neutrosophic logic, remains to be seen. 
11. Conclusion 
In this paper we have looked at bringing together three spheres of intellectual activity, 
firstly the idea of values or axiology, secondly the field of complex systems science and 
thirdly the area of non-Aristotelian logic. We have examined a number of connections 
between these fields and can conclude that a new form of paraconsistent logic 
(Neutrosophic Logic) may prove instrumental in welding together the needs of interactive 
humans whilst getting to grips with contradictory values and unpredictable complexity. 
There is much to be done in formalising in detail how this would work in practice, and in 
taking into account the complications added by evolution and contextuality, within a 
framework of circular causality and emergence. But the indications are promising that 
this could be achieved, given sufficient time and expertise. 
 
With the availability of inexpensive computers and the growth in the use of multi-agent 
simulations we are now perhaps in a position where we can instigate an experimental 
form of normative logic, looking to use agent evolution to develop and evaluate various 
logical formalisms. In such systems the agents are generally taken to be autonomous (not 
globally controlled), teleological (having internal goals), contextual (interacting with 
other agents and their environment), heterogeneous (different from each other) and 
autopoietic (self-perpetuating). Whilst much work is yet needed to put such approaches 
on a firm footing, there are considerable commonalties between the stance taken in this 
paper and recent work within these areas. 
 
By using a predicate calculus approach common to recent work on formalising complex 
systems, and both generalising this to a higher-order form suitable for treating multiple 
levels and including neutrosophic triples as primitives, we obtain a methodology of 
considerable scope, very suitable for use computationally and potentially applicable far 
beyond the area of values which has been our main concern in this paper. We should not 
  
minimise the difficulties however, we subsume here in our generalisation many specialist 
fields which all have their own share of difficulties and controversies. Nethertheless, the 
need to better integrate disjoint mathematical technicalities with interconnected real life 
applications is clear, and to this end normative concepts can form a bridge that links these 
two worlds. One final observation is that given our susceptibility for error, in the 
recognition of values, in understanding their interactions, in defining the scope of our 
systems and in defining suitable connectives, then the adoption of a form of logic that 
permits uncertainties and supports paradox seems highly appropriate. 
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Appendix:  Relating Logics to Teleological Fitness 
 
In this appendix we look briefly at the various forms of logic that we think need to be 
integrated if we are to create a valid logic of values. We relate the main idea of each of 
these formalisms to our treatment of values in terms of teleological fitness. One of the 
key differences we should emphasise is that we replace impersonal logical 
generalisations by personalised contextual ones. Each statement is related to the 
viewpoint of a living organism (not always human), which must reason out (not always 
consciously) ways of meeting their needs within ongoing environmental situations. In 
human terms this external context is largely social, and so we understand the effects of 
our actions on our own needs and the fitness of our wider societies to be dependent upon 
the validity of our socially derived beliefs (we make no distinction formally between 
ethical or other type of value fitness). By bringing in the idea of personal agency we 
highlight the tension between global rules and local ones. In a specific context it is often 
the case that global rules are inapplicable (as they were designed for standardised 
situations which do not always hold) and local ones are in conflict (different values are 
mutually incompatible when taken together) so we may need to restrict the scope of our 
logical rules by imposing appropriate boundary conditions.  
 
Natural Deduction: The definition of a logic without a rigid set of axioms. Our system 
has no axioms for generality (allowing us to use fuzzy truth values), all connectives are 
defined as local inference rules applied to arbitrary premises (scientific hypotheses). This 
open (sympoietic) contextual system contrasts with the closed (autopoietic) global 
systems of most formal treatments, and discards completeness for applicability. 
 
Classical Logic: Truth value is derived from valid syntactic forms of argument. The 
premises are considered to be fixed truth values, and only Aristotelian truth values (1, 0) 
are permitted. We generalise this initially to allow fuzzy truth values for intersection 
(AND), union (OR) and the other connectives, and later add semantic considerations 
relating to wider values. 
 
Alethic Modal Logic: Qualifies truth by adding possibility, actuality and necessity. The 
first we regard as encouraging creative alternatives, new paths through state space; the 
second denotes our current position in state space. The third implies that a value cannot 
exist or an act take place unless a condition is met (a critical path analogy). 
 
Deontic Logic: Adds obligation, permission and forbidden operators. We regard the first 
as an historical social norm intended to avoid fitness reduction (which may be 
empirically invalid), the second as an allowable alternative (within the social structure) 
and the last as a denial of a freedom to pursue an alternative (due to implied socially 
unacceptable disvaluations). Each relation is contextual within a cultural worldview. 
 
Epistemic Logic: Adds knowledge and beliefs. We adopt a coherentist approach to 
beliefs, based on the circular logic of complex systems,  in which all beliefs support each 
  
other in a consistent worldview (but one grounded by empirical trial and error, so this is 
neither absolute nor relative). We can have three types of belief, ‘true’ - that the 
proposition will have positive fitness effects if acted upon, ‘false’ in that it will have 
negative effects if acted upon and ‘indeterminate’ where we don’t know what result will 
pertain. 
 
Temporal Logic: Adds future and past operators, which relates to values changing over 
time (e.g. with metabolism, experience and education) and validity being dependent upon 
the timescales involved. In our treatment time is regarded as a sequence of discrete steps. 
 
Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Adds propositions and actions that implement changes in 
beliefs. We thus allow for both changes in base values and changes in the effectiveness of 
our beliefs in satisfying needs. 
 
Proairetic Logic: Adds preferences, which we relate to rankings of values, and the 
rankings of alternatives in the achieving of them, plus the changes in ranking over time 
with actions. This logic includes utility measures, which we generalise to matrixed global 
fitnesses, incorporating nonlinear interactions of preferences. 
 
Quantum Logic: Adds indeterminacy and probability, discarding the law of excluded 
middle. Measurement here relates to making a decision between alternatives, the act of 
choice transferring information (knowledge) from possibility to actuality - a trajectory 
through state space opening up a new set of resultant possibilities. 
 
Nonmonotonic Logic: Allows new rules to restrict the validity of the existing system, 
permitting evolution of truth contexts. This allows us to reduce or increase the scope of 
our values and beliefs, depending upon new circumstances, and adds falsification of 
existing rules. 
 
Fuzzy Logic: Adds partial fulfilment of truths, an infinite valued form of logic. We allow 
partial fulfilment of our values (e.g. what we called 3in5) and partial beliefs about them, 
i.e. partial set membership or completeness. 
 
Mereology: Focuses on the relationship between parts and wholes (usually on a 
reductionist assumption that the whole equals the sum of the parts). Relates in our 
treatment to the difference between intrinsic systems and their component extrinsic and 
systemic values. 
 
Non-Adjunctive Logic: Adds non-additivity, i.e. A AND B ≠ A & B. Here this allows 
contradictions of joined value systems and the possibility of dysergy and synergy (i.e. 
emergence - the whole not being equal to the sum of the parts). 
 
Higher-Order Logic: Add propositions that act upon sets of predicates rather than 
atomic facts. Here it relates to intrinsic systems being defined as sets of extrinsic values, 
and to higher levels of value logic incorporating sets of intrinsics. Thus the 4 orders of 
  
logic necessary as a minimum are systemic, extrinsic, intrinsic and holarchic (although 
these are not regarded as disjoint but are overlapping frameworks). 
 
Neutrosophic Logic: Adds independent true and false axes plus an indeterminacy one. 
We can have values and beliefs that have both true and false aspects (e.g. good and bad 
interactions with other sets of values), plus uncertainties as to their effects. 
 
It can be seen that each of these logics expresses only a subset of life’s possibilities, so it 
is not surprising that when applied to real human situations that problems occur and 
important value data is excluded. It is one purpose of our logic of values to highlight such 
problems, and to formulate a set of connectives for each context that minimises such 
reductions. 
 
Note that since any analogue value can be expressed as a string of binary digits, it is in 
principle possible to generate a logic of values using standard Boolean logic. However 
the added complications of doing this, together with the already difficult nature of the 
task, suggest instead approaches that adopt more natural human ways of expressing 
comparative variability and reasoning. Additionally the advantages of having an axis of 
indeterminacy, with neutrosophic logic, allows us to keep in mind the partial nature 
(contextual incompleteness) of all logics, and the vast difference between infinite 
possibility space and finite actuality space. 
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Abstract
Any system based on axioms is incomplete because the axioms cannot be
proven from the system, just believed. But one system can be less-incomplete than
other. Neutrosophy is less-incomplete than many other systems because it contains
them. But this does not mean that it is finished, and it can always be improved. The
comments presented here are an attempt to make Neutrosophy even less-
incomplete. I argue that less-incomplete ideas are more useful, since we cannot
perceive truth or falsity or indeterminacy independently of a context, and are
therefore relative. Absolute being and relative being are defined. Also the “silly
theorem problem” is posed, and its partial solution described. The issues arising
from the incompleteness of our contexts are presented. We also note the relativity
and dependance of logic to a context. We propose “metacontextuality” as a
paradigm for containing as many contexts as we can, in order to be less-incomplete
and discuss some possible consequences.
1. Introduction
Upset because none of the logics I knew were able to handle contradictions and
paradoxes, I created my own, which was able to do so (Gershenson 1998; 1999). Later I would
find out that my Multidimensional Logic (MDL) fitted in the category of paraconsistent logics
(Priest and Tanaka, 1996). Basically, I rejected the axiom of no contradiction, and instead of
having truth values of propositions, I defined truth vectors, where each element was
independent of the other. In this way, we can have a vector representing something that is true
and false at the same time, or nor true nor false at the same time. MDL gave interesting
results, and the new perspective influenced me to propose ideas in different branches of
Philosophy, Complexity,  and Computer Science (e.g. Gershenson, 1999; 2002).
In the autumn of 2001, I became aware of Neutrosophy (Smarandache, 1995). The fact
that it reached similar results than the ones I had makes me think that there is a lower
probability that we are completely mistaken. Neutrosophy covers a much wider area than my
ideas, but nevertheless I believe it could be enriched by them, since there are non-overlapping
parts. In this work I will expose how some of these ideas might help in making Neutrosophy
less-incomplete.
The contents of this paper were mainly sparse comments made to Florentin
Smarandache, and while giving them the shape of an article, the continuity of ideas was not an
entire success. My apologies to the sensible reader.
2. To be and not to be...
When people speak about the being, since it is one of the most general things you can
speak about, they often seem to speak about different things. I define two types of being:
absolute and relative. The absolute being (a-being) is independent of the observer, infinite.
The relative being (re-being) is dependant of the observer, therefore finite, and different in
each individual. The re-being can approach as much as we want to towards the a-being, but it
can never comprehend it. Objects a-are. Concepts, representations, and ideas re-are (Objects
do not depend on the representations we have of them).
We can only suppose about what things a-are, we cannot be absolutely sure, we can only
speculate, because they a-are infinite and we are not. We cannot say that something is
absolutely true or false. We can only assert things in a relative way. We could assign truth
values or vectors to them, but these would be relative to our context.
The being would be the conjunction of re-being and a-being. This is, without the
distinction we are drawing between them. But isn’t it confusing to speak about something
which is absolute and relative at the same time? Yes, precisely. But that is what we do every
day.
We can say that every effect a-has cause(s), but it does not mean that we can perceive
them, so some effects do not re-have causes.
3. Reason, beliefs, and experience
Reason cannot prove itself. It would be as if a theorem would like to prove the axioms
it is based upon. Reason, as all systems based in axioms, is incomplete (in the sense of Gödel
(1931) and Turing (1936)). Beliefs are the axioms of reason and thought. Reason cannot prove
the beliefs it is based upon. But how do these beliefs arise, then? Through experience. But
experience needs of previous beliefs and reason to be assimilated, and reason also needs of
experience to be formed, as beliefs need of reason as well. Beliefs, reason, and experience, are
based upon each other. Which came first? All of them. We cannot have one without the others.
Contexts are dynamic, and formed upon beliefs, reason, and experience. It is there where the
re-being lies. Since the re-being is dependant of our context, it is also dependant of our beliefs,
reasonings, and experiences. Contexts are dynamic because they are changed constantly as we
have new experiences, change our beliefs, and our ways of reasoning.
For example, we cannot say if capitalism a-is good or bad (independent of a context).
It re-is good for the people who get a profit from it, re-is neutral for the people who think that
are not affected by it, and bad for people which suffer from it. There re-is a god for people who
believe so, and there re-is not for people who do not believe so, but we cannot say if there a-is
a god. We can speculate as much as we want to about everything which a-is, but we will never
1But the silliness is also relative to the context of the one who judges the idea...
contain it, therefore we can only have an idea of it. It is not only that “we know without
knowing” (Smarandache, 1995), but less-incompletely: we re-know, but a-know not.
Anything we want to assert has an implicit context, for which what we want to assert is
consistent. But every idea is valid in the context it was created. Ideas cannot a-be right or wrong.
They re-are right or wrong according to a context. And since in order to be created they need
to be consistent with their context, they re-are always right according to their context. Then
which idea is more valuable? We should try to see which context is more valuable. Well, we
cannot say which a-is more valuable, we can only see that if a context contains others, the ideas
created in it will be valid also in the other contexts, and not necessarily vice versa. We do not
know which one a-is better, but the context which contains the others will be less-incomplete.
A problem arises on the horizon...
4. The silly theorem problem
For any silly theorem Ts, we can find at least one set of axioms such that Ts is consistent
with the system defined by the axioms. How do we know a theorem is not silly? Or how do we
know if the axioms are not silly?
We can extend this same problem to contexts: there can re-be any silly idea Is so that
there is at least one context for which it is consistent1. Empiricism comes to the rescue. Well,
not only experience, but evolution more or less helps us get out of the problem. This is,
contexts which support silly ideas, even when they re-are not silly in their own context, will not
be able to contend with the contexts which are able to describe more closely (less-incompletely)
what things a-are. The evolution of contexts consists in making them less-incomplete. In formal
systems a similar evolutionary (tending to pragmatic) criterium could be seen: the axioms
which support silly theorems are not useful, and that is why we then call them silly. If the
axioms and the theorems derived from them are useful in a context, we do not consider them
silly. But this is not a complete solution for the silly theorem problem. There is no complete
solution for the silly theorem problem (Or by saying this that is the solution?).
But silly ideas (for our context) are useful as well, because our ideas become stronger
when they neutralize them, and become less-incomplete if they contain them. There would not
be smart ideas without silly ones.
We can take advantage of the silly theorem problem, in order to define axioms after the
theorems, or contexts after ideas. For example, we might want such sets that A contains B, and
B contains A, but without A and B being equal. We would just need to define the proper
axioms. If this new set theory will be useful or silly is no reason for stopping, because we will
not know if it a-is silly or not, and we will know if it re-is silly only after we create it.
5. Incomplete Language
Not only silliness, but all adjectives can only be <used|applied> in a relative way,
dependant of a context. Language is relative as well. How can we speak about absolute being,
then? We can and we cannot. We speak about it, but in that moment it a-is relative.  For us,
it is and it is not-incomplete. But that we cannot completely speak about it, it is not a reason
to stop speaking about it (as Wittgenstein (1918) would early suggest in his Tractatus Logicus
Philosophicus), because we can incompletely represent its completeness... As Wittgenstein
himself (but not most of his followers...) realized, following the ideas in the Tractatus, we
would not be able to speak about anything... (languages are incomplete). Language is used
inside a context. Depending of this context the language will be different.
6. Incompleteness
If we cannot create complete systems, we should try to make them as less-incomplete
as possible. Since our systems are incomplete because they are finite, there is no way of
measuring the completeness of a system. It is like asking: how infinite is x, when x is a finite
number? We could also have a huge system, but if it is not related to the a-being of something,
it is not so useful as a small system which describes closely a part of what something a-is. So,
we could say that a system re-is less-incomplete as it approaches more the a-being.
But, for example, what is the a-being of the number four? We define numbers, so we
determine what they are. But this definition arises on our generalizations of what things a-are.
There a-is no number four, but we could say that there the number four a-is in things.
The a-being is far from materialism. Materialism re-is, and we cannot say for sure if
things a-are only materialistic or not, because we do not know what matter a-is.
So, getting back to the incompleteness of systems, they can approach the a-being as
much as we want to, but we <do not|will never> know what the a-being a-is. We could
measure the incompleteness of a system in a relative way, but I am not interested in defining
such a method. But we can see that a system will be less-incomplete if it contains others, even
the ones that (re-)“are wrong”. This is because a system which tries not only to explain why
things a-are, but also why other people thought it was something else will have a wider
perspective. Because people a-are not mistaken (nor right). There cannot be errors inside their
context (people do not create systems silly/mistaken for themselves). So, by containing as many
contexts as possible, we are also containing as many systems as possible. The great attempts
in science of unifying theories could be seen with these eyes. But for containing as many
contexts as we can, we are required to leave all hope of non contradiction behind, but I prefer
to do it for the sake of less-incompleteness. The non contradiction in systems is just a
prejudice. The systems are incomplete, so the contradictions are caused by their own limits.
Extending the system allows us to contain the paradoxes, and once we
<understand|comprehend> paradoxes, they stop being contradictory.
Perhaps the first reason for entering happily the realm of paradoxes and contradictions
is because we know that our systems are incomplete. This means that, even when they might
be valid for our present context, as our context enlarges, our systems sooner or later will not
2Is there such a thing as a “finished idea”???
be able to be consistent with all our context, as it has happened all through history. And also
because we are aware that people who do not share crucial parts of our context, they will not
agree with our systems. We are predicting the failure of our systems outside our context (as
1+1=2 in a decimal context, but 1+1=10 in a binary context) by perceiving its limits. This
means that we are predicting that someone will say: “Your system is wrong” (related to his
incompatible context). But by saying this, he proves that we were right. But people inside our
context will say: “You (re)are right”, which as our context evolves will prove to be “wrong” (or
less-incompletely speaking, “less-incomplete”). This is a paradox. But this paradox makes us
less-incomplete, because we are containing the contexts of the people who say “You are
wrong”. Our theory will re-be true and false at the same time (related to different contexts),
but it will always re-be true and false at the same time, as compared with theories which now
claim to “be” true, without admitting that outside their context they might re-be false.
We should not only seek for the truth or falsity or indeterminacy of an idea, because
these are relative (absolute truth (and falsity) is unreachable (but we can approximate as much
as we want to)) but for its less-incompleteness. This less-incompleteness is also relative, based
on our beliefs (one could argue that a small context could be more close to the a-being than
another one which contains it, but this cannot be discussed, just believed).
A less-incomplete theory should contain theories which are not wrong, but incomplete
in our context (i.e. myths, religions, dogmas, etc...). To be against something is useful, but it is
more useful to contain both (<A> and <Anti-A>'s). For example, a less-incomplete political
theory should contain socialism and capitalism, despotism and anarchism, dictatorship and
democracy, fascism and republic, communism and terrorism... At least, understanding why
each one exists and because of what, and for what each one is more suitable; take the things
WE need from them, reject the rest, add a bit of sugar, mix it for five minutes (or until the
foam is assimilated), and you have another utopia! If you know the rules of the game, you can
change them...
6.1. Neutrosophy and Incompleteness
Neutrosophy, as other systems, embraces the spirit just described: attempting to contain
as most contexts as possible, even when they are contradictory, for attempting to be as less-
incomplete as possible. But of course Neutrosophy itself predicts its own decay. It is not the
non plus ultra. It is not finished2. But <we cannot|there is no need to> go further now because
it fills successfully our contexts.
For example, we could add more values (concepts) to a (Neutrosophic) vector than
True, Indeterminate, and False. We just need to define them... (e.g. {T, I, F, T^I, T^F, I^F,
T^I^F, ~[T|I|F]}) How useful it is this? Someone might ask the same about T, I and F.
Why not only T & F, or only F. It depends on the context we are, on the things we need. Logics
are just a tool. It depends on what we want to do that we need to make a different tool (of
course, there is no “ultimate” tool). Since Neutrosophy is also based in axioms, it is also
incomplete.
<A> is finite, but <Neut-A> is infinite. Therefore, the ideas will evolve infinitely.
There are infinite <Anti-A>'s, each one related to a different context (Reference System in
Smarandache (1995)). The values/ranges of truth, indeterminacy and falsity (T. I. F.), and  are
dynamic, relative to a context, and there are infinite contexts, so about any event, there are
infinite number of Neutrosophic values/ranges, and any context a-is also infinite (it cannot be
completely described, as well as the event) Which one is the more representative? The answer
to this question is also related to a context! All the “answers” are related to a context, closed,
finite... the interesting thing is that all questions seem to be open and infinite... so they can be
answered in an infinitude of different (incomplete) ways.
If <A> is combined with <Anti-A>'s, let's suppose it evolves into <Neut-A>. But this
is infinite, so it would not be completely <Neut-A>, but as noted by Smarandache (1995),
<Neo-A>. Each step/cycle the idea is less-incomplete, but there will always be an infinitude
of <Anti-A>'s, and an unreachable <Neut-A>... From a smaller context, <Neo-A> would
look just as the old <A>?
7.Contextuality
Things re-are in dependence of their context. Since there is an infinitude of contexts,
things can re-be in an infinitude of ways. It is only inside a specific context, which we can speak
about the truth or falsity or indeterminacy of a proposition.
7.1. Context-dependant logic
Every proposition P can only have a truth value (or vectors) in dependence of a context
C. This truth value/vector is relative to the context C. Propositions have only sense (in the sense
of Frege (1892)) inside a context(s). Propositions have no sense without a context.
The truth values/vectors of a given proposition can change with context. So, for example
“This proposition is false” has a value of 0.5 in Lukaciewicz logic, [1,1] in multidimensional
logic, (1,1,1) in Neutrosophic Logic, and “?!” in Aristotelean logic. Or, the proposition “The
king of France wears a wig” would be, in terms of multidimensional logic, nor true nor false
([0,0]) in the XXth century context, but true ([1,0]) in the context of the 1st of January of 1700.
We are just indicating the limits of logics. Logics are just tools. They are useful only
inside a context. The context determines the logic. If a proposition goes beyond the context,
the logic developed in the context will not be able to contain it (but not necessarily vice versa).
7.2. Derivations of contextuality
Since all <Anti-A>'s of <A> are related to a reference point, we can find all reference
points so that all the elements of <Neut-A> are contradictory with <A> (and later with
themselves...). This is, any element of <Neut-A> can be potentially <Anti-A>, you just need
to have a reference point.
There will always a-be injustice, because this one is relative. Since different people have
different contexts (or we can use the word Seelenzustand (soul state), to refer to the personal
context, to distinguish from a general context)... So, since people have different
Seelenzustandes, we cannot speak of absolute justice, so things will be just for the people with
power... The less-catastrophic panorama (and most naive...) would be that the people in the
power would have the less-incomplete Seelenzustandes, trying to contain and understand as
many Seelenzustandes as they can, so, if they are just, in spite their relativity, they will be just
as well for all the people whose Seelenzustandes they contain.
If ideas are different in each Seelenzustand... well, they might have many similarities,
but on the other hand there is the problem of language representing ideas.... one can quote the
words of another in another context to communicate different ideas... but the “problem” of
language is a different story... (“In Philosophy there are no problems, just opinions (like this
one)”)
All adjectives are relative. Thus, we can find “opposite” (related to a reference point)
adjectives for the same object from different perspectives. (What is wrong from one
perspective is right from another, what is beauty-ugliness, good-bad, complex-simple,
complicated-simple, complicated-non-complicated, etc...). Are there adjectives which do not
behave this way?
8. Metacontextuality
Following the ideas exposed above, we can argue that, in order to be less-incomplete,
we need to strive for a metacontextuality, containing as many contexts as possible. We believe
this is the only way we have to approach to the a-being more than we already have, but of
course there might be other ways, and the proposed way will not be definite.
This does not mean that we will agree with “silly” ideas. This means that instead of just
declaring them silly and forgetting about them, we will try to understand what led people to
have such ideas, in order to try to see which perspective of the a-being they had. Then our
perspective will be greater than if we would just ignore the ideas we do not agree with.
We are tied to a context, a relative one. This is because there re-are no basic elements
from where we can build the rest of our world. There are only more complexity and
indeterminism in the entrails of the subatomic particles and quarks. There a-is no essence in
the universe, because everything is related. Everything a-is for and because of everything.
Everything is based on everything. It is naive to try to justify the world once we are already on
it. Everything is a condition of everything.  Otherwise, it would not be AS IT IS.
Therefore everything can re-be seen in terms of everything (just as a Turing Machine
(Turing, 1936) can represent all computations (and computations can represent Turing
Machines)). There a-is no base. Everything can re-be a base.
Metacontextuality, as the one Neutrosophy and other currents strive for, by
consequence predicts tolerance. This is, if we try to contain as much contexts as possible, we will
be able to be less intolerant to contexts and Seelenzustandes that are neglected from absolutist
non contradictory points of view. And this tolerance should be able to prevent many conflicts.
But may metacontextuality lead to indifference? This is, since everything can re-be
depending on a specific context, does it matter which context we choose? I believe that this
might be avoided if we put reason on its place, leaving place for experience and beliefs. Anyway
this issue should not be disregarded.
9. Conclusions
I believe that the question “Do you believe in an absolute reality/truth?” is on the same
level as “Do you believe in God?”. This is, the question is completely metaphysical... And
relative truths are incomplete. Should we keep searching for truth of things? I believe now it
would be more useful to search for the less-incompleteness of things. This can be achieved by
enlarging our contexts, containing as many contexts as we can.
Our limits are the ones we set to ourselves. We need only to take the blindfolding of our
prejudices in order to attempt a metacontextuality. And Neutrosophy bravely does this. If the
ideas exposed here, and the ones of Neutrosophy, are not assimilated by our society, this will
be because the society does not need them. This is, it “functions” based precisely on the partial
blindness of the individuals. Then, should we try to help everyone to open their eyes? We
already are doing so, they will open their eyes only if they want to.
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The Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy, introduced by Florentin Smarandache in 
1980, which studies the origin, nature and scope of neutralities, as well as their interactions with 
different ideational spectra.  Neutrosophy considers a proposition, theory, event, concept, or entity, 
<A> A in relation to its opposite, <Anti-A>, A and that which is not <A>, <Non-A>, and that which is 
neither <A> A nor <Anti—A>, denoted by <Neut—A>.  Neutrosophy serves as the basis for the 
Neutrosophic Logic (NL) or Smarandache’s logic, which is a general framework for the unification of 
all existing logics.  The main idea of NL is to characterize each logical statement in a 3D 
Neutrosophic Space, where each dimension of the space represents respectively the truth (T), the 
falsehood (F), and the indeterminacy (I) of the statement under consideration, where T, I, and F are 
standard or non-standard real subsets of ]-0, 1+[.  Moreover, in NL each statement is allowed to be 
over or under true, over or under false, and over or under indeterminate by using hyper real 
numbers developed in the non-standard analysis theory.  The neutrosophical value N(A) = (T(A), 
I(A), F(A)) in a frame of discernment (world of discourse) 1  of a statement <A> A is then defined as a 
subset (a volume, not necessary connective; i.e. a set of disjoint volumes) of the neutrosophic space.  
Any statement <A>, represented by a triplet N(A),  ) is called a neutrosophic event or N- event.  […]  
This Smarandache’s representation is close to the human reasoning.  It characterizes and catches the 
imprecision of knowledge or linguistic inexactitude received by various observers, uncertainty due to 
incomplete knowledge of acquisition errors or stochasticity, and vagueness due to lack of clear 
contours or limits.  This approach allows theoretically to consider any kinds of logical statements.  
For example, the fuzzy set logic or the classical modal logic (which works with statements verifying 
T(A), I(A)/0, F(A)= 1-T(A), where T  is a real number belonging to [0, 1]) are included in NL.  The 
neutrosophic logic can easily handle also paradoxes.  We emphasize the fact that in general the 
neutrosohic value N(A)  ) of a proposition <A> can also depend on dynamical parameters which can 
evolve with time, space, etc.  
 
[…] the foundations for a new theory of paradoxical and plausible reasoning [i.e. Dezert-
Smarandache Theory, ref. n.] has been developed, that takes into account in the combination process 
itself the possibility for uncertain and paradoxical information.  The basis for the development of this 
theory is to work with the hyper-power set of the frame of discernment relative to the problem under 
consideration rather than its classical power set since, in general, the frame of discernment cannot be 
fully described in terms of an exhaustive and exclusive list of disjoint elementary hypotheses.  In such 
general case, no refinement is possible to apply directly the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) of 
evidence.  In our new theory [i.e. DSmT, ref. n.], the rule of combination is justified from the 
maximum entropy principle and there is no mathematical impossibility to combine sources of 
evidence even if they appear at first glance in contradiction (in the Shafer’s sense) since the paradox 
between sources is fully taken into account in our formalism.  We have also shown that in general, 
the combination of evidence yields unavoidable paradoxes. 
This theory has shown, through many illustrated examples, that conclusion drawn from it provides 
results which agree perfectly with the human reasoning and is useful to take a decision on complex 
problems where DST usually fails.  […] this work has been devoted to the development of a 
theoretical bridge between the neutrosophic logic and this new theory, in order to solve the delicate 
problem of the combination of neutrosophic evidences.  The neutrosophic logic serves here as the 
most general framework (prerequisite) for dealing with uncertain and paradoxical sources of 
information through this new theory. 
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